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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE TASKS OF ECONOMIC STATESMANSHIP IN THE WORLD TODAY

AMONG the problems that the free world is facing, the increasing of its economic and financial strength is second only to the maintenance of its political and military supremacy. Indeed, as the free world enters the era of "competitive coexistence" with Russia and the countries in Russia's orbit, the issue of its economic and financial strength under armed peace comes into the foreground.

The free world, it is true, is enjoying unprecedented prosperity, and the economies of most of the free nations are inherently much stronger than in the earlier post-war years, domestically as well as internationally. Yet the rebuilding of efficient and resilient economies, not to mention the further advance toward freer and more multilateral world trade and payments, is once more being impaired by renewed inflationary pressures. Sterling, in which nearly half of the world's trade is conducted, is again experiencing difficulties. To be sure, remedial action, largely monetary, has been taken in many countries to reëstablish a more nearly sustainable balance, but much remains to be done to restore and permanently secure such a balance. This, therefore, is a good time to weigh the elements of strength and weakness in the free world's economy and the difficult and delicate tasks challenging the economic statesmanship of the free nations.[1]

I

The free world has moved a long way since the earlier post-war years when the so-called "dollar shortage" was measured in billions and the need for America's financial aid in many countries

[1] The views stated here are those of the writer and do not purport to reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

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was desperate. The chief reason why international payments difficulties appeared then as essentially a dollar problem was that Western Europe, with its associated overseas currency areas, was unable to secure from its own output sufficient foodstuffs, raw materials, and industrial goods to match its greatly increased needs. Besides, Western Europe was receiving far less than before the war from Eastern Europe, the Far East, and Latin America; and, so far as it was possible for this reduction in supplies to be made good elsewhere, it was done through imports from the United States and Canada. These and other shifts in trade accounted for much of the "dollar shortage".

Far from demonstrating the prevalence of an intractable "disequilibrium", the post-war "dollar shortage" thus was, for the most part, a sign of the large rehabilitation and reconstruction outlays by Western Europe and its associated overseas currency areas, and of the free gifts and loans made by the United States and Canada to speed up the post-war recovery. From 1946 through 1953, the United States, through gifts and loans, transferred to the rest of the world 33 billion dollars' worth of goods and services, excluding military supplies; this was equal to more than one fourth of all United States exports during these years. By 1953, however, the recipients of American aid had succeeded in greatly increasing their own output and in restoring a large measure of fiscal and monetary order, and as a result the "dollar shortage" has disappeared. Even though inflationary strains and balance-of-payments difficulties have reëmerged in certain countries and areas—these are among the elements of recent weakness that I shall discuss later—the improvement achieved in international payments has been truly remarkable. The present payments difficulties of the United Kingdom—a compound of the inflationary rise in demand in Britain and certain overseas sterling countries and of speculative pressures against the pound—are by no means as acute as during the earlier crises of 1947, 1949 and 1951, and must not therefore be allowed to obscure the fundamental improvement in international payments.

This improvement was basically the outcome of the growth in output and productivity in the nondollar world and of the redirection of world trade. In Western Europe, industrial production stands about 70 per cent higher than before the war; and

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agricultural and mineral output has likewise reached record levels. Although the rise in the gross national product has not been as striking as in industrial output, and although allowance must be made for the increase in population, Western Europe's recovery has been much faster and greater than after the First World War.

In other regions, record levels of agricultural and mineral output have likewise been reached, and industrialization has proceeded fast. This has been in part the outcome of official development expenditures so far undertaken, but the influence of a high level of world demand, which in turn induced a growing volume of private investment, must also be recognized. Export prices have necessarily continued to fluctuate, and price variations have been wide for certain agricultural products like coffee; but prices have remained favorable by any earlier standards except those of the world-wide commodity boom that followed the Korean outbreak in mid-1950. The demand for primary commodities has remained high because of the sustained level of business activity in the United States and other principal markets. The volume of investment in both the public and the private sectors has never been larger, and machinery and other equipment have become more readily obtainable in the industrial countries. However, economic development has not always been as great as might be hoped, and has often been distorted by inflation; furthermore, in view of the rapidly increasing population and with levels of per capita consumption remaining in many areas below pre-war levels in spite of all that has been done, the free world must not be complacent about its achievements. The reëmergence of agricultural surpluses, noted later, is another weak spot in the world economy today.

Nevertheless, as agricultural, mineral and industrial output has expanded to all-time record levels, most nondollar countries have been able gradually to replace the abnormal post-war imports from the United States by their own output or by imports from nondollar sources. Their own exports, on the other hand, have also risen substantially. These trends can best be illustrated by a few figures. In 1955, the volume of world trade (outside the USSR and the countries in its orbit) was about 55

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per cent larger than before the war; most of this increase has taken place since 1948. At the same time, the abnormally large proportion of world exports supplied by the United States and Canada has gradually declined—from 30 per cent of the total in 1948 to about 20 per cent of the much larger total in 1955 (excluding goods supplied under military aid programs). Another notable development has been the expansion of exports by the industrial countries of Western Europe: while the dollar value of aggregate world exports has increased by 55 per cent since 1948, that of Western Europe has risen by 130 per cent.

Chart I



These and other factors are best summed up in the trends of gold and dollar holdings of foreign countries, which are illustrated in Chart I. Such holdings had been depleted by 6.0 billion dollars between December 1945 and September 1949, the date of the world-wide currency readjustments; but they rose by 11.8 billion dollars between September 1949 and December 1955, when they stood 92 per cent above the pre-war level. Of these

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11.8 billion dollars, 2.6 billion accrued from new foreign gold production (probably including some gold acquired from Russia), while 9.2 billion can be accounted for by transactions with the United States as well as with international financial institutions, whose dollars were of course derived principally from the subscriptions by the United States government or borrowing in the United States. The gold and dollar acquisitions resulting from transactions of foreign countries with the United States have been the outcome of a number of factors, some fundamental, like those already mentioned, and some temporary or merely accidental, like those on which I shall comment below among the elements of weakness; but these temporary or accidental factors cannot hide the fundamental improvement in international payments.

The rise in gold and dollar holdings was, it is true, somewhat smaller last year (1.6 billion dollars) than in 1954 (1.9 billion) and 1953 (2.7 billion); but international payments are much freer today, and this, too, is a fundamental element of strength. The lower rate at which foreign countries acquired gold and dollars from the United States last year was due importantly to the great rise in their purchases from the United States—a rise larger than that in imports by the United States. More particularly, countries that have relaxed their dollar-import restrictions, like West Germany, the Netherlands, the Union of South Africa, and to a smaller degree the United Kingdom, are importing considerably more dollar goods than two or three years ago; to a lesser extent, this is also true of other countries in Europe and elsewhere.

Sterling in particular is much freer today than in 1953. In the United Kingdom, most raw materials and foodstuffs can now be imported without discrimination, while in South Africa there is no trade discrimination whatever and in other sterling countries a substantial part of imports may be purchased from the cheapest sources, without preference having to be given to non-dollar currencies. The remaining dollar discrimination in the sterling area, even though not negligible, is relatively small in comparison with the area's total imports. Furthermore, because of the widening in early 1954 of the transferable-account

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area to include almost all nonsterling nondollar countries, transferable sterling can be used for payments to and from practically all nondollar countries, and can be converted at the official rate into all currencies except those of the dollar area; large segments of international trade and payments have thereby been made multilateral. Since early 1955, transferable sterling, which previously could be converted into dollars only at a considerable discount, has in effect been convertible at a rate within 1 per cent of the official sterling-dollar rate. All this must be kept uppermost in our minds in judging the area's present conditions and prospects. It is particularly notable that, despite the area's renewed payments difficulties, there has been, with the principal exception of Australia, no relapse into the more stringent trade and payments controls that had characterized the earlier post-war years.

The economies of much of the free world are thus inherently much stronger than only a few years ago. Many countries are, however, still facing great economic and financial difficulties, domestic as well as international, which may well give rise to many doubts about the advance thus far made toward freer trade and payments.

II

Among these doubts, I may allude, to start with, to the fact that the closing of the dollar gap has taken place in an environment in which the productive efficiency of most European industries, and Europe's ability to live in a more competitive world, have not yet been tested fully. Most of the dollar liberalization has so far been concentrated on raw materials and certain foodstuffs; indeed, its main purpose has been to cheapen such imports and thereby exert a downward pressure on domestic prices. The cheaper dollar imports have actually helped to improve the terms of trade and lower the manufacturing costs of certain European industrial countries; but these countries have not yet encountered the competition of American manufactured goods in their own economies or in various sheltered markets. Altogether apart from the discriminatory import quotas, the tariffs in a number of countries isolate various domestic industries more effectively than before the war. The ultimate reasons for

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trade restriction lie today as much in the desire to protect individual industries (and also agriculture, where social and strategic considerations are important) as in the state of the balance of payments.

Chart II


GOLD AND DOLLAR HOLDINGS OF SELECTED FOREIGN AREAS
Billions of U.S. dollars
Billions of U.S. dollars
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
CONTINENTAL WESTERN EUROPE *
STERLING AREA
LATIN AMERICA †
ASIA †
CANADA
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
* Continental members of the OEEC -- i.e., including Turkey, but excluding Spain and Finland; holdings of the Bank for International Settlements for the European Payments Union, as well as for its own account, are included.
† Excluding sterling, French-franc, and Dutch-guilder areas.
Note: Holdings include official gold reserves (reported or estimated), and official and private dollar holdings as reported by banks in the United States. Dollar holdings consist almost wholly of sight and time deposits, United States Government securities (Treasury bills and certificates of indebtedness, and a limited amount of longer-term Government notes and bonds reported as purchased within twenty months of maturing), and bankers acceptances; in addition, there is a small amount of commercial paper and of liabilities payable in foreign currencies

The second reason for skepticism is the very uneven distribution among foreign countries of the post-war rise in the gold and dollar holdings. (See Chart II.) The largest gain has been made

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by Continental Western Europe—7.2 billion dollars from September 1949 to the end of 1955, with France and West Germany the principal beneficiaries but Italy and the Netherlands also showing sizable increases. Canada's holdings of gold and United States dollars have likewise risen (by 1.2 billion dollars); the strength of Canada's international economic position was also reflected during most of the recent years in the premium at which the Canadian dollar stood over the United States dollar. Outside of Continental Western Europe and Canada, however, the rise in gold and dollar holdings has, at best, been moderate. The aggregate gold and official and private dollar holdings of the sterling countries stood only 1.3 billion dollars higher in December 1955 than in September 1949, the post-war low; but they also were 1.3 billion lower than in June 1951, the post-war peak, and between June 1954, when the recent decline started, and December 1955 they fell by 900 million dollars. Central gold and official dollar holdings of the United Kingdom as the area's banker showed a broadly similar trend but, at 2,385 million in June 1956, they were undoubtedly too low for a country with England's external obligations and its commitments to invest abroad.

The gold and dollar holdings of nonsterling Asian countries and of Latin America have risen, but within each group the distribution of the rise has been very uneven; the holdings of some countries have actually declined. At the end of 1955, the holdings of nonsterling Asian countries stood at 1.0 billion dollars above September 1949 and those of Latin America 900 million above.

Altogether, therefore, only certain countries in Continental Western Europe, and Canada, have gold and dollar holdings that can be regarded as adequate. Even more important, the currencies of Continental Western Europe, essentially regional as they are, are collectively backed by gold and dollar reserves nearly four times as large as those supporting sterling, which, along with the United States dollar, is the world's key currency. Yet, conditions have, on the whole, been favorable to sterling, since world trade has been expanding and the terms of trade have not been too unfavorable to the sterling area.

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Another disturbing development is the persistence of Western Europe's dollar deficit on trade and other nonmilitary accounts; in 1955, this deficit amounted to 1.8 billion dollars. Some of Western Europe's rise in reserves has thus merely reflected—even though not in a simple and direct fashion—receipts of dollars under military and other aid programs of the United States. France in particular received sizable reimbursements for expenditures incurred in Indo-China; countries that do not receive direct aid have benefited indirectly from the flow of such dollars (for instance through the European Payments Union, of which France was at various times the largest deficit country). In addition, United States military expenditures abroad, which of course do not count as a form of aid, have likewise been important. These dollar receipts differ from normal commercial transactions, since they are based on strategic and military considerations rather than on private economic motives; but there is not much likelihood of their being terminated in any discernible future, even though they are likely to decline gradually.

The failure of the United Kingdom, and of the sterling area as a whole, to rebuild monetary reserves has been due in large measure to the persistent rise in demand for goods—for consumption as well as for investment in industrial plant and elsewhere—which has tended to outstrip available resources. It has thus led both to increased imports and to smaller exports than might otherwise have been achieved; as a result, balance-of-payments difficulties have reappeared, most recently in 1955. Sterling is, however, also one of the three main forms—with gold and the United States dollar—in which other countries hold their external liquid resources, whether as working balances for current trade or as currency reserves; Britain thus has large currency liabilities. Futhermore, sterling is vulnerable in the exchange markets whenever bankers, merchants and others go short of sterling, for instance by delaying to the last moment a necessary sterling purchase; pressures on sterling have occurred at times during recent years, and this tendency, too, has been an element of weakness.

Still other elements of uncertainty are of a political character.

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Among these are the future political status of Malaya—which, thanks to its rubber and tin earnings, is the largest single net contributor to the sterling area's dollar pool—and the future of the Middle Eastern oil, to mention but two examples. Furthermore, as the inevitable counterpart of its rôle in world affairs, Britain carries a burden of defense outlays far larger than could have been foreseen at the end of World War II; she has to be in a position to sustain this burden for a long time, and may even have to live with it indefinitely. A large portion of these outlays is in dollars; these political and strategic commitments—commitments that Germany and other Continental European nations except France do not have—may well make the difference between a precarious dollar balance and a surplus.

The United Kingdom, and also France and the Netherlands, have also been affected by the loss of much of their overseas investments; on the other hand, they have incurred large dollar indebtedness. The change in Britain's status from the world's greatest creditor to the world's greatest debtor has further increased the magnitude of the necessary adjustment in her balance of payments.

I have dwelt at some length on the elements of weakness that surround sterling, since the pound is a world currency, and in the long run will retain its international status only if it can hold its value and be freely used by people outside the United Kingdom. There are, however, still other elements of weakness, in the world at large, political as well as economic and financial. Conspicuous among them is the problem of agricultural surpluses—not only in the United States, but in many other countries as well. The possible impact upon their trade of the United States government measures for the disposal of agricultural surpluses is a matter of concern to many primary-producing countries.

Russia's offers to purchase surpluses of countries like Egypt (cotton), Burma (rice), Cuba (sugar), and Argentina (livestock) are other examples of the type of problems now coming up. These seemingly genuine business transactions may appear attractive to countries that are obviously glad to sell otherwise unsalable surpluses, but payment will be made in rubles (or

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other Soviet-bloc currencies) that the trading partners will be forced to use for Soviet-bloc goods that may be unsuitable, poor in quality, or overpriced by Western standards. The Western nations must not, however, be complacent about Russia's moves on the ground that they will necessarily defeat themselves.

III

These elements of weakness are deep-seated and disturbing. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the free world may be reasonably successful in building up efficient and resilient domestic economies, linked together by a smoothly working network of trade and payments. Looking backward to the state of chaos and the seemingly intractable problems of the early post-war years, and then comparing these with the half-way house that has been reached today, the free nations can, I think, feel encouraged; and, although the magnitude of the task ahead is appalling, there are reasons to hope that the undertaking begun years ago may not remain unfinished.

Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the problem is the growing awareness that there is no escape from economic necessity, since in the long run a country cannot consume or invest or spend for government purposes more than it produces; it can live beyond its means only so long as it spends its gold and foreign exchange reserves or receives loans and grants from abroad. Therefore, the only choice that exists is whether to equalize claims of consumption and investment with resources in a rational way, which will prevent inflation, or in a haphazard and economically and socially injurious way, which tolerates inflation; the equalization will have to be effected in the one way or in the other.

There is also a much greater awareness today than a few years ago of the economic and social costs of inflation, and of the relation of the surplus or deficit in a country's international payments to its management of its affairs at home. Only a few years ago it took as much courage to suggest, in certain countries, that a reduction in government spending, or in the rate of private or public investment, or in personal consumption, was desirable, as it took twenty-five years ago to state the case

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for a policy of economic expansion as a way out of the depression. Today, in contrast, many governments are endeavoring to impress upon public opinion the necessity for preventing consumption and investment from outstripping available resources, and thus stopping inflation and rehabilitating the currency. It is particularly noteworthy that not only the developed countries of Western Europe but also the developing countries in other parts of the world are now endeavoring to restore and maintain reasonable monetary stability. There are, of course, cases where monetary policy can do little, though the wrong policy can do a great deal to make matters worse. In countries that depend for a substantial part of their national income on the export of a few primary commodities whose prices are liable to sharp fluctuations, there are limits to what monetary policy by itself can do; this has been a serious problem for primary-producing countries. Another limitation upon monetary controls is the lack of developed money and capital markets.

The problem of reëstablishing a workable economic balance is still great in certain primary-producing countries where inflationary pressures have prevailed during most of the recent post-war years. On the other hand, Western Europe and Canada are undergoing inflationary strains and balance-of-payments difficulties that are marginal by any comparison with the earlier post-war years. The required reduction in the flow of spending appears therefore to be small, at least in aggregative terms. In Great Britain, for instance, what is required is an addition to exports, or a reduction in imports, or a combination of these, equivalent to about 1½ per cent of the gross national product.

Another encouraging sign is that the economies of Western European nations, though by no means as flexible as that of the United States, are more adaptable to changing circumstances than in the earlier post-war years. One of the most notable examples of adjustments in the pattern of production to meet changes in overseas demand is the very remarkable, though still insufficient, rise in Britain's exports amounting to two thirds in volume over pre-war exports. The increase in exports of metal and engineering products is particularly encouraging.

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Fully half of British exports now consist of such products; and, compared with those before the war, such exports have increased two and one-half times. It is, of course, for these products that there is the most sustained demand in world markets. The changes that Britain has made, and is still making, in her economy to meet this demand, even at the cost of cutting her own investment (as will be noted below), are just the type of adjustment that is required of a country dependent on foreign trade, if it is to reassert its position in a competitive world. Nevertheless, even so marked an expansion in exports has been inadequate to meet the demand for imports and the other claims on the United Kingdom's exchange resources.

There has also been a profound difference in the type of policies followed. During the earlier post-war years, in part because of the overhang of wartime inflation, most of the free nations relied principally on direct or physical controls over prices, allocation of materials and investment; but they have probably indulged, as the result of government deficit financing and bank lending to business, in more laissez faire with regard to redundant money than, at least in retrospect, appears to have been necessary. Today, the dynamic forces that alone can ensure a viable economy have been released while the necessary general controls over the economy are being exercised mainly through monetary policies. Furthermore, in countries with more developed money markets and banking systems, monetary policies are now working more strongly, and with a more powerful momentum, than at any time during the post-war years. Not only have the official discount rates been raised since early 1955 in sixteen foreign countries—sometimes to the highest levels since the war or even, as in England, to the highest level since the early thirties—but they have also greatly gained in power as a monetary policy instrument since 1950–52, the last previous phase of monetary restraint. Rigid central bank support of government bonds also has been abandoned, and much less reliance is being placed on selective credit controls (except for the revived consumer credit controls). The British Chancellor of the Exchequer's call upon the banks in July 1955 to effect "a positive and significant reduction to their

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advances" was, it is true, a reversion to the method of specific controls; but unlike the earlier official requests which had been qualitative—that is, in terms of the purposes of the proposed borrowing—this particular request was basically quantitative in nature, designed to speed up a remedial action that itself was of a general or quantitative character. Money has thus been made not only dearer but also scarcer, and this has been accomplished primarily through the traditional method of acting directly on the credit base. These and other features of general monetary restraint are a measure of the firmness of the new monetary policy.

The test to which monetary policy is currently being subjected is, however, very severe. In the past, many countries have been, at times, too ready to tolerate a higher volume of demand for goods than their overloaded economies could meet. As the British Chancellor of the Exchequer pointed out recently, the most "interesting clue" to Britain's economy is that "in the eight years from 1946 to 1954 we turned out 26 per cent more goods and services, but we paid ourselves 80 per cent more money for doing it." Of this 80 per cent of "more money", the largest portion was in wages and salaries; wage restraint is therefore an indispensable accompaniment of monetary restraint, more particularly since monetary conditions are closely linked to wages.

Furthermore, monetary policy, directed at restricting spending in the private sector of the economy, has not always been accompanied by a reduction in government outlays, including those of the nationalized enterprises, or by tax raises to help counter the excess demand for goods. In present-day economies, characterized by much larger government sectors than before the war, such lack of appropriate fiscal action has often impaired the efficacy of monetary policy. It is notable, therefore, that some measures taken this year in England were specifically aimed at reducing the spending in the government sector. Another difficulty has been the tendency in a number of countries, particularly in Scandinavia and until quite recently also in England, to soften the impact of the rise in interest rates in so far as it affects residential housing.

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A still further difficulty of monetary policy, even where aided by fiscal policy, is in making it induce a shift in the use of the productive resources, of the type required in a country like Britain. The main reliance is being placed on drawing down stocks and cutting new investment in plant and equipment. But stocks cannot be reduced below certain levels if efficient production is not to be impaired; hence most of the retrenchment will have to fall on new fixed investment. The difficulty, to be sure, is not that British investment is too high by any absolute standards (it had been, on the contrary, too low for decades) or that British production is too low (it is one of the highest per capita in the world), but that room has not been made for investment by reducing consumption and government expenditures. Consumption is now to be cut somewhat, but the brunt of the retrenchment will fall on fixed investment, as in 1947, 1949 and 1951. The diverting of resources from new investment thus involves a painful sacrifice in terms of viability prospects, but is, in the short run, a political and economic necessity. It has also the immediate advantage of enabling Britain to increase, in not too distant a future, her exports of machinery and equipment. Delays in deliveries and a lack of incentive to seek export markets, which are by-products of inflation, seem to have accounted, more than excessive costs, for Britain's failure to increase her exports further in an expanding world market.

IV

Another ground for reasonable hope in the ability of the free nations to build up efficient national economies is what may be regarded as the fairly satisfactory state of the economic relationships of the United States with the other parts of the free world. Among these relationships, I would emphasize the steady growth in United States output and hence in imports, as well as the record of United States trade policy which, despite many difficulties, has not been one of retreat.

The rôle of the United States in the world economy is, of course, more important than that of any other single country; but, contrary to assertions made in many quarters in the earlier post-war years, the world economy is not entirely dominated

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by the United States. Whenever America sneezed, the rest of the world was expected to catch pneumonia. So it seemed, indeed, in 1949 when a drop in industrial output in the United States preceded world-wide balance-of-payments disturbances; even then, however, this inference was not quite justified since the principal nondollar currencies were undoubtedly out of line with the United States dollar. When in 1951 similar disturbances occurred, at a time when American output and income were rising, it became clear that it was not the behavior of the United States, but rather factors indigenous to other parts of the world—which by then had "outinflated" the United States—that were primarily responsible for renewed balance-of-payments difficulties. Then came 1953, but, despite the mild recession in the United States, expansion continued in Western Europe and much of the rest of the world. Actually, industrial production in countries outside North America—equivalent to about two thirds of North American output—continued to rise at a rate that offset the drop in North American output, with the result that the level of world industrial production as a whole was maintained despite the American recession. This experience has shown that many foreign economies have become resilient enough to adjust themselves to moderate fluctuations in the level of business activity in the United States.

The United States has absorbed during recent years a growing volume of imports. The recession in the United States from October 1953 to September 1954, which was marked by a contraction of about 2.5 per cent in gross national product and 7 per cent in industrial output, was accompanied, it is true, by a decline in imports of 9 per cent in volume, but even during the year ended September 1954, prior to the sharp recovery that began at that time, United States imports were 20 per cent larger in volume than as recently as 1949. Moreover, from the third quarter of 1954 to the last quarter of 1955, imports rose about 30 per cent in volume.

An even more significant development of recent years has been a steady advance in United States imports of finished manufactures. The value of these imports increased from 960 million dollars in 1950 to some 1,800 million in 1955. Of this

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increase, over half represented purchases from Western Europe. The rise in imports of manufactured products has greatly contributed to the better international balance that has emerged. Nevertheless, our imports cannot be regarded as especially high in terms of the gross national product: today they are less than 3 per cent of the goods and services that the country is producing—a considerably smaller proportion than in the twenties.

The trade policy of the United States has likewise been important. Trade policy is necessarily a compromise between many economic and other forces; if we look, however, not at the "victories" and "defeats" in the contests over foreign trade policy, but at long-term trends, there has been a real continuity in our trade program since the mid-thirties. Once again in 1955 the Trade Agreement Act was extended and amended so as to provide increased authority for tariff negotiations; under this authority, the United States has negotiated, in the fourth round of tariff negotiations under the auspices of GATT, for further reciprocal tariff concessions over the next three years. Perhaps even more significant, the so-called "escape clause", under which the Tariff Commission can make recommendations to the President for higher tariff rates on the ground of injury to domestic industry, has been invoked in 62 cases since it became law in 1948; but only 16 of these cases were approved by the Commission, and of the latter's recommendations the President rejected 10 and put only 6 into effect. Statistically, this is not a bad record; and, even though the individual tariff increases that were finally effected threatened to cut deeply into the exports of the foreign countries concerned, in at least the two most publicized cases—watch movements and bicycles—the actual effect has been negligible. It may be added that consideration of national defense had apparently a bearing on the increased duty on imported watch movements; in the bicycle case, the actual tariff rise was held to less than initially recommended on the grounds, worth stressing here, that foreign producers and American importers had, by their "ingenuity and resourceful efforts", created an American market for lightweight bicycles. This stand, which should help allay the

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reluctance of other foreign manufacturers to undertake similar export efforts in this country, was unfortunately lost sight of in the criticism that once more the "escape clause" had been invoked against successful imports; and some damage was done to the much-needed understanding between the United States and its trading partners.

Much else could be said about the record of United States trade policy—among other things, that although many tariffs are high and many of our customs procedures are slow and cumbersome, many other United States tariffs are low and more than half of our imports enter free of duty. Even more important, however, is the increased awareness, both here and abroad, that there are very definite limits to what can be accomplished by further tariff reduction alone; and that what matters more than tariffs is the rising level of employment and incomes in the United States, which in turn calls for larger imports. The full answer to the question of what the United States can best contribute to international balance is therefore a continuing expansion of imports—which are now at the highest level ever recorded—in response to the growth of the American economy.

For several decades, there has been little experience for any considerable period of time with United States tariffs under conditions that might be regarded as more or less normal. The Trade Agreement Act was enacted during the depression, and the outbreak of war disrupted the new trade pattern that was then arising as a result of the many tariff reductions. Tariffs were further reduced after the war, but the earlier post-war years, and again the years immediately following the Korean war, were likewise abnormal. It is only today that the free world—including the United States—can begin forming a judgment on how American trade policy is actually working.

V

The strains and stresses in world trade and payments today thus differ fundamentally from the "dollar shortage" that plagued the free world during the earlier post-war years. The earlier inflations and the balance-of-payments predicaments

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had arisen because of the transition from wartime destruction and post-war distortion in trade and payments; in contrast, today's problems are for the most part the inevitable accompaniment of rapid economic growth of dynamic economies that have not yet learned how to maintain a high level of employment without at the same time giving rise to inflationary pressures and balance-of-payments deficiencies.

For this very reason, payments difficulties are no longer world-wide in scope and character. For this reason, too, they can be dealt with primarily by the countries concerned, on their own initiative and responsibility. We want, to be sure, a balance in international accounts at a level of living standards that will be socially and politically endurable; but it should be possible, I think, to achieve this with output and productivity at record levels in much of the world and—at least in the developed countries—much higher per capita than before World War II. The speeding-up of economic development in the less-developed countries of the free world, on the other hand, will require aid by all other free nations capable of maintaining a large export surplus and of providing resources for foreign investment. The principal contribution that the United States can make is for it to pursue economic policies that will facilitate the attainment and maintenance by the other free-world countries of a sustainable balance in their international payments at a high level of employment, income, and standard of living. Along these lines, the steadily rising volume of imports in response to growing output and the basic continuity in the United States trade policy, together with a long-range programming of economic aid now considered by the Administration, hold much promise.

Much more is, however, at stake than a further step-by-step advance toward freer and more multilateral trade and payments along the lines of the policies of recent years. It is important that the earlier momentum be not lost; but at a time when Russia and the countries in her orbit have entered into "competitive coexistence" with the free world, it is even more essential that the free nations reassert their willingness to reduce trade barriers further among themselves and speed up the eco-

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nomic growth of the less-developed regions. The free world consists, of course, of many sovereign nations, each with its own aspirations and its own way of life. Because of the political and atomic stalemate among the Great Powers, many of these nations, in Western Europe, as well as in Asia and Africa, are unwilling to commit themselves politically; they are, however, fully aware that the threat to their independence comes from Russia, and are therefore anxious to strengthen their economic and cultural ties with the United States. This calls, I think, for a much greater stress on trade among the free nations and on other economic aspects of their relationships. At this particular juncture, therefore, it seems of utmost importance to unite the economies of the free world into a smoothly working and, as far as is feasible today, self-sustaining network. Not only the well-being of each nation but also the political and military strength of the entire free world depend importantly upon countering Russia's attempts at economic penetration by re-creating as close an economic and financial unity as possible.

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ANDREW JACKSON AND THE JUDICIARY

IN 1822, protesting a recent attack on the judiciary, a future President of the United States wrote to his nephew, "the constitution is worth nothing and a mere buble [*sic*] except guaranteed to them by an independent and virtuous judiciary."[1] President Jackson is not remembered as a great defender of "an independent and virtuous judiciary" but instead has gained notoriety and fame for the legendary statement, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." Because this statement appears with bothersome regularity in studies of our constitutional past, it seems appropriate to reinvestigate Jackson's views on the place of the judiciary in our governmental system.

Reëxamination of Jackson's attitude toward the judiciary reveals more than the defiance historians have associated with Jackson's conflict with John Marshall during the famous Georgia controversy. Jackson's attitude was ambivalent and to some extent contradictory. He was defiant, but mixed with his defiance were two other significant elements: the belief that the executive was independent of judicial control in certain situations and an attitude of deep-rooted respect for the judicial function in others. The President did not try to resolve his ambivalence, although in retrospect all three components of his attitude—defiance, independence and respect—were based on the shifting constitutional sands of the separation of powers.

Respect for the Marshall court was not a part of the Jacksonian creed. The Jacksonians, as lineal descendants of the Jeffersonians, were vigorous critics of the federal judiciary, and Jackson's election in 1828 was in part a popular repudiation of the institutional aggrandizement of the judicial branch. All Americans revered the Constitution but worship of the document did not presuppose worship of the Supreme Court

[1] Andrew Jackson to Andrew Jackson Donelson, July 5, 1822, *The Correspondence of Andrew Jackson* (Washington, 1926–1935), III, 167 (hereinafter cited as *Correspondence*).

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or the Chief Justice, whose nationalism, according to Jackson men, threatened the sovereignty of the states. There is no evidence, however, that the President shared the extreme hostility of many of his lieutenants, and at no time did he cooperate with their proposals for drastic judicial reform.

Before discussing the President's attitude in specific instances it is necessary to mention the rôle which personal feelings played in contributing to an antagonistic environment. Jackson certainly objected to the institutional imbalance resulting from the Court's aggressiveness under John Marshall, but his displeasure was as much personal as institutional. It is a mistake to confuse Jackson's lack of esteem for John Marshall with presidential hostility toward the judiciary.

The famous statement reads, "John Marshall has made his decision . . .", not "The Supreme Court has made its decision. . . ." As a republican, Jackson could be expected to frown upon the Chief Justice as a symbol of centralization, but his republican objections were far outdistanced by his attitude toward Marshall the man. Marshall had offended Jackson in the campaign of 1828 by siding with Clay and Adams. Jackson was personally affronted and believed Marshall had gone beyond the bounds of "non-partisanship". In 1828 Marshall allegedly declared, "should Jackson be elected, I shall look upon the government as virtually dissolved," and stated his intention to vote for the first time in twenty years to contribute to Jackson's defeat. His subsequent denial of this report did little to assuage the mercurial Jackson, for Marshall publicly admitted

> having said in private that though I had not voted since the establishment of the general ticket system and had believed that I should never vote during its continuance, I might probably depart from my resolution in this instance, from the strong sense I felt of the injustice of the charge of corruption against the President and the Secretary of State.[2]

Such statements were not calculated to evoke presidential sympathy. Thus Jackson's personal resentment toward Marshall was compounded with a prejudice against the federal

[2] Albert J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall* (Boston, 1919), I, 463–464.

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judiciary among some of his advisers to produce an environment that was, superficially at least, unfriendly to the courts. The personal factor, Marshall's nationalism, and the President's view of the separation of powers and the nature of the Union were mixed together in opposition and accord in the whirlpool of events in the 1830's. The result was not simple hostility but a more complex equation of defiance, independence and respect.

Presidential Defiance: The Georgia Controversy

One of the most explosive problems in John Quincy Adams' bequest to his successor was the Indian question in the South and Southwest. The storm center was in Georgia, where the Governor and legislature exhibited increasing resistance to Adams' efforts to enforce treaties with the Indians. Jackson was known to be sympathetic to the interests of the whites in this region and this was a major factor in his electoral success there in 1828. Emboldened by Jackson's election and offended by the efforts of the Cherokee tribe to establish its own government within the bounds of the state, Georgia passed stringent laws invalidating the Indian enactments and authorizing the division of Cherokee lands. Georgia's action was in apparent conflict with treaties negotiated by the Cherokees and the United States but especially an act of 1802 in which the state had ceded all the lands now comprising Alabama and Mississippi to the United States on the condition that the government extinguish the Indian titles by negotiation as soon as possible.[3] Included in the Act of 1802 was a guarantee that intruders on Indian lands be ousted by the federal government until the land titles were extinguished.

In three instances the Cherokees or persons identified with them engaged the state of Georgia in litigation in the federal courts and in all three cases Georgia, with the tacit approval of the President, ignored the mandates of the Supreme Court.[4]

[3] See Ulrich B. Phillips, "Georgia and State Rights", *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, II, 34–35, 67–69 (1901), and the *18th Annual Report*, Bureau of Ethnology, pp. 652, 696.

[4] In another important case the Cherokees tried to enjoin the operation of the new state laws but the case was dismissed by the Supreme Court for want of jurisdiction. *Cherokee v. The State of Georgia*, 30 U. S. (5 Pet.) 1.

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The first incident concerned an Indian, George Tassels, who was convicted of murder under the laws recently extended throughout the Cherokee territory. On appeal from the decision of the Georgia courts the Supreme Court issued a writ of error which was ignored by Governor Troup, and Tassels was executed. The failure of the President to enforce the Court's writ led John Quincy Adams to observe: "The Constitution, the laws and treaties of the United States are prostrate in the State of Georgia . . . because the Executive of the United States is in league with the State of Georgia. He will not take care that the laws be faithfully executed."[5]

A second incident occurred two years later when one James Graves was tried and convicted of murder in Georgia. Again the state refused to obey an order issued by the Supreme Court to show cause why a writ of error should not issue.

Of greater importance was the trial of two white missionaries to the Cherokees who had violated state law. The incident culminated in the famous case of *Worcester v. Georgia*. In this instance the President not only defied the Supreme Court by refusing to enforce the mandate but coöperated with Georgia by removing Worcester from a postmastership as a reprimand.[6] The Georgia law of December 1830 required licenses and an oath of all whites in Cherokee territory, and when Worcester refused to apply for the license he was convicted in the Georgia courts.

On appeal John Marshall held the Georgia statute unconstitutional because it was in conflict with the Act of 1802 and treaties with the Cherokees. Marshall asserted that "the treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separate from that of the states."[7] Directing a personal blow at Jackson, Marshall pointed out

[5] Charles F. Adams, ed., *The Memoirs of John Quincy Adams* (Philadelphia, 1876), VIII, 262–263.

[6] George R. Gilmer to Colonel John Sanford, April 20, 1831, *Correspondence on the Subject of the Emigration of the Indians*, I, 451. Sen. Doc. No. 512, 23rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1834).

[7] 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 500, 497, 498.

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that Worcester had been sent to Georgia by the President with a commission granted under the laws of the United States to instruct the Indians. He called the decision of the Georgia courts a "violation of the acts which authorize the chief magistrate to exercise this authority."[8] The President again refused to execute the mandate of the Supreme Court, an action which would have required the removal of all Georgia authority, forcibly no doubt, from the Cherokee lands.

On what constitutional grounds did the President base this doctrine of defiance and inaction? In reply to a Senate resolution inquiring why he had not enforced the Act of 1802, the President gave a partial answer. Jackson said that, though the purpose of the statute was to remove white intruders from Indian lands, "The authority of the President . . . is not imperative." The President believed it was lawful to use military force to remove intruders only in cases where military force was absolutely necessary. In this instance, he reasoned, it was unnecessary and would violate the rights of Georgia, for the statute was applied only so long as Georgia did not "extend her laws throughout her limits." In a rare and uncharacteristic case of broad statutory construction the President concluded that because Georgia had extended her laws throughout the state the statute was no longer applicable within Georgia's boundaries.[9]

Secondly, Jackson did not accept the Court's holding that the Cherokees had rights independent of state authority. Under the Constitution Congress possessed the power "to regulate commerce with Indian tribes", but only dangerous construction,

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 557, 562.

[9] "Special Message to Congress", February 22, 1831. James D. Richardson, comp., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (Washington, 1899), II, 536–537 (hereinafter cited Richardson). Jackson authorized the Secretary of War to write the following in reply to protests of the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions: "I am instructed by him to inform you that having on mature consideration satisfied himself that the Legislatures of the respective States have power to extend their laws over all persons living within their boundaries, and that when thus extended, the various Acts of Congress . . . become inoperative he has not authority to interfere." Lewis Cass to William Reed, November 14, 1831. Bernard E. Steiner, "Jackson and the Missionaries", *American Historical Review*, XXIX, 722 (July 1924).

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the President contended, could bestow on Congress the power to interfere with a state's jurisdiction over Indian lands within its limits; for the clause was designed to give "the General Government complete control over the trade and intercourse of those Indians only who were not within any state." To give the Chief Executive the power to interfere with the relations between a state and the Indians within the state would, from Jackson's point of view, "place in his hands a power to make war upon the rights of the States and the liberty of the country—a power which should be placed in the hands of no individual."[10]

The President said that if he were to execute the writs of the Court or its mandate in favor of Worcester, he would be going beyond his own power and compounding the erroneous decision of the Supreme Court with his own unconstitutional action.

Finally, the President denied that he was empowered to enforce the law against a state. In a letter to the Secretary of War he wrote, "No feature in the Federal Constitution is more prominent, than that the general powers conferred on congress, can only be enforced, and executed upon the people of the Union."[11] He closed his argument by saying he could not enforce a decision which violated the constitutional provision, "no new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state . . . without the consent of the legislatures of the States as well as of the Congress."

These are Jackson's arguments, and when one recalls his opposition to the Nullifiers in South Carolina less than a year afterward, the constitutional reasoning falls far short of a full explanation for his defiance of the Supreme Court. Besides a vague urge to defend the rights of the states against an aggressive Court, it seems that the President, during the Georgia controversy, was singularly unclear about his obligations to the Constitution.[12] Since Jackson's constitutional argument was

[10] Richardson, II, 536–547. See also James A. Hamilton, *Reminiscences* (New York, 1869), p. 134.

[11] *Correspondence*, IV, 220.

[12] John Spencer Bassett, *The Life of Andrew Jackson* (New York, 1911), II, 690–691.

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largely feeble rationalization, it is necessary to turn elsewhere to discover the underlying reasons for his defiance and inaction.[13]

Jackson's resistance to the Court was certainly conditioned by a personal distaste for John Marshall, but this was not all. Among other reasons was Jackson's lack of sympathy for the Indians and his apprehension lest any concession damage the core of his Indian policy—removal across the Mississippi. Long experience in fighting and negotiating with the Indians convinced Jackson years earlier that removal was the only sound policy. He informed Congress in his First Annual Message that the Indians had already been told "that their attempt to establish an independent government would not be countenanced by the Executive . . . [and had been advised] to emigrate beyond the Mississippi or submit to the laws of the states."[14] Also, as an Indian fighter turned president he could not easily forget "the prowling lion of the forest who has done us so much injury."[15] In short, he had respect for Indian rights so long as they were exercised on the western bank of the Mississippi.

[13] Several authorities contend that Jackson was not empowered to enforce the *Worcester* decision since an effort to give the decision legislative sanction failed of passage in the House; for example, in Charles Warren's *The Supreme Court in United States History* (Boston, 1922, II, 224), where the questionable point is made that a mandate was never issued by the Supreme Court. Warren contends it is "clearly untrue" that Jackson defied the court decree. The crucial fact is, of course, that Jackson did not want to enforce this particular decision and, had he wanted to, his ingenuity would have found a way. Commentators like Warren perhaps forget that the Act of 1802 was still good law despite Jackson's interpretation of it. He might just as well have read the statute in favor of the executive instead of the states. Also he was not beyond using his autonomous power to execute the laws faithfully during the Nullification crisis in South Carolina. No doubt if Jackson had believed it possible and desirable to enforce the law against Georgia he would have done so.

[14] December 8, 1829, Richardson, II, 458.

[15] Jackson to Secretary Crawford, June 13(?), 1816, *Correspondence*, II, 249. It should be remembered that Jackson witnessed the ghastly results of the notorious Fort Mims massacre and this memory did not leave him. In 1812 he wrote to Willie Blount, "my heart bleeds within me on the recept [*sic*] of the news of the horrid cruelty and murder committed by a party of Creeks, on our innocent wives and little babes." June 4, 1812, *ibid.*, I, 225–226. It is difficult to see how the Cherokees expected to evoke presidential sympathy by engaging William Wirt and John Sergeant as counsel. Wirt was presidential nominee for the Anti-Masonic party and Sergeant was vice-presidential nominee as well as chief counsel for the Bank of the United States.

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But there were more urgent reasons for the avoidance of a clash with Georgia, particularly when, as Jackson knew, armed force would be necessary to carry out the mandate. Paradoxically, a President who is noted for his quick temper and rashness often attained his goal by being temperate and avoiding an open struggle. This factor has too often been overlooked in past commentary on the Georgia controversy. Jackson's forbearance was rooted partly in his aversion to the use of military force.[16] Also, the President was in the midst of his fight with the Bank of the United States and was soon to stand for reëlection. Certainly he did not forget that Georgia, largely in reaction to Adams' inflexible Indian policy, had repudiated Adams and strongly supported Jackson in 1828. A proper Indian policy was important for holding Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi within the party during a crucial election year.[17] Finally, Jackson needed Georgia's support against the South Carolina Nullifiers. If Jackson did not consider this the primary justification for his defiance of the Supreme Court, history should. While the President saw the Indian problem as a temporary one, the nullification issue presented a basic national crisis. He and his advisers were not unaware that the Nullifiers counted on him to chastise Georgia and thus draw that state into their ranks. As one Jacksonian wrote:

> They [South Carolinians] hope to see Georgia embroiled with the General Government, in which they may join and make a common cause . . . [a permanent injunction by the Court] will be disregarded by Georgia, and any attempt to enforce it will be promptly resisted. This is precisely the State of Things which our Nullifiers are anxious to see brought about. And should this happen, I can see no other result but civil war and the dismemberment of the Union. . . . One thing is certain, General Jackson will not lend his official aid to enforce the injunction. This may avert disaster for awhile. . . .[18]

[16] See for example, *Correspondence on the Subject of the Indians*, IV, 811, *supra*, footnote 6.

[17] Thomas B. Govan, "John M. Berrien and the Administration of Andrew Jackson", *Journal of Southern History*, V, 447 (November 1939).

[18] William Smith to D. E. Huger, February 16, 1831, Poinsett Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

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Of utmost importance as a cause of Jackson's defiance of the Supreme Court was his awareness that enforcement—had he wanted to act—would be difficult and bloody. Here it seems is the significance of Jackson's refusal to enforce Marshall's decision. Whether or not the famous statement is apochryphal is a moot question, although it does not seem out of character and expressed the President's feelings.[19] But what does the sentence mean? It certainly suggests defiance of Marshall, but it means more. Drawing on a declaration that is similar and expands the cryptic pronouncement, one is led to believe Jackson meant not only that the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court were institutionally incapable of enforcing the mandate but that all of the national government would be unable to coerce Georgia:

> The decision of the supreme court has fell still born and they find it cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate . . . if orders were issued tomorrow one regiment of militia could not be got to march to save them from destruction and this the opposition know, and if a colision was to take place between them and the Georgians, the arm of the government is not sufficiently strong to preserve them from destruction. . . .[20]

Jackson might have expanded his original statement to read: "John Marshall has made his decision and he can try to enforce it. I cannot. Even if the Executive wished to enforce the mandate it is not powerful enough to oppose the tide of feeling in the South."

[19] The statement can be traced to Horace Greeley's *American Conflict: A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, 1860–65* (Hartford, 1864), I, 106. Greeley said, "I am indebted for this fact to the late Governor George N. Briggs, of Massachusetts, who was in Washington as a member of Congress when the decision was rendered." The quotation as Greeley transcribed it is as follows: "Well: John Marshall has made his decision: *now let him enforce it.*" See Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1948* (New York and London, 1948), p. 409, whose note contains an apparent *non sequitur* which should be corrected by consulting Marquis James, *Andrew Jackson: Portrait of a President* (Indianapolis, 1937), pp. 304–305, and Warren, *op. cit.*, II, 219.

[20] Jackson to John Coffee, April 7, 1832, *Correspondence*, IV, 430. See also Peter A. Brannon, "Removal of the Indians from Alabama", *Alabama Historical Quarterly*, XII, 96, 100 (1950).

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Added to the note of personal defiance of Marshall and the inference that the Court was powerless without the coöperation of the executive is the President's recognition of political reality. In sum, Jackson's defiance of the Court was compounded of constitutional argument, personal and political considerations, and an awareness of what was politically and militarily feasible. Considering the prospect of active resistance in Georgia and the explosive situation in South Carolina at the time, one is left to wonder whether Jackson should not be praised for prudence instead of being condemned for inaction.

Presidential Independence: The Bank Veto

In 1832 President Jackson vetoed the bill rechartering the United States Bank despite a clear expression of Congressional will favoring the Bank and the Supreme Court's recognition of the Bank's constitutionality in *McCulloch v. Maryland* some years before. In the Veto Message the following statement appears:

> Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it. . . . It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision.[21]

Two key ideas appeared in this passage and the later refinements of the veto by administration leaders in the ensuing Senate debate: (1) the President has an unqualified right to use the veto power to block "unconstitutional" legislation despite

[21] "Veto Message", July 10, 1832, Richardson, II, 582. Note also Jefferson's declaration, "My construction of the Constitution . . . is that each department is truly independent of the others, and has an equal right to decide for itself what is the meaning of the Constitution in the cases submitted to its action; and especially where it is to act ultimately and without appeal." Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane, September 6, 1819. A. A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh, eds., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Washington, 1907), XV, 214. Another Jeffersonian precept appearing in Jackson's veto is summed up in Jefferson's words, "Each generation is independent of the one preceding, as that was of all which had gone before." Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, *ibid.*, p. 42. Both suggest a balance between the three branches and an independence which must be used in the service of new social forces. Both, of course, reject a sacrosanct position for the judiciary.

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judicial precedents affirming the constitutionality of similar statutes; (2) the President is not required to enforce "unconstitutional" statutes.

Jackson clearly believed he possessed an independent right to judge the validity of legislation even if the judgment were contrary to judicial precedent. In reply to friends of the Bank who contended that *McCulloch v. Maryland* settled the question of the Bank's constitutionality, Jackson declared: "Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the acquiescence of the people and the states can be considered as well settled."[22]

Drawing upon his power as representative of the whole people and his oath to support the Constitution, Jackson said in effect that if the President believed the statute in question was a "danger to our liberty", and the people and the states agreed with the President, then the Chief Executive's opinion was superior to mere judicial precedent in judging questions of constitutionality. He averred as well that the instant case dealt with new facts and a new situation which could not be governed by *McCulloch v. Maryland*, and therefore "ought not control the coordinate authorities of the Government." This assertion of independence was based on Jackson's belief that it was the autonomous duty of the executive to pass on constitutional questions in preparing his veto:

> Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, not as it is understood by others . . . the opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both.[23]

But was the President obligated to enforce statutes which he considered to be unconstitutional? The controversy and confusion over this question arose partly from the opening words of the passage cited above—"Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it". The President's opponents

[22] Richardson, II, 581.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 582.

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seized on this as a flagrant extension of executive power and an effort to destroy the judiciary. The point at issue was serious enough to lead Taney to write the following passage in a letter twenty-six years later. He defended the President:

> He [Jackson] was speaking of his rights and his duty, when acting as part of the legislative power and not of his right or duty as an executive officer. For when a bill is presented to him and he is to decide whether, by his approval, it shall become law or not, his power or duty is as purely legislative as that of a member of Congress, when he is called on to vote for or against a bill. . . . But General Jackson never expressed a doubt as to the duty and the obligation upon him in his executive character to carry into execution any act of Congress regularly passed, whatever his opinion might be of the constitutional question.[24]

Taney's interpretation after the fact seems acceptable. But Martin Van Buren inadvertently introduced conflicting evidence when he wrote years later that Jackson "contented himself with frequent and unreserved concurrence in the views which had been taken of the subject, on the floor of the Senate by Judge White."[25]

An examination of White's interpretation of the veto, however, shows it to be in direct contradiction of Taney:

> If either of these coordinate departments is . . . called upon to perform an official act, and conscientiously believe that performance of that act would be in violation of the Constitution, they are not bound to perform it, but, on the contrary, are as much at liberty to decline acting, as if no such decision had been made. . . . They ought to examine the extent of their constitutional powers for themselves; and when they have had access to all sources of information within their reach, and given to everything its due weight, if they are satisfied that the constitution has not given a power to do the act required, I insist they ought to refrain from doing it.[26]

[24] Roger B. Taney to Martin Van Buren, June 20, 1860, "Taney's Letters to Van Buren in 1860", *Maryland Historical Magazine*, X, 23 (1915).

[25] Martin Van Buren, *An Inquiry into the Origin and Course of Political Parties in the United States* (New York, 1867), p. 329.

[26] *Congressional Debates*, VIII, 1243–1244 (1833).

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It is impossible to reconcile these two conflicting statements, for there is no extant evidence of Jackson's view written in his own hand. Since Taney assisted in the preparation of the Bank veto perhaps his word should be given more weight than Judge White's. It seems safe to conclude, however, that Jackson, Taney, Van Buren and White were one and all confused about the matter.[27] If Jackson agreed with White's speech in the Senate, it was agreement with an extreme claim of executive independence; but Taney, who was closer to the President, denied in later years that this was the proper interpretation. This enigma notwithstanding, there remains the generous extension of executive independence in Jackson's vigorous assertion that he, in judging constitutionality, while considering a veto, was not bound by the precedents of the Supreme Court.

Presidential Independence: Kendall v. United States

Of equal importance in illustrating a broad doctrine of the executive independence were the arguments put forward by two of Jackson's advisers, Amos Kendall and Benjamin F. Butler, in *Kendall v. United States*, *United States v. Kendall*, and *Kendall v. Stokes*.[28] Although *Kendall v. United States* was decided against Kendall, the Postmaster General, the doctrine expressed by representatives of the President before the Court typifies the Jacksonian view of presidential independence. There is no positive evidence of the President's opinion on the outcome of these famous cases, but it is believed his attitude can be established by inference.

The parties involved in *United States v. Kendall* were the Postmaster General and Stockton and Stokes, a mail-carrying firm. Kendall succeeded William Barry as Postmaster General in 1835 and upon reviewing the departmental accounts disallowed a claim awarded to Stockton and Stokes by his predecessor. Kendall considered the claim excessive, in some respects

[27] Carl B. Swisher, *Roger B. Taney* (New York, 1935), pp. 196–197.

[28] 37 U. S. (12 Pet.) 1181 (1838); 26 *Fed. Cas.* 62 (1837); 44 U. S. (3 How.) 506 (1845). In the present analysis *United States v. Kendall* will be relied upon, for it was more immediate to Jackson's presidency and the arguments are more precise.

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fraudulent, and refused to pay the firm.[29] Stockton and Stokes turned to Congress and after a brief investigation Congress passed a resolution directing the Solicitor of the Treasury to review the claim, a review which ended in an order for payment. Once again Kendall refused to honor the claim and Stockton and Stokes appealed to the President. Jackson replied that since Congress was then in session, "and the best expounder of the intent and meaning of their own law, I think it right and proper, under existing circumstances, to refer it to that body for their decision."[30]

The second appeal to Congress resulted in a Senate resolution affirming the carriers' claim for the full amount and Kendall countered once again by arguing that only the Senate had ordered payment, not both Houses of Congress. In desperation Stockton and Stokes turned to the Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus. In June 1837, three months after Jackson's departure from office, the Circuit Court held that a mandamus should issue to force Kendall to pay the award, a decision which the Supreme Court affirmed in January 1838.[31] The Court declared that an act of Congress, empowering the Solicitor of the Treasury to pass on the claim and the subsequent resolution of the Senate, imposed a ministerial duty on the Postmaster General who had no choice but to pay the award.

Two documents express the administration viewpoint: a letter to Chief Judge Cranch written by Kendall explaining his refusal to obey the mandamus and an opinion written by Attorney General Benjamin F. Butler at Kendall's request. Both Kendall and Butler denied the right of the federal courts to issue a writ forcing an executive officer to perform any act, and both based their argument on a strict interpretation of the separation of powers.

[29] For the situation in the Post Office Department see Leonard D. White, *The Jacksonians* (New York, 1954), pp. 274–279.

[30] Jackson to L. W. Stockton, December 1836, 26 *Fed. Cas.* 704. "Special Message to Congress", February 15, 1837, Richardson, III, 280. Kendall reported to the President his refusal to pay and asked him to request Congress to pass an explanatory act, "which, if it confirms the opinion of the solicitor, I shall implicitly obey." Kendall to Jackson, December 27, 1836, 26 *Fed. Cas.* 704.

[31] 26 *Fed. Cas.* 705; 37 U. S. (12 Pet.) 1214.

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Kendall's letter to Judge Cranch contained an unqualified denial of the power of any judicial officer to control the acts of the executive.[32] Kendall reasoned that under the separation of powers the President alone has the power to execute the laws. If the mandamus issued by the Circuit Court was valid, Kendall argued, "the effective and controlling Executive of this great republic will not be the Chief Magistrate elected by the people, but three judges of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia."[33]

In sum, the proper function of the judiciary was to expound the law, the executive's to enforce it. Kendall assured the Court that he did not consider an executive officer above accountability, for each officer was responsible to the President and ultimately to Congress.

In his exegesis the Postmaster specifically denied to the judiciary the power to issue a writ for the execution of a ministerial duty:

> No such distinction is to be found in the Constitution. It is the duty of the President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"—*special* laws as well as *general;* but no such duty is enjoined upon the judiciary. . . . The officer whose particular province it is to execute the law is under the immediate eye of the President, holds office at his will, and may be removed if he refuses. . . . The Executive power is ONE—*one* in principle—*one* in object. Its object is *the execution of the laws.* It is not susceptible of subdivisions and nice distinctions as to its duties and responsibilities. To execute the laws, and *all the laws*, are its duties.[34]

To yield to the writ, Kendall declared, would violate his oath to discharge the duties of his office faithfully and to support the Constitution.[35]

At the Postmaster's request Attorney General Butler prepared

[32] *Letter of the Postmaster General . . . In Reference to the Power of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia to Control Executive Officers in the Performance of Their Official Duties* (Washington, 1837).

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 5. Italics in original.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 12. Kendall allowed room for a tactical withdrawal by declaring that even if a mandate could issue to enforce a ministerial act—a premise he did not for a moment accept—his action on the claim had not been ministerial.

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an opinion supporting his fellow cabinet officer. He agreed with Kendall that the mandamus should not issue, for it involved a crucial surrender of executive independence. No law, Butler wrote, "can confer on any court in the United States the power to supervise and control the action of an executive office of the United States in any official matter, properly appertaining to the Executive Department in which he is employed."[36] Butler emphasized that the President could resist actively a writ of mandamus, a fact which exhibited "in the clearest light, the incapacity of any court to issue such a writ."[37]

It is difficult to determine Jackson's attitude toward these extreme claims of executive independence. Butler and Kendall were the President's constitutional advisers and Jackson did declare at one time that he would, and his cabinet officers should, defer to the Attorney General in questions of this nature.[38] The case arose at the end of the President's second term, however, and he either did not have a sustained interest in the problem or was busy with other affairs of state. The only written record touching on Kendall's difficulty with the courts was a comment Jackson made in defense of Kendall when Stockton's search for a settlement led to a private suit for damages against Kendall. Jackson was in retirement at the Hermitage and wrote to Kendall:

[36] This opinion does not appear in the *Opinions of the Attorney General*. See 26 *Fed. Cas.* 724–729 and *Opinions of the Attorney General*, I, 1010–1027, for Butler's earlier advice to Kendall assuring him that he had the power and obligation not to pay the claim.

[37] 26 *Fed. Cas.* 730–731. When arguing the case before the Supreme Court he retreated somewhat by admitting that a federal court could be invested with "jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any ministerial officer of the United States to compel the performance of his duty," and included the President in this category. Nevertheless, Butler defined "ministerial" very narrowly and claimed the statute in question offered discretion to the Postmaster General and thus his actions were not controllable by the writ of mandamus. 37 U. S. (12 Pet.) 1209, 1186, 1187.

[38] Concerning the Attorney General's opinion on the withdrawal of deposits from the United States Bank, Jackson declared that the Attorney General's view "ought to govern the heads of departments as it did the President." Jackson to Martin Van Buren, September 15, 1833, *Correspondence*, V, 187. This is not to suggest that Jackson placed his own constitutional views in an inferior position. He respected his Attorneys General and they, in turn, were sensitive and sympathetic.

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> I have just received your letter of the 19th instant, and it rends my heart with sorrow to read that you who so ably and faithfully watched over the interests of the government as Postmaster Genl. should be crushed and deprived of your personal liberty, by such a cruel and unjust judgement against you. . . . This precedent must lead to make the President and all the heads of Depts., subject to be harassed by suits, by every villain who wished to put his hand into the public crib, and is prevented by them. . . .[39]

Unfortunately Jackson made no direct comment about the other decisions, *Kendall v. United States* or *United States v. Kendall.* Congress was the proper board of appeal as "the best expounder of the interests and meaning of [its] own law."[40]

Although the President's attitude can be established only by inference,[41] three facts point to his tacit acknowledgement of an ample interpretation of presidential independence. Jackson was emphatically opposed to the private suit against Kendall and saw the dangers to the executive in such a suit; he stated a specific preference for a settlement in Congress, not the courts; and, despite a thorough search, there is no evidence of presidential disagreement with the reasoning of his constitutional advisers. Their mildest argument placed the President beyond the arm of the judiciary when Congress had not made its intentions crystal clear. In its most extreme form the interpretation empowered the executive to resist a writ even in the face of a clear statement of Congressional intent. Both arguments presumed an ample area of presidential freedom in determining

[39] The judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court. 44 U. S. (3 How.) 512.

[40] See Jackson to Kendall, September 29, 1842, *Correspondence,* VI, 170, and Jackson to Kendall, May 15, 1841, *ibid.,* p. 113. Jackson importuned Justice Catron to have Kendall's case accepted quickly by the Supreme Court (*ibid.,* p. 174), and suggested to one congressman that a bill be passed for Kendall's relief. "Should the head of a department be made personally responsible for resisting a fraudulent claim, what becomes of the safety of the revenue, this precedent is a very dangerous one, to remain unrevoked." Jackson to Cave Johnson, November 25, 1842, *ibid.,* p. 179.

[41] Jackson's successor believed the mandamus was a violation of the separation of powers and hinted that Jackson agreed with him when he advised Kendall to resist the writ and added that he "considered the disposition made by his predecessor as final." See Van Buren's "Second Annual Message", December 3, 1838, Richardson, III, 503–505.

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how the laws were to be executed and a guarantee against judicial "legislation". Submission to a writ of mandamus, these advisers contended, would do injury to the separation of powers, confound the proper rôle of the judiciary, and place an irresponsible superior above the highest representative of the people.[42] The theory fits the Jacksonian pattern, and the most cautious generalization is that the President's advisers, in their arguments before the courts, expressed a Jacksonian view of executive independence, and probably the view of the President himself.

The President and the Courts: The President Sustains the Judiciary

Defiance and independence only partially characterize Jackson's attitude toward the judiciary. Hidden behind the traditional description of Jackson, the antagonist of the judiciary, is evidence of deep-rooted respect and support for the judicial function. It can be argued that the courts were stronger in 1837 than in 1828 partly because of Jackson's defense of the federal courts during the Nullification controversy and his apparent unwillingness to succumb to proposals for far-reaching judicial "reform".[43]

Before investigating these aspects of the President's relations with the judiciary mention should be made of an unusual theory of executive accountability which arose during Jackson's presidency. In three separate instances Jackson or his advisers claimed that the President was personally liable to private

[42] *Letter of the Postmaster General*, p. 6.

[43] It can be argued that Jackson's appointments to the Supreme Court strengthened the judiciary by replacing Marshall nationalists with Taney moderates. The President wanted to be assured that potential appointees reflected his interpretation of the Constitution and he was willing to consider a candidate only "if his principles on the Constitution are sound, and well fixed." He was aware of the importance of life tenure as a vehicle for transporting his beliefs beyond his years in the presidential office. Jackson to Van Buren, October 27, 1834, in Samuel G. Heiskell, *Andrew Jackson and Early Tennessee History* (Nashville, 1920), III, 507. Jackson relieved some of the pressure on the judiciary by appointing men sensitive to contemporary social trends. None of Marshall's decisions were overturned but many were made more palatable to a new generation. See Charles G. Haines, *The Role of the Supreme Court, 1789–1835* (Berkeley, 1944), and Warren, *The Supreme Court in United States History*, II, 273–274.

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suits while in office—a doctrine that ceased to be good law (if ever it was) after *Mississippi v. Johnson.*

This argument was used on two different occasions by counsel for Kendall in *Kendall v. United States.* Benjamin Butler told the court:

> Where the President has controlled and directed the action of the inferior executive officer, they [counsel for Stokes, defendant in error] contend that the inferior is not responsible; and, as the President's liability to private action has been doubted, there will then, it is said, be no responsibility. The answer is, that whenever the President takes an active part in an illegal action, to the injury of an individual, though it be done by the hand of his subordinate, he will be responsible in a civil suit, along with that subordinate: and that the latter cannot be excused from doing an unlawful act, by pleading the command of his official superior.[44]

There is no evidence in Jackson's correspondence that he subscribed to this principle of accountability but it is mentioned in one of his major messages to the Senate. Since Jackson reviewed and helped to write all of his important messages, he certainly knew that the following statement appeared, although he may not have realized its implications.[45] Reviewing the ways in which the President could be held accountable Jackson said in his Protest to the Senate, "He is also liable to private action of any party who may have been injured by his illegal mandates or instructions in the same manner and to the same extent as the humblest functionary."[46]

One can hardly believe, knowing Jackson's character and his views of executive independence, that he would have submitted to a private suit for any reason while in office. But there is a trace of respect for the judicial function and the need for executive accountability which deserves mention.

The President's attitude toward the federal judiciary during the Nullification controversy is more conclusive and enduring.

[44] 37 U. S. (12 Pet.) 1211. Butler said the remedy should be used sparingly! "Opinion of Attorney General Butler" in *Letter of the Postmaster General,* p. 26.

[45] Butler helped Jackson with this message. Jackson to Kendall, April 1834, *Correspondence,* V, 258.

[46] "Protest to the Senate", April 10, 1834, Richardson, III, 71.

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One major tenet of the Nullifiers' creed was the freedom of state power from the judgments of the federal courts. The radical doctrine of the Nullifiers was not accepted by Jackson. Although the President did not hesitate to assert his own freedom from court precedent under the separation of powers and appeared to believe in a large degree of administrative independence, it did not follow in Jackson's reasoning that a state could ignore the federal judiciary and the supremacy of national law. If South Carolina objected to the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832, according to Jackson, her proper recourse was to the courts, not nullification. He condemned this heresy. South Carolina, the President wrote, "has not only not appealed in her own name to those tribunals under the Constitution and laws of the United States but has endeavored to frustrate their proper action on her citizens by drawing cognizance of cases under the revenue laws to her tribunals."[47]

The President declared that there were two avenues of appeal from an unconstitutional law: a constitutional amendment or a suit in the federal courts. Unilateral action by one state to nullify a law—the right which South Carolina believed was hers—would destroy the supremacy of national law that the President, the Congress and the Supreme Court were duty bound to defend. It is of the utmost significance that Jackson, reputedly an opponent of the Judiciary Act of 1789, affirmed the usefulness and validity of this statute in his Special Message to Congress on Nullification and his Proclamation to the people of South Carolina:

> The Constitution declares that the judicial powers of the United States extend to cases arising under the laws of the United States and that such laws, the Constitution, and treaties shall be paramount to the State constitutions and laws. The judiciary act prescribes the mode by which the case may be brought before a court of the United States by appeal when a State tribunal shall decide against this provision.[48]

[47] "Special Message to Congress", January 16, 1833, Richardson, II, 623.

[48] "Proclamation", December 10, 1832, Richardson, II, 647. The Administration newspaper, *The Globe*, was outspoken in its defense of the Judiciary Act and the supremacy of the federal courts. See *The Washington Globe*, December 4, 1832.

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By defending the federal courts against the destructive doctrine inherent in nullification Jackson put his stamp of approval on the usefulness of judicial review in a federal system and showed his respect for the judiciary. His enemies attacked him for his behavior during the Georgia controversy and their opinions have been passed down as the correct view of the President's attitude toward the judiciary. Nevertheless, his greatest antagonists, Story and Marshall, recognized the President's service to the judiciary. As Story wrote to his wife, "since the last proclamation [on nullification] and message, the Chief Justice and myself have become his warmest supporters."[49] In the final analysis, Jackson's defense of the Judiciary Act of 1789—the cornerstone of the federal judicial power—was possibly more important than his record of defiance and independence. While affirming the rôle of the judiciary in maintaining the integrity of the Union, Jackson rose above narrow partisanship and dissolved some of the odium associated with his defiance of the Supreme Court in the Georgia controversy. As we have seen, in fact, the two events were closely related in Jackson's mind.

It should be recalled that many of Jackson's followers were children of the Jeffersonian era and consequently hostile to the judiciary. Jackson's alliance with the courts in his struggle with the Nullifiers is all the more impressive because of this. The decade preceding Jackson's first term burgeoned with court decisions—*McCulloch v. Maryland*, *Ogden v. Saunders*, *Cohens v. Virginia*, and *Craig v. Missouri*, to name only a few—which aroused the fear of the South and the West and stored up resentment which threatened to explode in a burst of legislation

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Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was the linchpin of the federal judicial system and the guarantor of the supremacy clause of the Constitution. It established clear channels of appeal from state court decisions when a state tribunal ruled against the constitutionality of a federal law or treaty, ruled in favor of a state law in conflict with the Constitution, federal law, or treaty, or ruled against a constitutional right or privilege. It guaranteed that national courts, not state tribunals, be the final interpreters of national law. See Justice Story's opinion in *Martin v. Hunter's Lessee*, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).

[49] Joseph Story to Mrs. Story, January 27, 1833. William W. Story, *Life and Letters of Joseph Story* (Boston, 1851), II, 119.

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designed to cripple the federal judiciary. In the early years of Jackson's presidency frequent attempts were made in Congress to weaken the judiciary, although they seemed to taper off after Marshall's death and the influx of Jackson appointees into the federal courts.

The attacks usually centered on the 25th Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. In January 1831, for example, the Committee on the Judiciary reported favorably on a bill to repeal the 25th Section but it was defeated on the floor of the Senate soon afterward. As was to be expected, most of the attacks originated with the delegations from the South and West. They did not hesitate to propose repeal of the entire Judiciary Act of 1789, a constitutional amendment limiting the judges to seven years' tenure, unanimity in the Supreme Court on questions of constitutionality, and an outright prohibition against decisions touching on the rights of the states.[50]

The President certainly felt the force of demands for "reform", for important members of his inner circle of advisers were among the most vigorous critics of the judiciary. The atmosphere of hostility was doubtless charged by the attitude of Martin Van Buren, Amos Kendall, Louis McLane and Andrew Stevenson, all close presidential advisers. Van Buren attacked the Supreme Court while a member of the Senate in 1826 and while John Marshall lived feared his control over the Court. Like many Jackson men he followed Jeffersonian doctrine; when Jefferson told him of his proposal to limit judicial tenure to four or six years, Van Buren recalled: "Fresh from the Bar, and to some extent at least under the influence of professional prejudices, I remember to have thought his views extremely radical, but have lived to subscribe to their general correctness."[51]

Thomas Hart Benton in the Senate and Andrew Stevenson in the House, both legislative lieutenants of the President, deplored Marshall's invasion of state sovereignty. Stevenson

[50] *House Report*, # 43, 21st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1831). See Haines, *op. cit.*, pp. 593–596; Joseph Story to Mrs. Story, January 28, 1831, Story, *op. cit.*, II, 43, 44; William Pope to Andrew Jackson, December 25, 1829, Jackson Papers, Library of Congress; and Warren, *op. cit.*, II, 198–201.

[51] John C. Fitzpatrick, *Autobiography of Martin Van Buren* (Washington, 1918), pp. 183–184, and Warren, *op. cit.*, II, 130.

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was Judge Spencer Roane's protégé, Marshall's most celebrated opponent in the states, and carried his prejudice against the Court with him to Congress.[52] Amos Kendall's hostility toward the judiciary dated from his experience as an editor in Kentucky and the rise of the New Court party there. At one time he proposed a special court to which each state was to appoint a judge to handle conflicts between the states and the federal government.[53] Louis McLane, another presidential confidant, proposed to Van Buren that judicial tenure be limited and the President be given power to remove judges on petition of two thirds of the state legislatures. And a Tennessee politician, in one of many similar letters, asked Jackson to propose to Congress a change in the Judiciary Act which would restrict appeals from the state to the federal courts.[54]

There is abundant evidence that Jackson was subjected to arguments against the judiciary by influential presidential advisers and political leaders in the states. Some men close to the President, such as Edward Livingston, Roger B. Taney and James Buchanan, did not take part in the attack. James Buchanan, in fact, wrote the minority report of the Judiciary Committee which had reported favorably on repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1789. But the unfavorable climate of opinion and the commitment of many of his advisers to judicial reform suggest that if the President had used his popularity and power to support anti-judicial legislation, "reform" would have carried the day. The fact is that Jackson did not recommend proposals to weaken the judiciary in his messages to Congress, nor is there evidence of hostility in his correspondence. On the crucial issue of repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1789 he was persistently silent.

[52] Francis Wayland, *Andrew Stevenson* (Philadelphia, 1949), p. 27; Warren, *op. cit.*, II, 185.

[53] William Stickney, *Autobiography of Amos Kendall* (Boston, 1872), pp. 206, 253.

[54] Louis McLane to Van Buren, July 20, 1830, Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress. "The judiciary ought not to have the power to impose an *absolute* control over the other departments of the government. I would much rather trust the Senate with Constitutional questions than the Judges." Richard Riker to Van Buren, April 14, 1828, *ibid.*; Worden Pope to Jackson, December 25, 1829, Jackson Papers.

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Conclusion

What were the results of eight years of defiance, independence and respect? The President brought with him to office party leaders who were hostile to the federal judiciary and demanded reforms that included the recall of judges and repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The President did not put his weight behind these efforts. For more significant and complex reasons than dislike of John Marshall and loyalty to states' rights, Jackson defied the Supreme Court during the Georgia controversy, argued for the President's independence of the Supreme Court on constitutional questions in his Bank veto and inferentially in his attitude toward the Kendall episode. On the other hand, defiance and independence are only the most obvious parts of an involved picture. The President also reaffirmed the value of judicial review during the Nullification controversy when the integrity of the Union was at stake and indirectly strengthened the federal judiciary by appointing men who were more in tune with their times than their aging predecessors. Jackson did claim a coördinate and independent standing for the President but it did not follow that the states were independent of the federal judiciary. These observations indicate that caution should be exercised when quoting that highly quotable remark, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." This statement has been accepted generally as the touchstone of Jackson's attitude toward the judiciary. One can argue, conversely, that this was the exception to a rule of guarded but genuine respect for the judiciary based on Jackson's constitutional sense and his own past. Closer scrutiny suggests that a happy but probably apocryphal statement should not be accepted as conclusive evidence of Jackson's disposition toward the judiciary.

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TOYNBEE AND THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

AMERICAN thinking on international relations is characterized today by an unmistakable growth of interest in theoretical approaches to the stubborn and persistent problems confronting a world leader. It has of course been apparent for over a decade that many American scholars were essentially dissatisfied with the dominant formalistic, legalistic and institutional approaches to international problems. Nicholas J. Spykman's *America's Strategy in World Politics* in 1942 represents an early and outspoken dissent to ways of thinking then prevailing. As international politics has emerged as the focal point of international studies, authorities in this field including Spykman, Frederick S. Dunn, Hans J. Morgenthau, Harold Sprout, Reinhold Niebuhr, Grayson Kirk, William T. R. Fox and Arnold Wolfers have sought to lay bare the essential qualities of the structure and functioning of international society. As political questions have taken on preëminent importance, scholars have looked for the rudiments of a theory to give them meaning. Practitioners somewhat later have emphasized the need for more general principles. Thus former Secretary of State Dean Acheson observes: "We Americans in our study and writing on international relations have tended to shun theory and logical philosophic analysis of historical material—certainly in this century—in favor of narrative exposition and absorption in the problems of international organization."[1] Mr. Acheson and former colleagues on the Policy Planning Staff see "the great and overpowering need—'for an applicable body of theory.' "[2]

British and Canadian scholars, despite their historic concern with the harsh realities of international life, have been reluctant to venture too far along the treacherous highway of abstraction

[1] Louis J. Halle, *Civilization and Foreign Policy: An Inquiry for Americans* (New York, 1955), p. xvi.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

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and generalization. Modern history has held the field at Oxford and Cambridge and those British scholars like E. H. Carr, Herbert Butterfield, C. A. Manning, Martin Wight and Georg Schwarzenberger, whose published works reflect a conscious attempt to formulate a coherent framework for thought, have been subject to more than casual criticism from their traditionalist peers. Perhaps the pragmatic qualities that some claim to find in the British national character account for this suspicion of theory. It is also entirely possible that the claims of a certain group of American theorists who boldly assert the scientific authority of their work as against mere philosophical speculation and political theory have heightened opposition to these pursuits.

The historian Arnold J. Toynbee occupies an important place in the spectrum of British thinking on this problem. Mr. Toynbee is of course a theorist in the more general sense of the history of civilizations. He has erected a theory of international politics, however, which is less well known and must be extracted from occasional writing such as his contributions to the Royal Institute's annual *Survey of International Affairs*. His concern with large historical ideas and suggestive comparisons makes this analysis more than the mere chronological account of events, and of course his major historical work is replete with philosophic insights.

If Toynbee contributes to a theory bearing on the relations between national political units, he eschews the more extravagant claims of political behaviorists who maintain that theorists are scientists and may confidently look forward to much the same progression characterizing the evolution of any of the natural sciences. The historian Huizinga once observed that if the scientific character of history were emphasized, the greatest historians of former times would have to be excluded.[3] Despite Mr. Toynbee's dedication to the empirical method, he too would probably be dismissed as a member of this group. There are three limitations inherent in the nature of history which restrict any science of politics and apply to Mr. Toynbee's attempt to construct a more rational theory.

[3] Raymond Klibansky and others, *Philosophy and History* (London, 1936), pp. 3–4.

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The first is the limitation of materials. At first glance it would appear that this obstacle has here been surmounted. The screen upon which *A Study of History* is reflected is large enough to permit the illumination of from twenty to thirty civilizations over the time-span of 6,000 years. But this amplitude of material is more apparent than real, for on numerous occasions it becomes clear that Mr. Toynbee has proceeded from shreds of evidence and data which only imagination and guesswork could reconstruct. Minoan Civilization is the key to several of his principles but he admits he is "hampered by having no access to written records."[4]

Another handicap which confronts any historian is the limitation of his own energy and knowledge. In the *Study*, the architectural design is often much better than a good deal of the building material. The fund of available knowledge for the study of man is today so massive that no one can presume to speak authoritatively on all phases and periods of history. An isolated scholar, regardless of how enormous his learning, must draw heavily upon secondary sources. The problem here is to distinguish with reliability between good and inferior examples, and the strong and weak points, of those sources. In his dependence upon Bergson and Huntington, for example, Mr. Toynbee falls victim to this limitation. Perhaps only through coöperative efforts by teams of scholars can we expect any amelioration of this problem.

The third limitation is the paradox that historians must be both researchers and artists. History can be comprehended only through its narration. Here the observer stands not outside but curiously within the network of events he describes. The collection and ordering of data may be scientific up to a point; their recording and analysis require gifts of imagination and artistry of another order.

1. *"Laws" and Principles of History and Politics*

Despite Mr. Toynbee's defection from some of the tenets of modern social science, he must be considered a theorist. One of his foremost objectives has been to erect "laws" and

[4] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1934), vol. I, p. 93.

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principles which would demonstrate recurrence and regularity in history. An American scholar has argued on this point: "The absolutely unique, that which has no element in common with anything else is indescribable, since all description and all analysis are in terms of predicates, class concepts, or repeatable relations."[5] These predicates and relations are the keys to Mr. Toynbee's concept of history. He has asserted unequivocally that he conceives this to be both a necessary and manageable task. In a letter to this writer he notes: "As to the issue between recurrence and uniqueness, I think both elements are present in history as in everything else, and the logical difficulty of reconciling them is neither greater nor smaller in history than in other fields of thought."[6] He finds there is a compelling urgency to the job of formulating these principles of recurrence: "May not it mean that we ought all of us to give far more time and far more serious and strenuous thought than many of us have ever given to this job of forming one's general ideas?"[7]

Mr. Toynbee's "general ideas" in international politics as distinct from his "laws" of history spring from the soil of interstate relations. For example, he posits as a principle of political dynamics the balance of power which "comes into play whenever society articulates itself into a number of mutually independent local states."[8] He appears to maintain, subject to certain qualifications, that this principle characterizes all political constellations in which multiple units seek to relate their actions to one another. The aversion of modern intellectuals to this concept ought not to obscure the fact that the greatest of English-speaking philosophers have greater affinity for Toynbee's views than for those of his more utopian peers. Specifically, Edmund Burke declared: "The balance of power had been ever assumed

[5] Morris Cohen, *The Meaning of Human History* (LaSalle, Ill., 1947), p. 84.

[6] Letter from Mr. Toynbee to this writer dated April 19, 1950.

[7] Arnold Toynbee, Pieter Geyl, and Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Pattern of the Past* (Boston, 1949), pp. 90–91.

[8] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. III, p. 301.

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as the common law of Europe at all times and by all powers."[9] Since 1930 Mr. Toynbee has been fascinated particularly by one aspect of this "common law". He notes that, throughout most of history, the balance of power ineluctably has shifted from the center of a political system to its periphery. In contemporary history following World War I, Europe's declining position in world politics can be comprehended in terms of this law:

> . . . in the third century B.C., we see the city-states of Greece—an Athens, a Sparta, a Sicyon, a Megalopolis, a Rhodes—encircled and dwarfed by a ring of outer Powers which owed their own vitality to the elixir of Hellenism—a Macedon, a Syria, an Egypt, a Carthage, a Rome . . . [in] the Far Eastern extremity of the Old World, we shall similarly perceive the little states in the centre—a Song, a Chou, a Lu—which had been the seedbeds of Chinese culture, on the point of succumbing to the contending Great Powers on the Periphery: a Ts'i, a Ch'u, a Ts'in.
>
> From these analogies, it would appear that the plight in which . . . Europe found . . . [itself] was not after all an unprecedented departure from the ordinary course of history. . . .[10]

With similar illustrations from ancient and contemporary history Mr. Toynbee endeavors to prove that states which occupy the homeland of any civilization sooner or later are dwarfed and dominated by a new order of emerging "Great Powers" which inevitably spring up on the fringe.

No less pertinent for international politics is the "law" Mr. Toynbee evokes to account for the pattern in the recovery of great nations following major wars. The eventual recovery of Germany following World War I could have been forecast in at least a rough-and-ready reckoning, he believes, based on France's recovery following the Napoleonic Wars.

> The post-war recuperation of France after the General War of 1792–1815 declared itself when the Bourbon Restoration was supplanted by the Orleanist regime of Louis Philippe through the

[9] Edmund Burke, "Third Letter on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France", *Works and Correspondence*, vol. V (London, 1852), p. 381.

[10] *Survey of International Affairs, 1930*, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Oxford, 1931), p. 133.

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> Revolution of July 1830, in the fifteenth year after the decisive military defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. The post-war recuperation of Germany after the General War of 1914–18 declared itself in the fifteenth year after the capitulation of the Prussian General Staff. . . .[11]

A final illustration of this type of "law" may be found in Mr. Toynbee's thesis that in a conflict between more and less civilized antagonists, the latter enjoys decisive advantages in any protracted struggle.[12] It is the reasoning supporting this "law" which is of primary interest in this connection. The civilized Power has greater ability to mobilize moral and material energy in peace and war. In peace, this fact accounts for its remarkable progress; in war, it condemns it to expend its whole blood and treasure to the point of self-destruction. After the First World War in 1918, Germany lay prostrate for over a decade but Russia and Turkey were enabled to retrieve their previous losses in the space of a few years. A backward country is less likely to consume its full strength in war and thus retains a margin of power for bold adventures and new programs. One might wonder how truly this applied to the United States or even Great Britain after World War II. These principles are plainly as stimulating and suggestive as they are lacking in precision and verifiability. Nor do they provide more than the most general indication of the essential qualities of Toynbee's theory of international relations. Before we seek to identify the basic ingredients of his theory, however, it may be useful to point to the main features of his conception of international relations.

2. *The Nature of International Relations for Mr. Toynbee*

From the beginning there has been no unanimity among scholars in the field as to a proper definition of international relations. In the same way, Mr. Toynbee has moved uneasily through three separate definitions at three different stages in his thinking. In the nineteen twenties, he conceived of the field as limited narrowly "to the relations between sovereign

[11] *Ibid., 1933,* p. 112.

[12] Toynbee, *A Study of History,* vol. IV, pp. 393–94.

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independent states."[13] There was only a faint indication of any consciousness of the kind of problem which would be presented by the Spanish Civil War more than a decade and a half later. In a preface to the first *Survey* he made one prophetic addition to his theory: "Not states but relations between states have been chosen as the units, except in the few cases . . . in which the status or internal condition of a country was itself an international affair."[14]

In the nineteen thirties, however, Mr. Toynbee altered this definition and abandoned the sharp distinction between internal and foreign affairs. An American scholar made this same point with great persuasiveness by emphasizing that "there is no clear dichotomy between internal and foreign affairs."[15] Mr. Toynbee pointed out that this distinction was really little more than a convention which in most cases confused the individual who was seeking a proper understanding of the international drama.

More specifically in 1933 he was impressed that the two most outstanding events in international relations were the American depression and the German political revolution neither of which would have been properly defined under his first classification. Whenever the internal affairs of any one of the sixty or seventy countries affected the potential world distribution of power, but only then, they became a *bona fide* topic within international relations. He was arguing at this point that the mutual interpenetration of domestic and international affairs had become the rule rather than the exception. The historical episode which most emphatically confirmed this belief was the Spanish Civil War in the summer of 1936 which presented "the historian with another case of the . . . breakdown of the conventional distinction between 'internal' and 'foreign' affairs."[16] From the moment when hostilities

[13] *Survey of International Affairs, 1929*, p. 202.

[14] *Ibid., 1920–23*, preface.

[15] Edward M. Earle, "National Security", *Yale Review*, vol. XXIX (Spring, 1940), p. 452.

[16] *Survey of International Affairs, 1935*, vol. II, p. vii.

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were opened, the burning question of the day was whether the war was in fact a civil war or an international war upon a Spanish stage. Far from an academic exercise, this was a political issue fraught with all the danger which surrounded the possible drift of the five "Great Powers" in the direction of a general catastrophe.

A third conception of the scope of international relations which has occupied the attention of Mr. Toynbee down to the present day is a conception which is Janus-headed in character. One type of international relations is that among communities within a civilization; another is among the civilizations themselves. These two conceptions influence and affect one another and it is therefore incumbent upon scholars that they explore the latter form of international relations as carefully and as thoroughly as they have the former.

In recent years the foremost practical concern in international relations has been the analysis of power politics. On numerous occasions, Mr. Toynbee has made it plain that contemporary international society is one in which the precepts of Machiavelli have been more appropriate for action than those of Grotius. Our international politics is an expression of the fundamental and unceasing drives for power among individuals. Mr. Toynbee has remarked: "I certainly believe that anarchic power politics are simply the reflection of the power drives of a number of individuals."[17] On the level of individuals, power is manifested in numerous ways. In the Far East, the prestige of the Confucian scholars enabled them to dominate and ruthlessly exploit the peasants. In other civilizations, the peculiar positions of priests, philosophers, or warriors have permitted them to dominate. This underlying force of human conduct which is often concealed or disguised within a nation is obvious, fundamental and universal on the contemporary international scene.

Our surest guide for international politics as it is practiced is Machiavelli. If his exposition of the nature of politics "seemed shocking to Western minds for several centuries after the date of the publication of *The Prince*, it offended through being innocent of both obtuseness and hypocrisy, and not through

[17] Letter from Mr. Toynbee to this writer dated April 19, 1950.

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being guilty of any misrepresentation of the principles on which the philosopher's contemporaries and successors were acting in real life."[18]

There are ample illustrations of the workings of power politics which may be taken from Hellenic history. These include, for example, the curious shift in alliances among Greek city-states culminating in the policy of the Aetolian Confederacy of aligning itself with Rome against Macedon which ultimately involved Greece in the Hannibalic War. But power politics as such attains its present character only with the passing of the *Respublica Christianum*. Significantly, in Toynbee's discussion of the handling of the Crusades and relations with the House of Hohenstaufen, the papacy is criticized not for engaging in power politics but for making such poor guesses regarding the causes and leaders which should be encouraged. Some of the strongest passages in Mr. Toynbee's writings concern the radical discrepancy between the pretenses and ideological rationalizations of statecraft and the political principles on which action is really based.

One event which vividly illuminates the nature of international relations concerns the meeting of British and Persian statesmen following the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. The Persian statesman repeatedly mentioned his great disappointment at the cynical sacrifice of his nation upon the altar of the Anglo-Russian entente. British policy, he acknowledged, had been honorable and fair before 1907 but to sacrifice Persia now in this way was an act of moral degeneracy and timidity. The Englishman sought to explain by discussing Britain's strategic interests and the threat of a Russo-German Alliance. He asked his Persian friend to put himself in the British position and choose between the probable sacrifice of Persia to Russia and the possible destruction of Western Civilization. At this, the Persian lost his temper and declared that such cynicism was beyond all imagination. To speak with complacency of the sacrifice of Persia, "the priceless jewel of civilization", on the off-chance of saving a worthless Western society was sheer impudence. He concluded: "What should

[18] *Survey of International Affairs, 1933*, pp. 116–17.

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I have cared and what do I care now, if Europe perishes so long as Persia lives!"[19] Mr. Toynbee concludes with enviable candor that these views reflect more often than we might prefer the present standards of international society and the primacy of loyalty to the state in power politics.

It may serve to help us identify further Mr. Toynbee's approach if we note that two philosophies of international relations have coexisted in Western society for at least a century and a half. The one has been idealistic and moralistic in character and crusading in spirit. Rivalry and conflict among nations has been viewed as a mere temporary distortion of the normal pattern of international life. The second philosophy interprets politics as an unending struggle for power. It focuses attention on practical choices in diplomacy, on permanent aspects of foreign policies, and on techniques of accommodation and adjustment. The question it asks is what techniques are necessary and essential for international peace and order when there is no world state in existence nor any binding system of world law. In a most striking and revealing fashion, Mr. Toynbee combines these two philosophies in his own theory and emphasizes first one and then the other.

In the nineteen twenties and well into the nineteen thirties, he was a prominent spokesman of the idealist school. He appeared to agree with Lord Curzon that a new alliance between England and France would be inconsistent with the League of Nations. He noted with displeasure that the Franco-Polish military alliance "introduced an unfortunate element of *raison d'état*" into French policy respecting the sanctity of the European Peace Treaties. In appraising the work of the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments of the League of Nations, Mr. Toynbee emphasized the overweening influence of the munitions makers. At times he verged on the "devil" theory of politics, looking for individual scapegoats accountable for the sorry state of the world.

At the same time, his faith in the Leaque of Nations was often extravagant. He criticized Austria for turning to Italy at the time of the Ethiopian crisis. It seemed inconceivable

[19] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. I, pp. 162–63.

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that nations would depend upon traditional alliances now that a collective system was available. He spoke of the "sinister play of 'power politics' " within the League of Nations. "The League of Nations represented an attempt to reconcile peace with growth . . . treaty law with international equity. A relapse [from the League] . . . would signify . . . the problems of postwar Europe would not or could not, after all, be settled by the new method of reason, debate and a conciliation."[20] The underlying cause of these lapses was human wickedness and sin. He spoke of British and French foreign policy as "negative, weak-willed, cowardly egotism which . . . the reigning politicians . . . in deference to what they believed to be the will of their constituents—to stop short of an effective fulfillment of their own covenants."[21] The foreign policy of the United States was "captious and perverse . . . in the sight of a neutral observer."[22] All during this period, British interests, international law, and universal morality were equated. What served British interests was unabashedly said to further law and morality—in all cases. This is the Toynbee with whom students of power politics like E. H. Carr were especially impatient at the time.

There is a second Toynbee, however, who sets forth a philosophy of international politics which goes back to what some have called political realism. This is the Toynbee who emphasizes underlying political issues and the problem of conflicting foreign policies. In the mid-thirties he began to wonder whether a settlement between Germany and France was not more important than the perfecting of new machinery of international organization. At this point, we shall cite only two references from Mr. Toynbee's writings which illustrate the second philosophy.

> A definitive territorial settlement between Germany and France would assuredly do more than any other single international transaction . . . to assure . . . the peace of Europe. It could not,

[20] *Survey of International Affairs, 1930*, p. 10.

[21] *Ibid., 1935*, p. 2.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

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> perhaps, absolutely ensure that France and Germany should live, henceforth, in perpetual peace with one another; for the territorial question was not, unfortunately, the sole question . . . but if once the territorial conflict between the two principal Powers of Continental Europe were removed from the arena the whole international situation in Europe was likely to improve almost beyond the range of imagination.[23]

The second illustration represents Mr. Toynbee's outlook toward the United Nations and can well be contrasted with his earlier view of the League.

> The United Nations organization may fairly be described as a political machine for putting into effect the maximum possible amount of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union—the two great powers who would be the principal antagonists in a final round of naked power politics. The present constitution of the U.N. represents the closest degree of cooperation that the United States and the Soviet Union can reach at present.[24]

The final step in Mr. Toynbee's disenchantment with the idealistic philosophy of international relations appears to have been reached as we moved into the deepening Soviet-American crisis called the "cold war". In 1949 he declared: "anything that would enable us to buy time seems worth thinking about; and, therefore, I suggest a provisional partition of the world into a Russian and an American sphere by agreement between the two."[25] In the nineteen thirties Mr. Toynbee was critical of those so-called cynical views which were contrived merely to gain time. His more recent statement, however, places him alongside other students of diplomacy who have recognized the need for techniques appropriate to the unregulated character of international politics.

Finally, one observes an interesting correlation between Mr. Toynbee's general historical method at a given period and his philosophy of international affairs. There is at least a rough correspondence between his exclusively nation-centered

[23] *Ibid., 1934*, p. 627.

[24] A. J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial* (New York, 1948), p. 204.

[25] A. J. Toynbee, *The Prospects of Western Civilization* (New York, 1949), p. 46.

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historical method of the nineteen twenties and the exceedingly strong emphasis upon the idealistic philosophy of international relations. As the focus of his history shifts from nation to civilization to higher religion, there is a perceptible change from idealism to realism in international politics. Cautious and hesitating at first, this change becomes clear as his thinking reflects the mounting crisis between East and West. It may be worthy of note that this same combination of theological absolutism and political relativism can be found in Niebuhrian Protestantism and the proclamations of the Vatican on the "cold war".

3. *The Balance of Power as Law or Alternative*

Mr. Toynbee's ambivalence between idealism and realism, the two prevailing ways of thinking about international politics, can be tested by examining his approach to one of the fundamental problems of international society. The balance of power is discussed in almost every treatise on international politics, but the place and significance it is given depend upon which of two philosophies the writer or publicist has accepted. A popular and widely held view assumes that statesmen have a choice between policies based upon the balance of power and more desirable policies based on morality and justice. A second and less popular view has served as the common law of diplomats and statesmen for at least the past four centuries. It maintains that "any given system is perpetually subject to that play of political forces which is known as the Balance of Power."[26] There is a social principle underlying the relations of independent units which provides that stability can be achieved through a tendency of the separate units to establish and reëstablish some kind of equilibrium. This equilibrium is at best uncertain, precarious and temporary, for life can never be kept in a static balance but is subject to unceasing change and variation. A rough stability is achieved from time to time, however, through forces which combine to reëstablish the lost equilibrium. This social law can be formulated in terms that are broader than international politics:

[26] *Survey of International Affairs, 1930*, p. 134.

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> If one species happens to vary in the direction of greater independence, the interrelated equilibrium is upset and cannot be restored until a number of competing species have either given way to the increased pressure and become extinct, or else have answered pressure with pressure and kept the first species in its place, by themselves too discovering means of adding to their independence.[27]

Mr. Toynbee never leaves any doubt as to which of these positions has greater relevance for the present. For him, as we have seen, "the Balance of Power is a system of political dynamics that comes into play whenever a society articulates itself into a number of mutually independent local states."[28] The balance of power manifested itself during the second chapter in the history of our own Western Civilization which extended in duration from 1075 to 1475. Then the structure of our contemporary multiple state system was being foreshadowed among the little North Italian city-states. The same system of pressures and balances operated to preserve the independence of individual states and prevent their domination by any would-be conqueror. Moreover, one can extract from this episode in history principles and "laws" which will be manifested again in other political constellations.

One "law" which comes into play when balance-of-power policies are successfully pursued provides that "the Balance of Power operates in a general way to keep the average calibre of states low in terms of every criterion for the measurement of political power: in extent of territory and in head of population and in aggregate of wealth."[29] When conditions are most favorable for the operation of balance of power, this condition obtains. Thus Quincy Wright asserts that "stability will increase as the parity in the power of states increases."[30] Much of the anxiety over contemporary problems has been produced by an awareness that this condition has been destroyed by the emergence of the two "Super-Powers" since World War II.

[27] Julian S. Huxley, *The Individual in the Animal Kingdom* (London, 1912), pp. 115–16.

[28] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. III, p. 301.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

[30] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago, 1942), vol. II, p. 755.

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In another "law", Toynbee asserts that a balance-of-power policy can be most effectively applied and executed at the fringe or periphery rather than at the center of a political system. The pressures which resist the necessary adjustment and accommodation are intensified at the center of a system. The job of a diplomat is, therefore, compounded when he deals with resentments and jealousies over small plots of territory at the heart and core of an established state system. A corollary of this theory which the political scientist finds more immediately significant is the principle of international politics that conflicts of power are most effectively composed in political "open spaces" away from the territories of the dominant Powers. What is of interest here is the political and diplomatic significance of Mr. Toynbee's thesis. Africa has traditionally performed the function of "open space" for the European Powers, as have Afghanistan, Siam, and sometimes America. Within Europe a similar rôle has been played by buffer states "which, precariously protected by the equilibrium of the vast masses around them . . . preserve their poise by maintaining a rigid neutrality."[31] Such was the pattern of European power politics in the half-century between 1871 and the First World War.

A third "law" takes as its text the theme that in practice the purpose of the balance of power is to maintain order and safeguard the independence of member states within a political system. If this is taken as our guide in evaluating the balance of power, then its record has been quite successful. Expecially until the Partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century this principle was useful and effective. "In all the warfare between French and Spanish armies, and French and Austrian armies, that met in battle on Italian soil in the course of nearly four centuries of European contests from the days of Charles VIII to the days of Napoleon III, no combatant, from first to last, ever dealt his adversary a mortal blow."[32] These achievements were possible because of a moral and political climate which has since disappeared. The moral consensus

[31] *Survey of International Affairs, 1926*, pp. 18–19.

[32] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. III, p. 311.

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to which Gibbon pointed in 1781 was primarily responsible for the nature of European politics during the four centuries of "temperate and undecisive" warfare. The balance of power was ideally suited for its principal task under these conditions; for, as Gibbon observed, it would "continue to fluctuate, and the prosperity of our own or the neighbouring kingdoms may be alternately exalted or depressed; but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts and laws and manners."[33] If international peace instead of order is made the yardstick for the balance of power, then its history becomes a far more melancholy one.

A final "law" is a summary of the others. It contends that the balance of power is a universal instrument of foreign policy for any nation seeking to preserve its independence. From Henry VIII to Winston Churchill it has been the first principle of British foreign policy. Its ubiquitous character is revealed in Greek politics where leagues were formed against Athens, Sparta, or Thebes when one or the other represented the dominant threat. Moreover, the Phoenician and Etruscan foes of the Greeks themselves combined to defend their vital interests. In the religious sphere the universality of this force emerged in the contests between Christians and non-Christians in the Roman Empire. Under Christian emperors and under pagans such as Julian there was mutual toleration based on an equilibrium of power rather than on common moral principles. ". . . during those years, the material strength of the Christians and non-Christians in the Roman empire was approximately equal, so that, for the time being, neither party could attempt to suppress the other with any hope of success."[34] When this equilibrium was superseded by a superiority of power for the Christians, the policy of toleration was abandoned with alacrity.

In international administration, the balance of power can be observed in certain technical arrangements. Thus in 1929, "the new Tangier settlement was an attempt to express a diplomatic balance of forces between four European Powers."[35]

[33] Quoted in *ibid.*

[34] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. IV, p. 226.

[35] *Survey of International Affairs, 1929*, p. 198.

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The territorial settlements which have provided for joint occupations of regions or areas are other examples. Within certain limitations, the boundaries of these formal arrangements are roughly the same as the power factors that underlie and are present in actual international politics. So the balance of power is equally present in administration and politics during historical epochs from 500 B.C. to the present.

If we turn from broad principles to the question of implementing the balance of power, we note that the balance of power has worked most effectively whenever there has been some nation which was the "holder" of the balance. Occasionally a Power has retained enough freedom of action substantially to affect the prospects of war or peace by joining with the weaker nations threatened with domination and control. Mr. Churchill has pointed out that this has been "the wonderful unconscious tradition of British foreign policy." England has "joined with the less strong Powers, made a combination among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military tyrant whoever he was, whatever nation he led."[36] Venice among the North Italian city-states performed this function. The immediate question which has concerned Mr. Toynbee and others is whether there is at present any nation on the political horizon willing or able to perform this task. The notion that England could once more take up this rôle is "an academic dream in an age in which Great Britain had been welded to the Continent by links of air."[37] Modern technology has destroyed the foundations on which this policy had rested. Indeed, despite his convictions about the balance of power, Mr. Toynbee is not so sure this policy was the best one for implementing its security even in earlier centuries. "The English, again, were not really unaware of the fact that England had never, at any time in her history, been able to keep out of any major European conflict that might conceivably end in Europe falling under the military domination of some

[36] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. I: *The Gathering Storm* (Boston, 1948), p. 208.

[37] *Survey of International Affairs, 1933*, p. 170.

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single Power."[38] This statement was written in the early 1930's when he was opposing the position of Mr. Churchill. Again at the time of the Manchurian crisis he wrote in even sharper tones in criticizing the British Foreign Office for seeking "to finesse in the manner of those eighteenth century diplomatic virtuosi who sought to save their own countries and to 'preserve the Balance of Power' by deftly playing off one neighbour against another."[39] Whether for moral or technical reasons, there is little chance that England can continue to fulfill her traditional rôle. Nor for that matter could the British Commonwealth collectively. He answers the question regarding the ability of this larger unit to act as a "balancer" by saying: "On a bare statistical test, yes; on a geographical and political test, no!"[40]

The view has become popular that Western Europe as a united confederation in world politics might serve as a "Third Force". "This suggestion, too, wears a promising appearance at first sight; but it, in turn, fails to stand the test of examination."[41] The only practical way of seriously pursuing this goal was the policy which Hitler sought to impose on all Europe. "Hitler's Europe—a Europe forcibly united by German conquest and consolidated under German domination—is the only kind of Europe that could conceivably be a match in war potential for either the Soviet Union or the United States."[42] The destruction of the Nazi enterprise is a measure of the prospects for this being achieved. With the partition of Europe in practice between East and West, this remote possibility becomes an outlandish vision. The conclusion one reaches is that "the dead weight of European tradition now weighs lighter than a feather in the scales, for Europe's will no longer decides Europe's destiny. Her future lies on the knees of the giants who now overshadow her."[43] As one of the regional organizations within the larger

[38] *Ibid., 1934*, p. 324.

[39] *Ibid., 1932*, p. 540.

[40] Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, p. 138.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 124.

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United Nations, Europe can exert an influence, but as a "balancer" in the contest for world domination she is almost powerless.

Are there other candidates for this ancient and important task of the "holder" of the balance? Some have maintained that China or India, because of their vast territory, great population and plentiful resources, could qualify. The answer Mr. Toynbee offers is that "these two mammoths are most unlikely to prove able to exert their latent strength during the critical period of history that lies, we may guess, immediately ahead of us."[44]

During most of the history of the modern state system the main weights of the balance of power were predominantly in Europe. Expansion of any major political importance was conducted by Western European countries which bounded the Atlantic Ocean or the North Sea. Indeed,

> . . . for several centuries this particular balance did not transcend the limits of Western and Central Europe. For example, no Islamic countries entered into it until the General War of 1792–1815, and no Far Eastern countries until the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance a dozen years before the outbreak of the General War of 1914–18.[45]

Since the beginning of World War II, however, the principal weights in the balance of power have become non-European. Similarly, the scales of the balance have been transplanted from Europe to the United States and the Soviet Union. All other local or "inferior" balances have become mere functions of the dominant world system.

It is possible to estimate the approximate weights already in opposite scales of the balance of power. Most of the nations which appreciably affect the world-wide distribution of power are committed to either the Soviet or American bloc and so there is less uncertainty about the strength of the major protagonists. The chances of fresh reserves of power being thrown in at the "eleventh hour" have been greatly diminished. At

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 142.

[45] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. I, p. 28.

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least this is true for the immediate future. What interested Mr. Toynbee in 1948 was that on this basis the United States and the West were "so much stronger than the Soviet Union that, short of attempting to wrench out of her rival's grip some country upon which the Soviet Union had already fastened its hold, it is apparently possible today for the United States to assert her own protectorate over any country she chooses in the no-man's-land between the Soviet Union and herself."[46] Turkey and Greece lie on the very threshold to the chief granary of the Russians in the Ukraine and the Caucasus. Yet we have had sufficient power to extend our influence to the boundaries of the Soviet sphere. This factor coupled with an immense superiority in technology appeared in 1948 to give us a preponderance in the world balance of power. One word of caution offered by Mr. Toynbee then was that the dynamic and simple communist ideology might whittle away this advantage through a process of missionary appeals and political penetration. Only a program of social transformation could compete with this revolutionary ideology and on this point there was some question as to how far the world could be attracted "by the present rather conservative American gospel of out-and-out individualism." An estimate today would be less favorable to the West than when Mr. Toynbee made his earlier comparison, and it is noteworthy that the bipolar world has already tended to fragment into local and regional centers of power to an extent he had not anticipated.

Finally, Mr. Toynbee, as his approach has matured, has maintained that there are probably no clear and distinct alternatives to the balance of power. Even his conception of the world state has been revised and "politicized" so that one "Great Power" or combination of Powers would serve as its cornerstone. In the "idealist" period of his writing, Mr. Toynbee gave the impression of sharing the misconception that statesmen and politicians have a choice between balance-of-power policies and a better kind of international relations. Of Mr. Neville Chanberlain's "Munich" policy he wrote that it was an attempt "to make the perilous passage from a newfangled

[46] Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, p. 144.

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British foreign policy based on a collective system of international security within the framework of the League of Nations to an old-fashioned policy based on the Balance of Power."[47] Again, in his study of the history of Islam he depreciates the policy of the twelfth- and thirteenth-century Caliph Nasir who sought to check the imperialist adventures of any of the "successor states" which threatened to become too strong. "This hazardous play with an unstable Balance of Power was less statesmanlike than the simultaneous efforts that Nasir made to rehabilitate the Caliphate by peaceful means."[48]

On the surface, this appears to be a thoroughgoing repudiation of political principles which are basic to the balance of power. In fact, however, there is some evidence that these statements may not be fully representative even of Mr. Toynbee's "idealist" thinking. At the time of Munich, he refers to the argument that the balance of power is unreal and thus cannot have been affected by German expansionism. He observed then: "That is comforting; I can go to sleep again. All the same, I rather mistrust this argument that such a thing as 'the balance of power' does not exist."[49]

He goes on to show, in a way reminiscent of the famous memorandum of Sir Eyre Crowe, that Great Britain has always taken steps to prevent the aggravation of any political situation where there was a threat to the European balance of power. Was Munich this kind of a situation? One school of thought insisted that no threat existed since Germany had for centuries dominated Central Europe. This point is unacceptable to Mr. Toynbee, for he properly distinguishes domination by a unified Germany from that by a disunited Germany, as in the past. An imperialist state which has united eighty million people is a different kind of threat than a loose confederation of princes and petty rulers. Against the former, the same policy which had been used against Louis XIV, Napoleon and

[47] *Survey of International Affairs, 1935*, vol. II, p. 479.

[48] Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. III, p. 212, n. 3.

[49] Toynbee, "After Munich: The World Outlook", *International Affairs*, vol. XVIII (January-February 1939), p. 9.

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the Kaiser must be employed. ". . . we have generally resisted the domination of Europe by a single Power when there seemed a possibility that the Power would use its domination of the Continent to threaten the independence of the British Isles and the interests of Great Britain overseas."[50] This is surely an outlook which leaves little room for a conception of foreign policy based on alternatives to the balance of power.

The source of confusion between these contradictory statements about the balance of power is probably a deep conviction born of the times that the new system of collective security was a step beyond the previous techniques for preventing wars. If Mr. Toynbee's fervor was extravagant, so were the sentiments of most fellow interpreters at that time. Obviously the last statement we have quoted more nearly reflects his permanent views on the balance of power, made just as he was crossing the chasm which separates the "idealist" from the "realist" school of thought. Within or outside a collective security system, the balance of power is plainly one of the paramount forces in international politics.

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[50] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES IN POST-WAR POLAND

THE purpose of this article is to identify the causes of the most significant social changes of the "institutional revolution" occurring in post-war Poland rather than to account for all the major changes which have taken place since 1945. It is especially concerned with changes which have contributed to the integration of the social system with economic developments. Socio-economic integration in a communist society is consciously pursued through a policy of planning. Communist planning means much more than mere solving of economic problems; it is equally concerned, as Maurice Dobb puts it, "with wider issues concerning those social relationships which compose the basic texture of society."[1] Accordingly, this article will deal with some of the social effects of economic planning in post-war Poland.

The basis for a new social pattern in post-war Poland was established by the new geographical boundaries, by the agrarian reform, and by the rapid industrialization following the nationalization of basic industries imposed by the Communist government in the last decade.

The geographical changes were the result of the post-war settlement by which Poland lost her predominantly agricultural Eastern territories to the Soviet Union. By the same settlement Poland gained in the West more industrialized provinces, the so-called Recovered Territories. The ratio of urban to rural population was affected by frontier changes even before economic reconstruction and industrialization started. The agricultural population, representing 61 per cent of the total population before the war, dropped to 46 per cent by 1950.[2] The net loss of rural population was about five million, excluding war losses.[3] The problem of surplus agricultural labor, estimated

[1] Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917* (London, 1948) p. 33.

[2] *Wiadomości statystyczne* (*Statistical News*), February 1951, special communiqué.

[3] Over nine million persons inhabited rural areas east of the Curzon line, while rural gains in the Recovered Territories equal three million; at the same time the urban gains roughly cover urban losses due to territorial changes.

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before the war by various authors at between five and nine million,[4] had been largely solved by the shift in boundaries alone. It should also be noted that the ratio of cultivated land to the total area surpassed the pre-war ratio as the result of geographical changes. It also appears that seasonal work movement between industry and agriculture has almost ceased, as compared with 1938.[5] The urban population was more severely affected by war losses and by the virtual annihilation of the Jews who had once owned very substantial interests in commerce and in handicraft industries. Their number was reduced from three million in 1939 to 50,000 in 1949.[6] The land reform of 1946 dispossessed the landowning gentry class and by reducing the area cultivated by richer peasants created a tendency toward leveling up of the peasant class.

A number of factors which were primarily intended to help economic efficiency molded society in the industrialization drive; they were the trade unions, the factory councils,[7] the labor laws, and the new principles of social control, socialist discipline of labor, and socialist competition. The trade unions in particular have been playing a dual social and economic rôle.

I

As organs promising a new social integration, the trade unions molded the workers of town and country backgrounds by instilling into them the principles of socialist labor discipline as well as communist principles of the organization of society. As organs with an economic purpose they prod the worker to a more strenuous effort for the purpose of fulfilling and surpassing production plans. In a sense they are a national aspect of the problem of social control with which the factory councils are

[4] Instytut Ekonomiki Rolnej, *Wieś w liczbach* (*Agricultural Statistics*) (Warsaw, 1952), p. 28.

[5] "Der Beschäftigungsindex Polens von 1925 bis 1952", *Wirtschaftsdienst*, vol. IV, No. 9 (36), September 1952, p. 3.

[6] "Satellite Demography", *News From Behind the Iron Curtain*, vol. IV, No. 5, May 1955, pp. 25 *et seq.*, from estimate in W. P. Mauldin and D. S. Akers, *The Population of Poland* (Washington, 1954).

[7] *Rady zakladowe*—also styled Workers' Councils or Works' Councils.

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concerned on a specialized, departmental level. But the trade unions do not exercise social control as much as they indoctrinate the rank and file of workers with a desire for it. The real control from below comes from the factory councils and is counter-checked by the managers who are entrusted, as in the Soviet Union, with the "verification of fulfillment"[8] or "control of work accomplished on current plans."[9]

The factory councils, which were established by a decree of February 6, 1945, are workers' representative bodies in every workshop or factory employing over twenty workers.[10] The council and the management of the factory coöperate to achieve higher productivity.[11] There are monthly talks in which the director, his administrative and technical personnel, representatives of the council and the most active workers participate.[12] The factory councils give advice on problems such as how to achieve the estimated production and utilize to the best advantage the available raw materials and machinery; how to work out the best devices for safety and hygiene by which efficiency could be improved; how to bring planned order into the processes of production, initiate a saving campaign, and eliminate waste, inefficiency, unwillful negligence and criminal neglect that jeopardize production.[13]

These "police" functions may have economically beneficial effects. But the more involved the factory councils are in the economic policies of their factories, the less can they be concerned with general labor issues; in practice, they have no voice in determining the government's social policy in labor matters. Even their participation in planning is purely nominal;

[8] A term used in A. A. Arakelian's *Industrial Management in the U.S.S.R.* (Washington, 1950), p. 91.

[9] *Ibid.*, translator's note.

[10] Mieczysław Kijas, *Prawo społeczne* (*Social Law*) (Warsaw, 1949), vol. I, p. 236.

[11] Włodzimierz Szczepański, *Rady zakładowe* (*Workers' Councils*) (Warsaw, 1947), p. 26.

[12] Kijas, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

[13] Komisja Centralna Związków Zawodowych w Polsce, *Przewodnik dla rad zakładowych* (*Guide for Workers' Councils*) (Warsaw, 1947), pp. 20, 25, 26.

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the "counterplans" they produce often in coöperation with the plant management, together with promises to reach the goals of the national economic plan, have no effect on what the plan purports to achieve.[14] The workers' participation in planning, the principle of socialist competition and the Stakhanovite movement serve only as incentives in the production processes. This suits the purpose of planning which, as Alexander Baykov says, "is a reality when the execution of the plan is effected by means of direct orders and instructions" and not "by applying indirect measures".[15]

While giving a worker a modicum of administrative and managerial power, the factory councils deprive him of all political power. They themselves have no political power although they are required to enforce the party line in the factories. Their rôle ends there: they are no more than channels through which decisions are transmitted. These new organs have never been entrusted with authority, and it has been apparent that the older institutions, the trade unions, have lost the power they had possessed to bargain for economic benefits and defend the worker against the employer. Apparently, logic is turned upside down to imply that the people's state cannot now act against the worker since all means of production are his. Not only have the factory councils not gained what the trade unions have lost; their efforts, being what Professor C. E. Black calls a "psychological substitute for the more decisive influence",[16] only make the workers better subjects of managerial supervision.

II

Managerial control further imposes its tight grip by means of the recent labor legislation. In the new labor laws, the socio-economic motive has come to the fore. "Since the liberation," declared Kazimierz Rusinek, Minister of Labor, "Polish labor law

[14] Barrington Moore, *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power* (Cambridge, 1950), p. 302.

[15] Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (Cambridge, England, 1947), p. 424.

[16] Cyril E. Black, "The People's Democracies of Eastern Europe", in Taylor Cole (ed.), *European Political Systems* (New York, 1953), p. 255.

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is being bound more and more closely with the general process of economic and social reconstruction of the state."[17] The keynote of the labor law in Poland is discipline. Its emphasis is on duties and not on rights. Long before assurances as to the right to work and rest were given in February 1947 by the declaration of the legislature,[18] the decree of January 8, 1946 introduced a general duty to register[19] and compulsory work for all, except the unfit. The decree declared that the state will not tolerate shirking work which is socially useful. Four years later, on April 19, 1950, a special decree on the socialist discipline of labor stated that submission to the discipline of labor is a condition of successful fulfillment of the Six Year Plan.[20] Thus the principle of the discipline of labor was made a part of the economic system. The decree of April 1950 put stress on punctuality and regular work; it penalized absenteeism and gave honors and prizes in various forms to the workers who over a period of two or three years have been scrupulously regular and punctual in their attendance. This is what socialist discipline of labor amounts to in the strictly legal sense; yet in the broad sense it means much more: it encompasses devices known under the broad title of socialist competition that have not yet found expression in statute form, and the functioning of which is unthinkable without the climate provided by the social control. Without control socialist competition would never pass the stage of committee discussions and resolutions at plenary meetings. As it is, this competition uses the vast apparatus of social control to carry out the resolutions to achieve better results, stamp out waste, increase economies and lower the cost of production.[21]

[17] Ministerstwo Pracy i Opieki Społecznej, *Zbiór przepisów prawa pracy* (*Collected Labor Legislation*) (Warsaw, 1948), vol. I, p. v.

[18] Par. (j). *Cf. ibid.*, p. 7.

[19] This applied to all men between 18 and 25, and women between 18 and 45. Kijas, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 371.

[20] *Dz. U. R. P.* (*Polish Gazette*), No. 20, file 168. See also *Socjalistyczna dyscyplina pracy* (*Socialist Discipline of Labor*) (Warsaw, 1950), p. 5.

[21] W. Kłosiewicz, "Rozwijajmy współzawodnictwo pracy, wzmagajmy walkę o plan" (Let us develop the competition of labor and intensify the struggle for the plan), *Nowe Drogi* (*New Ways*), No. 5 (35), May 1952, pp. 31–32.

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To achieve this, it promotes monster labor festivals where factories, schools, offices, collective farms, and coöperative societies pledge to increase production and exceed the goals set by national plans. Thus in post-war Poland every year, in March and April, there have been large-scale competitions of labor to commemorate Workers' Day (May 1).[22] In 1952 some 1,100 state farms (*Państwowe Gospodarstwa Rolne*) and over 2,000 coöperatives decided to celebrate President Boleslaw Bierut's birthday with promises of more intensive work.[23] This "intensification" of productive effort is doubtful as a stimulus because the worker, who is constantly penalized by long hours of unremunerated overtime work, often reaches the stage of near exhaustion and also finds himself in a state of apathy in which incentive to earn more is much less attractive than the desire to do less work.

In exceptional cases, if the worker is lucky enough to make a technical improvement or invention, his initiative is rewarded by the state. Indeed, the state has encouraged and sponsored the inventors, granting a considerable number of patents. This encouragement of creative initiative which finds an outlet in what is known in American industry as "suggestions" is part of the principle of "socialist competition".[24] It found official sanction in the prizes awarded by the Ministry of Industry and Trade for labor- and time-saving devices.[25] Its chief significance is in its scale; it is all-embracing to the extent that all workers find themselves more or less involuntarily involved in the scramble for inventions. The result is, first, the creation of new labor-saving techniques, and, second, a spirit of labor discipline into which the competing workers are more and more submerged. The range of recorded inventions is wide, the possibilities are

[22] "Apel 'Pafawagu', Chraplewa i Millina" (The Call of 'Pafawag', Chraplewo and Millin), *Nowe Drogi*, No. 3 (33), March 1952, p. 7.

[23] Kłosiewicz, *loc. cit.*, p. 33.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 29. "Socialist competition" takes one of two forms: it may mean either pledging to exceed a norm or simply competing for results. It may involve individuals, teams, shifts or entire plants.

[25] Order No. 14 of October 21, 1948. Kijas, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 299.

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seemingly inexhaustible,[26] and the state tries to derive as much from the fact that the "toiling masses" are being constantly reminded of the necessity to think out better methods of work and to improve techniques as the industry gains in the savings made and in a quickened pace of production.

Yet socialist discipline of labor is a communist invention only in name; devices such as the workers' initiative, for instance, have been practiced widely in capitalist industries and were not unknown in pre-war Poland. The main difference in this respect between the communist and non-communist countries seems to be that of emphasis. If the capitalist industrial society is, as Peter Drucker sees it,[27] exclusively concerned with economic advancement, the social goal of an individual belonging to such a society is limited to a purely economic reward, and is devoid of all glory "of dignity and individual fulfillment",[28] for which men yearn. As this yearning is not satisfied, "status in work", to quote Professor V. A. Demant, "seems to be an elemental need which no modern industrial society has succeeded in according to the mass of men."[29] In communist Poland where the group is put higher than the individual, the approach to status is different. As in other satellite countries a worker with no real freedom will have his work labeled as "functionally significant".[30] Status is given as a substitute for freedom, as if it could be forgotten that without the latter it has no meaning. Rudolf Schlesinger writes:

> The very success of the [Russian] Revolution has created a new order of social values and a new social hierarchy, which is distinguished from the pre-revolutionary by the fact that higher income and social prestige is derived exclusively from a larger contribution made by the particular citizen to the national economic effort.[31]

[26] In two weeks' time 1365 projects were submitted in the "Pa-fa-wag" (State-owned Railway Carriage Manufacturing Establishment in Wroclaw) plants alone. Kłosiewicz, *loc. cit.*, p. 28.

[27] Peter F. Drucker, *Concept of the Corporation* (New York, 1946), p. 151.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] V. A. Demant, *Religion and the Decline of Capitalism* (London, 1952), p. 154.

[30] Professor Demant refers to "functional significance" in *op. cit.*, p. 94.

[31] Rudolf Schlesinger, *Soviet Legal Theory* (London, 1951), p. 232.

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This principle, no longer true in the case of the Soviet Union, is also not true of people's democracies. One of the paradoxes of the communist reclassification of social values is the coexistence of the new approach to status, apparently an economically beneficial phenomenon, with, first, the principle of forced labor, and, secondly, what could be termed "hyper-accountability". The economic usefulness of these two phenomena is doubtful and their existence can be justified only on grounds of doctrinal exigencies.

Hyper-accountability is a foster child of a legal principle, *nullum crimen sine poena*, well adapted to the communist conception of justice. According to this principle, society is to be protected against crime independently of the individual guilt. The crime itself must not remain unpunished, but it is immaterial who bears the penalty. The process of crime detection is reduced to basic essentials and is simplified to the utmost because discovery of a mere criminal intention is a sufficient proof of guilt, and a simple negligence involves severe punishment.[32]

Hyper-accountability is the unknown factor without which the organization and functioning of a firm in a Communist-planned economy cannot be fully appraised. It leads to grossly uneconomic results. Yet, it is an outcome of planning, of constant production drives, and cannot be disposed of so long as strict execution of planned orders is required. It involves all members of the management engaged in the work of fulfilling the plan. Hyper-accountability is evident on every level, making each employee dependent on the good humor of his superior. It sets into motion a huge apparatus of bureaucracy, without which the planners would never be able to determine whether the plans have been completed, and throws its excessive burden on the shoulders of both the management and the workers. It piles up administrative and economic sins, making a custom out of illegal practices, among which hoarding of stocks and

[32] The atmosphere in which hyper-accountability is flourishing has been well described in Arthur Koestler's classic *Darkness at Noon*: "Our engineers work with the constant knowledge that an error in calculation may take them to prison or the scaffold; the higher officials . . . ruin and destroy their subordinates, because they know that they will be held responsible for the slightest slip and be destroyed themselves. . . " (Signet Book edition, New York, 1952), p. 115.

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barter trading are minor offenses. It encourages deception through simulating the successful achievement of productive goals.[33] It is conducive to the manipulation of accounts in order to show fulfillment or over-fulfillment of plans. It leads to anomalies such as extensive practicing of "pull" with higher officials, by the management, in order to obtain favorable allocations of raw materials and funds, to enhance production; and it also leads to a widespread system of coöperation between officials and the management in illegal or semi-legal dealings involving corruption and bribery.

In Poland, corruptibility of officials had reached hitherto unknown proportions; it existed under the German occupation, but has since become a part of the system. Sheer inadequacy of wages and salaries compels officials to double or treble their salaries by accepting bribes and gifts.

Hyper-accountability, moreover, is harmful to the working of the industrial machinery, because it deprives managers of the full control they should possess. In addition to the strict control by the Commissariat concerned, and the party, the manager is subject to constant challenge by the Stakhanovists and party activists, raising the production goals higher than those set by the management,[34] and disturbing the smoothly working system of mutual support that many people from top to bottom are desperately trying to preserve. The clashes of interests and frictions due to hyper-accountability are only too apparent.

The predicament of a Soviet manager or administrator has been described in *The Economist*:

> If he runs a factory, he knows that he must achieve the target set him by the central planners. He knows that, with the raw materials and labour force provided for him, he is likely to fail;

[33] Joseph S. Berliner in "The Informal Organization of the Soviet Firm", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. LXVI, No. 3, August 1952, describes the four principal techniques of simulation—producing the wrong assortment of goods, falsified accounting of goods in process, lowering the quality of output, and misappropriation of funds. In post-war Poland the quality of goods has declined, often because of lack of primary resources which had not been delivered in time by the Soviet Union.

[34] On this issue see Berliner, *loc. cit.*, pp. 363–364.

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> and that if he does he will face at best demotion and poverty, at worst savage punishment for sabotage. If he observes the law and carries out orders he is doomed. To save himself he must cook his accounts, falsify his contracts, hoard his materials, bribe his foremen, exploit his workers, and make illegal transactions with other factories.[35]

The social danger inseparable from hyper-accountability is even more serious in a country where the process of enslavement has not gone far than in a highly sovietized state where the workers offer no resistance to the bureaucratic machinery. But in a people's democracy where the memory of the old way of life is fresh and alive, hyper-accountability not only is detrimental to the country's economic functioning but also leads to desperate discontent and social unrest.

The institution of forced labor camps plays a similar rôle. Considerations that shaped decisions of those who planned the camps lie in the sphere of policy and doctrine; labor camps are a convenient reservoir into which undesirable human elements can be pooled, and they inspire enough horror both to intimidate elements hostile to the régime and to coerce "free" workers to increase productive efforts. The incentive value of slave laborers lies in the fact that the "norms" they achieve are set as goals for "free" workers. Slave laborers do their utmost to fulfill the norms because this is often the condition of reduction of the period of enslavement. "Free" workers, on the other hand, having no such powerful incentive, lag behind, and are penalized for inefficiency or "sabotage".

In Poland, there is no need for slave labor camps as reservoirs of manpower. In effect, they drain the labor market of the available manpower. This is an obvious disadvantage in time of industrialization. Forced labor, moreover, is not advantageous economically in countries where the cost of capital equipment is lower than in the Soviet Union, and where a comparatively greater number of skilled workers exist with pre-communist experience in modern industrialization.[36] In Poland,

[35] "The New Privileged Classes", *The Economist* (London), November 22, 1952, p. 547.

[36] G. I., "Forced Labor in the Satellite States", *The World Today*, vol. IX, No. 3, March 1953, p. 127.

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as in Czechoslovakia, labor is comparatively scarce and can be utilized more productively than in forced labor camps. The forty-two camps containing probably about 50,000 inmates[37] have not been established and maintained for predominantly economic reasons. Polish industry is centered in well-populated areas where the supply of labor is generally adequate. The government, moreover, uses the expedient of directing any number of "free" workers to any areas that may require labor.[38] Yet the alternative of increasing the use of slave labor as an expedient will perhaps be adopted if the resistance of the peasants to collectivization succeeds. If the influx of laborers from land to industry, which was increasing under the Six Year Plan, proves insufficient, the solution could be to increase slave labor, officially known as the "labor reserve". Such a movement would serve two purposes. It would provide manpower to plants, and by eliminating the kulaks and reluctant middle peasants it would subdue the peasantry—a class obstructing the fulfillment of socialization. Of what use exactly the slave labor camps will be in the future is a matter of speculation. At present they are a consequence of political terrorism, and are used by planners as a "stick" to ensure efficiency. Their potential importance in the future is based on the fact that the organization, although comparatively small in Poland, has all the features of permanency visible in its Soviet counterpart.

III

An examination of the economic aspects of social changes shows that, although the reasons for changes are sometimes doctrinal, there are few indications of flagrant violation of economic principles by ideological considerations. But it would be futile to deny that economic policy is being repeatedly used as a tool for social revolution. The greatest scope for social revolution was offered by the Six Year Plan mainly because

[37] Richard K. Carlton (ed.), *Forced Labor in the People's Democracies* (New York, 1955), pp. 154, 163. Leland Stowe, however, quoted 400,000 for September 1951. *Conquest by Terror—The Story of Satellite Europe* (New York, 1951), p. 169. According to one source in 1953 there were 175 camps with 180,000 inmates. *The World Today, loc. cit.*, p. 125.

[38] Statute of March 7, 1950. *Dz. U. R. P.* (*Polish Gazette*), 1950, Law No. 107.

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of such processes involved as industrialization, technological improvement, coöperative movement, and collectivization. As a result of economic changes a regrouping of social classes took place: the number of peasants needed in collectives was smaller, but, as a natural consequence of the larger number of industrial establishments, the body of workers increased. According to Stalinist theory, socialist industrialization not only wipes out capitalist forms but also strengthens the position of the working class. "Every new plant", writes David J. Dallin, "increases the number of workers in the country and decreases the number of artisans and peasants; the establishment of a new plant increases the number of that portion of the population which the government regards as most devoted to it, or, at any rate, most obedient."[39] By creating industrial conglomerations the planners can mold the structure of society and obtain the desired ratio between factory workers, peasants and white-collar employees. The big metallurgical project *Nowa Huta*, established near Cracow, for instance, will not simply mean industrialization of the Cracow area and will not only create an outlet for surplus agricultural workers, but will reverse the class ratio, grafting into the body of the Cracow district some 100,000 new workers.

But the social changes involved are not simply shifts of population from rural to urban areas, or the setting up of nation-wide labor reserve training systems of labor youth battalions (*Służba Polsce*—"Service to Poland"—organization). The trends of economic policy indicate intensification of the class struggle. Coöperatives, for instance, are mentioned by Oscar Lange as being primarily instruments of the class struggle. "Together with nationalized business they crowd out private trade and eliminate from the nationalized economy capitalist elements both in the city and in the village. In the second place, co-ops are instruments in organizing a socialist form of production."[40]

Although after full collectivization of agriculture the disproportion between urban and rural areas is expected to disappear, so far the introduction of planned economy to the sphere

[39] David J. Dallin, *The Real Soviet Russia* (New Haven, 1948), p. 123.

[40] Oscar Lange, "Cooperatives in New Poland", *Poland of Today*, vol. IV, No. 11, November 1949, p. 18.

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of agriculture has brought a sharpening of class antagonisms, especially visible in the singling out of the kulaks from the middle peasants (*sredniaks*), now most numerous, and small peasants. Unity between town and country is a goal, but it is being stressed that this is to be reached with the simultaneous extermination of the kulaks.[41] Various means have been prepared to fight the kulak. The incompatibility of his interests with those of poorer peasants has been brought to public attention, mainly through the channels of party organization.[42] He has been decried as representing the main enemy foothold in socialist Poland.[43] Already in 1948 Hilary Minc pointed to the methods by which the government was fighting the rich peasant while favoring the poor. He stressed the need for class differentiation by such means as discriminatory taxation, credit policy, price policy, restricted use of machine tractor stations, and discrimination in admitting to membership of agricultural coöperatives.[44] Economic reforms were as a rule not only directed against the prosperous peasant but they set against him the poorer peasant whose interests they protected. Such was the case of the October 1950 currency reform that explicitly promoted the interests of poor and middle peasants. It gave to the owners of savings belonging to the latter groups

[41] B. Gałęski, "U podstaw dysproporcji między przemysłem a rolnictwem" (Causes of disproportion between industry and agriculture), *Gospodarka Planowa* (*Planned Economy*), vol. VII, No. 10, October 1952, p. 15. For the various means used to abolish what Stalin called "the antithesis between town and country" see Stefan Ignar, "Likwidacja przeciwieństwa między miastem a wsią w Polsce Ludowej" (Elimination in People's Poland of the disparity between town and country), *Myśl filozoficzna* (*Philosophical Thought*), No. 1 (7), 1953, pp. 83–113.

[42] Jan Klecha, "Wzmacniać siły Polski Ludowej—patriotyczny obowiązek chłopów pracujących" (To strengthen People's Poland is the patriotic duty of toiling peasants), *Nowe Drogi*, No. 4 (34), April 1952, p. 47.

[43] E. Ochab, "Dyskusja nad referatem B. Bieruta 'O umocnienie spójni między miastem i wsią w obecnym okresie budownictwa socjalistycznego' VII Plenum KC PZPR" (B. Bierut, "On the strengthening of unity between town and country in the present stage of socialist construction"—a discussion), *Nowe Drogi*, No. 6 (36), June 1952.

[44] See Hilary Minc, "Bieżące zadania partii w zakresie polityki gospodarczej i społecznej na wsi" (The party's current tasks with respect to agricultural policy, social and economic), *Nowe Drogi*, vol. II, No. 11, Sept.-Oct. 1948, pp. 162–178.

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the right to convert them into new currency at a full exchange rate (equal to the exchange rate applicable to wages, prices, pensions, etc., that is, 3 new zlotys for 100 old zlotys), and it reduced the indebtedness of the poor to the rich peasants by letting the former pay their debts at a favorable rate, 1:100[45] ordinarily good for cash exchanges only.

The seriousness of the attack made by the state against the kulaks can be realized only when the vagueness of the official description of kulaks as a social group is taken into account. In 1950, some 170,000 families were said to belong to that group.[46] Yet subsequently any middle peasants owning 15–25 acres have been classified in the same group. "Almost any land-owning farmer is either a kulak", says Leland Stowe, "by today's definition or by tomorrow's cunningly planned redefinition."[47] In practice any farmer is liable to be listed as an undesirable capitalist, and the immediate future of any but the poorest and landless peasants is precarious.

The social structure of rural areas is being similarly affected by nationalization of distribution, both wholesale (virtually nationalized by 1949) and retail. Nationalized trade is expected to eliminate all capitalist elements from the market and undermine the speculators who rely on the coöperation of the rich peasants. By creating a network of retail stores throughout the country (in the form of coöperatives in rural areas) the nationalized trade is intended to cater more adequately to local needs;[48] in effect it will tend to separate the rural from the urban communities, bringing to an end the peasant's dependence on the town for shopping purposes. The Six Year Plan was expected

[48] Nationalized retail stores numbered 16,834 in 1946 (including 15,500 co-operatives) while there were still 156,860 private stores. K. Boczar and H. Chołaj, "Rola i zadania handlu socjalistycznego w Polsce Ludowej" (The functions of socialist trade in People's Poland), *Ekonomista*, vol. I, 1955, p. 163. Between December 1947 and May 1950 the number of nationalized retail stores rose from 22,000 to 48,000. T. Sapociński, "Rozwój handlu uspołecznionego w planie 6-letnim" (The development of socialized trade in the Six Year Plan), *Gospodarka Planowa*, vol. V, No. 12, December 1950, p. 670.

[45] Janusz Malicki, "Reforma systemu pieniężnego" (Monetary reform), *Gospodarka Planowa*, vol. V, No. 11, November 1950, p. 595.

[46] Stowe, *op. cit.*, pp. 126–127.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

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to nationalize entirely retail turnover, 33 per cent of which was "socialized" in 1948, 55 per cent in 1949, 83 per cent in 1950, and 96 per cent in 1953.[49]

These developments in distribution have taken place simultaneously with industrialization and collectivization. The peasant, subject to collectivization and dispossession, will in theory be able to purchase in his local store the same articles he bought in the near-by town. Yet, in the foreseeable future, in neither type of store will there be a glut of consumer goods, and the poor peasant's capacity to pay will be met with an inadequate quantity of goods. Thus, the state-owned and state-run retail stores or coöperatives will only add to the seriousness of the situation created by the Communist policy. Neither will the new pattern of distribution help the much-advertised union between workers and peasants. The word "union", as used in Poland, has an unusual meaning. Once the kulaks are eliminated, "union" will mean no more than class truce. It is most unlikely that this class truce will invite coöperation between classes; it will rather confine each class to its place in order that the whole economic machinery might work with the least friction.

In Poland, so far there has been no class peace. Her political system is not rigid enough to make class struggle impossible.[50] Her two classes, the bureaucracy and the working class—the ruling classes in the U.S.S.R.[51]—have not yet "developed"

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 671. See also Boczar and Chołaj, *loc. cit.*, p. 166.

[50] In Soviet Russia, on the other hand, "the rigid political system had the function of preventing the emergence of a class struggle within the new society." Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 117. Any discussion of a class system is inconclusive if it does not start with a definition of a class. A good definition is given by Pitrim Sorokin in "Qu'est-ce qu'une Classe Sociale?", *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, vol. II, 1947, pp. 79–80. It insists on professional and economic links converging in the same social group (*couche*); it gives a solid basis for class differentiation which cannot consist in mere classification of various social groups (such as clergy, nobility, *bourgeoisie*, workers, peasants, intelligentsia, etc.) but ought to provide a flexible frame into which various patterns of classes would fit.

[51] This is according to the Trotskyist point of view. "It is possible", argues Max Shachtman, "to have more than one class ruling in a society resting upon the collective ownership of property—concretely, the working class and the bureaucracy." "Is Russia a Workers' State?", *The New International*, vol. XVIII, No. 1, January-February 1952, p. 41.

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enough to stop the interplay and clashes characteristic of the old class system and exclude the influence of the intelligentsia and the peasant masses. Class war is being progressively intensified. The fight against the enemies of communism followed the usual pattern. The most politically active members of the middle classes, members of the judiciary, as well as army and police officers, succumbed to the first attacks. As in Soviet Russia, the intelligentsia is not trusted. Next on the list for extermination comes the peasantry—"the last capitalist class", to use Lenin's own words,[52] and, incidentally, now enjoying a standard of living higher than other classes. But the liquidation of "rural capitalists" was planned in Poland as a slow and lengthy process during which general coöperation of all inhabitants of rural areas was expected,[53] and this in turn necessitated a gradual intensification of class war.

The struggle against antirevolutionary elements, as one writer on constitutional problems says,[54] took the form of frontal class assaults in the first years of the people's democracy in Poland. There followed a subsequent sharpening of class conflict, which became more ruthless as the capitalist elements began to disappear. President Bierut commented on these developments as inevitable and in accordance with Stalinist theories.[55] "Stalin incarnates in himself", to quote a subsequent pronouncement of L. M. Kaganovich, "the sacred class anger of the working class and its hatred toward those who exploit and oppress the people."[56]

The people's democracy style of class war in Poland creates problems of its own. One of these is increased social and eco-

[52] Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

[53] Minc, *loc. cit.*, p. 161.

[54] Stefan Rozmaryn, *Polskie prawo państwowe* (*Polish State Law*) (Warsaw, 1951), p. 207.

[55] Boleslaw Bierut, *Podstawy ideologiczne PZPR* (*The Ideological Bases of the United Polish Workers' Party*) (Warsaw, 1949), p. 49; quoted by Rozmaryn, *op. cit.*, pp. 206–207.

[56] L. M. Kaganovich' speech reported in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (*Workers' Affairs*), Sofia, January 7, 1950; quoted by *News From Behind the Iron Curtain*, March 1953, p. 35.

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nomic differentiation between the classes and within the body of the proletariat. Methods such as scaled wages and piecework, used as economic incentives, have a social effect as well: they mark a divorce from equalitarian policies originally professed by socialist doctrines[57] and split the working class into a number of more or less privileged groups. Varying of wages through income differentials is due not only to the departure from equalitarian policies[58] but also to the need of powerful incentives necessitated by the economic plans of industrialization. The Six Year Plan had therefore a definite influence on social stratification.

Optimum utilization of resources requires differentiation of wages, which must be fixed relative to productivity. The adverse effects of arbitrary fixing of prices of consumer goods lead to "a long-run departure from the optimum utilization of resources."[59] Differences in productivity will not be proportional to differences in wages, and workers may avoid certain occupations requiring unusual exertion.

Another problem of the class war involves the intelligentsia. It has not yet been solved by any communist country. Not recognized by Lenin as an independent political factor because of its lack of relationship to the means of production, the intelligentsia was nevertheless temporarily utilized so long as it was irreplaceable. Sometimes it was even mildly cajoled; according to Lenin, lessons had to be learned from the old intelligentsia but no concessions were to be granted to it. It was intended for ultimate extinction and was to be replaced by the new intelligentsia of the people. The effects of that policy were complex: there was never any real possibility for

[57] For similar developments in Soviet Russia see Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 192. Professor W. W. Kulski speaks of Stalin's "implicit acknowledgement of social stratification as a desirable phenomenon." *The Soviet Regime* (Syracuse, 1954), p. 465.

[58] This departure itself is by no means complete. Communist economic policies are not concerned solely with an equalization of wages; indirect measures such as state aids to education as well as occupational and professional training have also been sponsored in Poland, with the effect, at least in theory, of promoting more equal opportunities for earning.

[59] Abram Bergson, *The Structure of Soviet Wages* (Cambridge, 1946), p. 21.

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class peace, yet the Soviet régime could not escape the process of *embourgeoisement*[60] which still continues. But neither the party nor the Soviet common man has learned to trust the members of the new intelligentsia, and the gulf between classes has remained unbridged, thus giving the lie to the doctrine of a classless society. Similarly, Poland's People's Democracy is building up its people's intelligentsia, recruited chiefly among the working, lower- and middle-peasant classes. Various devices have been geared to this end; among the most important are the drive to promote workers to managerial posts, educational laws giving preference to the poor, and the distribution of housing accommodation, which is available first to the applicants of working-class origin or background.[61] Housing, moreover, is rendered alarmingly inadequate, because building is far down on the list of industrial priorities, and it is the old intelligentsia which probably suffers most.

All this is not tantamount to saying that in Poland distinctions between classes are disappearing. This is not even true of Soviet Russia, although class conflict in Russia has diminished. To state that class distinctions have disappeared would mean no more than that there is a fluidity between classes and that opportunities are now open to certain social groups which have become more privileged. Yet this fluidity is temporary: it can last only as long as change proceeds, from the old to the new intelligentsia. In Russia, for instance, the new intelligentsia has emerged and the government is trying by a series of new laws to make it a hereditary class, again barring the poorest from educational facilities. There is no way of establishing a new class equilibrium in Poland, as long as the problem of the intelligentsia remains unsolved; the future of any real class truce hinges on this. Furthermore, unless a new attitude is adopted by people's democracies to their new intelligentsia, it

[60] Hugh Seton-Watson, "The Social Contradictions of Stalinism", *The Fortnightly*, December 1952, p. 377. He calls the ruling class in the U.S.S.R. "a state bourgeoisie". *Cf.* his "Russia's Ruling Class", *The New Leader*, July 11, 1955, p. 12.

[61] On these points see Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York, 1951), pp. 283 *et seq.*, and Stowe, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

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is the members of that intelligentsia alone who will become truly "classless". They will belong to no class fully recognized by the state, will be accepted by neither the working nor the peasant class, and will be doomed to existence in a social vacuum, and to "withering away".

This change from the old to the new middle class poses difficult questions: How to make the transition come smoothly and with the least obstruction to the working of the economic mechanism? How to reconcile two goals—the full use of the "old" professionals and experts with communist indoctrination of the "new" middle class? The latter for some time to come has to work side by side with those who are either half-converted Marxists, or who are regarded as quite inconvertible (immune to *pierekovka* or remolding). Symptoms of this clash of ends and means are many. Among them are various "easier" trends; various "concessions" to the intelligentsia such as the right to form exclusive clubs, recently observed throughout the satellite countries; and bribing of intellectuals by allowing and indeed sponsoring literary criticism which for some time has been flourishing in Poland. It is not hard to discover the source of those government-sponsored campaigns of "criticism" which only too often are accepted as genuine by many Western commentators incredibly prone to discover the signs of "opposition" in communist countries.

Will these measures ensure efficient coexistence of the "old" intelligentsia with the budding servile middle class, which has to be trained into the state of educated serfdom? The question will harass Communist "social engineers" for at least another generation until the takeover by a new middle class is completed.

The revolutionary power of the toiling masses does not eliminate other classes from the functioning of the political mechanism, but puts the working class and the new bureaucracy at the head.[62] The dictatorship of the proletariat in Poland is said to rest on the union of workers and (some) peasants, yet this union is to serve as an agent in combating capitalist

[62] The result is the rule by the party-controlled industrial and administrative bureaucracy. See Z. Zaremba, "Social Transformations in Poland" (Part II), *Journal of Central European Affairs*, vol. XII, No. 3, October 1952, p. 280.

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elements primarily within the peasant class itself.[63] Generally speaking, in communist countries there is no merging of classes within each other, but only certain interchangeability of the members of various classes; there are periods of more or less intense conflicts and no prospects for a classless society. A classless society could perhaps exist only in a prepolitical stage, in a primitive community with an undeveloped sense of hierarchy, and where either a Hobbesian state of "war of all against all" would predominate, or an idyllic existence based on natural instincts of gregarious behavior, unspoilt by self-assertive passions and tempered by a mellow climate of social and economic utopia.

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[63] Rozmaryn, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

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PUBLIC AID TO RAILROADS IN THE RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH*

PUBLIC aid to railroads in the South in the years immediately following the Civil War has usually been discussed as a colorful part of the political history of Reconstruction. In 1872, the Democratic members of the committee of Congress on "the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States" countered the Republican majority's findings on the outrages of the Ku Klux Klan with a minority report attacking the abuses committed by the Reconstruction governments.[1] Recklessness and corruption in aid to railroad corporations formed a major part of the indictment brought against the legislatures composed of "carpetbaggers" from the North, their Southern white allies or "scalawags", and the newly enfranchised Negroes. Later accounts have followed much the same pattern. Though it is recognized that public support of railroad construction was often accepted policy before Radical Reconstruction, the general impression given by the

* This is one of a series of articles prepared under the auspices of the Council for Research in the Social Sciences of Columbia University. Previous articles were published in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, "National Planning of Internal Improvements", vol. XLIII, No. 1 (March 1948), pp. 15–44; "The Virginia System of Mixed Enterprise: A Study of State Planning of Internal Improvements", vol. LXIV, No. 3 (Sept. 1949), pp. 355–387; and "Local Government Planning of Internal Improvements", vol. LXVI, No. 3 (Sept. 1951), pp. 411–445; in the *Journal of Economic History*, "The Revulsion Against Internal Improvements", vol. X, No. 2 (Nov. 1950), pp. 145–169; and (with Harvey H. Segal), "Baltimore's Aid to Railroads: A Study in the Municipal Planning of Internal Improvements", vol. XII, No. 1 (Winter 1953), pp. 2–35; and in the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, "Public Spirit and American Improvements", vol. 92, No. 4 (Oct. 25, 1948), pp. 305–309.

The author has profited by the perceptive research assistance of Mr. Nathan Miller. The principal source used was the admirable collection of state documents in the New York Public Library. Use has also been made of the Library of Congress, the Columbia University Libraries, the Alabama State Library at Montgomery, the State Library and Archives of Tennessee at Nashville, and the public libraries of Nashville and of Mobile, Alabama.

[1] *Report of the Joint Select Committee to Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States* (*Ku Klux Conspiracy*), 13 vols. (Washington, 1872). This will be cited as *Ku Klux Report*.

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literature is that of an "orgy" of extravagance, bad judgment and financial corruption under Radical rule followed by a return to honesty and financial prudence when the victory of the Democratic or Conservative party brought "Redemption" and the restoration of white supremacy.

Yet in the long history of American attempts to promote internal improvements by public action, railroad aid during Reconstruction is not a wholly isolated phenomenon. It may therefore be of value to reëxamine it in the light of our increased knowledge of internal improvement measures in other regions and other periods, and in the light of the economic conditions and the transportation developments of the time.

For such an examination, the first requisite is a general view of the measures adopted by Southern legislatures and constitutional conventions. Table I on the following pages attempts such a conspectus for each of the eleven states that formed part of the Confederacy. It is arranged by years, from 1866 through 1879, and also with relation to the major political changes. The area between the heavy lines is intended to represent for each state the period of Radical Reconstruction in the conventional sense of the term, during which the Radical party was in control and the state met the full prescriptions of Congressional Reconstruction, including the admission of Negroes to franchise and office and the disenfranchisement of citizens active in the life of the Confederacy.[2] In the cases of Virginia and Tennessee, which did not experience reconstruction in this full sense, the single dividing line is drawn at the point fulfilling the three conditions of Negro franchise, restoration to the Union, and control by the Democratic party. The lower part of the Table thus represents the condition after what Southern writers commonly describe as "Redemption", and it is extended through 1879 in order to take account of the situation following the end of Reconstruction in the last group of states at the beginning of 1877.

[2] The dates for the end of Radical Reconstruction conform in general to those given in William A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 1865–1877* (New York, 1907), map opposite p. 114. In the case of Texas, the election of a Conservative legislature in 1872, rather than of a Conservative governor in 1873, is taken as the turning point.

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Some of the legislation consisted of general enactments setting forth conditions under which state aid would be given or local aid authorized. These appear in the Table as "general state", "general local", or "general county". Much more often, the laws extended aid to a particular railroad or permitted particular communities or groups of communities to render such aid. In these cases, the entries indicate the number of cases and the agency, for example, "1 state" or "8 local". In the case of a state, financial aid most often took the form of the loan of its own bonds or its endorsement of the company's; the amount is given where possible in absolute figures or as a rate per mile. In the case of local authorities, the most common type of aid was subscription to the company's stock. The entries in italics indicate actions on the other side of the ledger, including the repeal of aid legislation and constitutional prohibitions against further aid.

The Table represents the intentions of the legislatures and does not measure the burdens actually incurred by the governments or the amount and timing of the aid received by the companies. Railroads often failed to meet the conditions specified for the granting of aid, or met them only over a period of years. Local electorates sometimes voted against the subscriptions authorized by the legislatures. The contingent liability incurred in the endorsement of a corporation's bond might or might not become an actual one. From the side of the corporation, a million dollars received in depreciated state bonds would do less than a million dollars' worth of construction.

Within these limitations, an examination of the Table discloses certain significant characteristics of the movement for railroad aid. The first is its ubiquity. Not one of the eleven states failed to use public money to promote the development of railroads. The second is its variety of forms. Particularly striking is the number of expedients found for giving assistance without directly involving the money or credit of the public agency. Texas had lordly acreages of land to grant, and other states could give lands forfeited for taxes or swamp or overflowed lands or what remained of earlier federal grants. In almost all cases, railroads were allowed generous rights of way

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TABLE I

RAILROAD AID LEGISLATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH: 1866–1879

	LOUISIANA	SOUTH CAROLINA	FLORIDA	MISSISSIPPI	ARKANSAS
1866		2 state (1 $600,000; 1 $6,500 per mi.)	1 state (land) 1 local		
1867	1 state (way and materials)			1 state (way and materials)	General state ($10,000 per mi. 6 local
1868	3 state (1 $25,000; 1 $6,000 per mi.; 1 way and materials) 1 local	*suspension of earlier state aid* 1 state ($4,000,000 plus $20,000 cash) 1 local	*const. forbids tax for corporation* 1 state (way and materials) 1 local	*const. forbids state loan of credit or stock subscription*	*State aid requi voters approval* general state ($1 15,000 per m and county
1869	3 state (2 $12,500 per mi.; 1 $10,000)	2 state (1 $50,000 plus renewal earlier aid; 1 $500,000 plus deferment of lien)	general county 2 state ($14,000 per mi.) 1 state (way and materials)		general state (forfeited lands)
1870	1 state ($12,500 per mi. plus $3,000,000) 1 local	*partial sale railroad stock*	5 state (2 add't'l $2,000 per mi.; 1 $10,000; 1 $12,500; 1 $14,000)	2 state (way and materials) 8 local	
1871	5 state (1 $2,500,000; 3 12,500 per mi.; 1 $7,500)	1 local 1 state (deferment of lien) *partial sale railroad stock* 1 local		general state ($4,000 per mi.; 1 state (rr. stock) 4 state (way and materials) 1 state (cheap land) 11 local	
1872	1 state ($12,500 per mi.) 1 state (way)	1 state (exchange) 1 local *const. forbids state loan without approval ⅔ voters*		general local 1 state ($4,000 per mi.) 5 state (cheap land); 6 state (way and materials) 17 local	

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TABLE I

RAILROAD AID LEGISLATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH: 1866–1879

ALABAMA	TEXAS	GEORGIA	NORTH CAROLINA	VIRGINIA	TENNESSEE
local	general state (16 sections per mi.) general local 8 state (land) 2 state (way) 1 local	state road ($1,500,000) 1 state ($10,000 per mi.) 3 local	3 state (1 renewal ⅔ stock subscription; 2 securities) 2 local	3 local	41 state (9 $10,000 per mi.; 32 total $7,147,000) 1 local
eneral state 12,000 per mi.) local			7 local	1 state (concession on lien) general local 2 local	23 state (2 $5,000 per mi.; 3 $10,000; 17 total $3,095,000; 1 way and materials) 8 local
neral state 6,000 per mi.) neral local local	1 local	3 state (1 $8,000; 1 $10,000; 1 $12,000 per mi.) *const. forbids state subscription*	7 state (2 $10,000 per mi.; 5 total $4,650,000) 2 local		6 state (2 $10,000 per mi.; 1 $8,000; 1 $5,000; 2 total $140,000) general local 7 local
	const. forbids land grants	4 state (1 $8,000; 1 $12,000; 1 $15,000 per mi.) 1 local (land)	8 state (1 $20,000 per mi.; 7 total $12,150,000) general county 4 local	*const. forbids state subscription or grant of credit*	1 state ($8,000 per mi.) 7 local
state $16,000; addt'l $6,000 er mi.; $2,500,000; $300,000) local	1 state ($10,000 per mi.) 7 state (way and materials) 2 local	29 state (16 $12,000; 11 $15,000; 2 $3,000 additional per mi.) 5 local *lease of state road*	4 local	1 state (renewal of guarantee) 10 local	*repeal of state aid** 10 local* *const. forbids state loan or subscription*
local 1,000,000)	2 state ($10,000 per mi.) 12 state (way and materials) 2 state (way) general local 6 local	6 local	*repeal of state aid* 22 local	8 local *state interest in railroads to be sold*	general local (further special laws not required)
ocal		10 local	6 local	12 local	

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TABLE I (*Continued*)

RAILROAD AID LEGISLATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH: 1866–1879

	LOUISIANA	SOUTH CAROLINA	FLORIDA	MISSISSIPPI	ARKANSAS
1873	1 state (way) 1 local	4 local	*repeal of state financial aid*	7 state (1 $10,000 per mi.; 1 $8,000; 1 way; 3 way and materials; 1 cheap land) 9 local	general local 11 state (forfeited land) 1 local
1874	2 state (way and materials) 2 local *repeal lapsed grants*	8 local	general state (land) 2 state (1 land; 1 way and materials)	2 local	*const. forbids loc aid and state loc of credit*
1875	1 state (way and materials)	2 local	*const. forbids state loan or subscription or local aid*	1 state (previous rr. loans) 1 local	1 state (forfeited and swamp land)
1876	2 state (way and materials) 2 local				
1877	2 state (way and materials) *repeal 1 local*	2 local	2 state (way and materials)	1 state (relinquishing loan)	
1878	1 state ($2,000,000) 3 state (way and materials) 2 local	7 local		1 state (cheap land) 3 local	
1879	1 state (transfer of land grant)	1 local	1 state (way) 1 state (land, way and materials) 4 state (land)		7 state (forfeited and swamp land)

Source: Session Laws of the eleven states. The area within the heavy lines represents the period of Radical Reconstruction, that below the lower line the period after "Redemption".

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TABLE I (*Continued*)

RAILROAD AID LEGISLATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH: 1866–1879

ALABAMA	TEXAS	GEORGIA	NORTH CAROLINA	VIRGINIA	TENNESSEE
neral state 4,000 per mi. n exchange for 16,000 endorse- ıent)	29 state (26, 16 sections; 1, 20; 2 way and materials) 1 general (way and materials) 21 local (14 land only)	1 local	8 local	8 local	
	11 state (1, 20 sections; 6 16; 3, 12 or 16; 1, 8) 1 local (land) *partial repeal local*	1 state (rr. stock) 2 local *repeal of state aid*	4 local	4 local	
local *nst. forbids state* *orks or loan or* *ɔcal aid; repeal* *late general*	19 state (1, 20 sections; 17, 16; 1, 4) 9 local (7 land) *const. forbids local aid, state grant money*	1 local	9 local 1 state (purchase majority interest $850,000)	4 local	*local aid by Nashville forbidden*
	state general (16 sections per mi.)	1 local		6 local	
		2 state (1 loan, 1 way) 2 local *const. forbids state and local aid*	1 state (adds $1.50 per share) 1 state ($70,000 per year for purchased rr) 8 local	6 local	
				5 local	
			1 state ($50.000) 10 local	8 local	

The repeal law and one of the local laws were adopted in December 1869 after the Democratic victory in the fall elec-
ıs.

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through the state lands, usually with the privilege of taking from them timber and other necessary materials.[3]

Of greater interest is the question of the relationship between railroad policy and political régime. The Table demonstrates that the answer is neither simple nor uniform. There are, to be sure, a number of cases which conform rather closely to the stereotype of extensive aid under Radical rule and sharp reversal of policy after Redemption. In Arkansas and Tennessee, Democratic régimes adopted constitutional prohibitions within their first year of office. In Alabama and Georgia, state aid ceased no less abruptly after the "Redeemers" came into power, though constitutional prohibitions did not follow until 1875 and 1877.

But four other states—Louisiana, North and South Carolina, and Florida—show a different and somewhat unexpected pattern. In these the revulsion against lavish subsidy to railroads occurred under Radical rule before the Conservatives recaptured power, which in three cases took place only at the very end of the Reconstruction period.

There remain three states which fit into neither of the categories. The experience of *Texas* was rendered exceptional by the vast territories at the disposal of the state government, and here the land grant was by far the most important form of assistance. A first glance at the Table might even suggest that the case was the opposite of the classic one. A convention dominated by Conservatives adopted in 1866 a constitutional provision, never used during Reconstruction, permitting state endorsement of railroad bonds at the rate of $15,000 per mile. In the same year the legislature reënacted an 1854 statute which offered sixteen sections per mile to any railroad fulfilling the specified conditions. On the other hand, the framers of the Reconstruction constitution, which was adopted in 1869, regarded this policy as "profligate"[4] and forbade land grants altogether—a restriction which remained in force until 1873. In this respect Redemption was followed not by restraint but

[3] Other privileges, not given in the Table, were provisions for tax exemption, often included in railroad charters, and the free use of convict labor for construction.

[4] S. G. Reed, *A History of the Texas Railroads* (Houston, 1941), p. 149.

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by more liberal largesse. The self-styled "Liberators of Texas", who took over control of the legislature in 1873, offered in that year sixteen or more sections per mile to no less than twenty-seven railroad corporations and continued the land-grant policy in subsequent years.[5] The greatest controversy, however, and the principal charges of corruption were over two measures for the donation to railroads of large issues of state bonds. These acts were both passed during Radical Reconstruction, though the bonds were never issued. It was a Democratic legislature which substituted land grants for them, and it was a convention under Democratic control which in 1875 outlawed state grants of money as well as further aid by local authorities.

Yet party lines were by no means clearly drawn either on the issue of financial or of land-grant aid. A Republican newspaper denounced the Democrats in one year for favoring "ruinous railroad subsidies" and in another for being "anti-railroad ox-cart demagogues".[6] The most controversial of all the Texas measures of railroad subsidy, the law of 1871 which offered $6,000,000 in bonds or 14,400 sections of land to two companies of what became the Texas and Pacific system, was carried largely by Democratic votes over the second veto of a Radical Governor.[7]

Another case, that of *Mississippi*, is less of an exception than is commonly supposed. Because of the constitutional prohibition against the loan of the state's credit adopted by the so-called "Black and Tan Convention" of 1868, Mississippi has often been thought of as largely immune to the fever of railroad subsidy.[8] It did grant less aid than most. Yet local authorities, urged on by newspapers within the state and outside,

[5] By 1882, when the land-grant legislation was finally repealed, the companies had received more than 32,000,000 acres. Reed, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[6] San Antonio *Express*, Aug. 3, 1870; Aug. 2, 1874.

[7] Charles W. Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas* (New York, 1910), pp. 307–308. *Ku Klux Report*, vol. I, p. 212. In the preceding year, the veto had been barely sustained, 3 Democrats and 35 Republicans voting for it, and 27 Democrats and 31 Republicans against. San Antonio *Express*, Aug. 3 and 6, 1870. See also Charles S. Potts, *Railroad Transportation in Texas* (Austin, 1909), p. 96.

[8] James Wilford Garner, *Reconstruction in Mississippi* (New York, 1901), p. 281, but see also pp. 288–289, 302–303, 329.

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gave assistance to railroads to an extent which the majority of the Ku Klux Committee regarded as extravagant.[9] Moreover, as the Table indicates, the state government itself found a variety of assets which could be transferred to the railroads without direct violation of the constitutional provision. Most of these expedients were devised by Republican legislators, and no Democratic votes were cast in favor of the controversial act of 1871 appropriating $4,000 per mile for railroad aid out of actual or anticipated balances in the State Treasury. Yet part of the Democratic press applauded the measure, admitting that "even its evil parentage" could not "hide its intrinsic good."[10] When the Redeemers finally came into power in 1876, they rejected the recommendation of the holdover Republican Governor to repeal the act giving $8,000 per mile to the Vicksburg and Memphis and contented themselves with tightening the conditions of the grant.

Virginia, a state which did not experience Radical Reconstruction, was the only one of the eleven which gave no direct state aid to railroads during the period. As the result of its vigorous ante-bellum program of assistance to internal improvement, the state held a majority of the stock in most of the Virginia railroads and was the sole owner of several. These roads, like those of the rest of the South, were in poor physical condition at the end of the war. Instead of embarking on a policy of new investment, the Virginia legislature in 1871 decided to sell its railroad securities and apply the proceeds to the improvement of the state's immediate financial position. Railroad leaders took an active part in state politics, and in this case charges of undue subservience to railroad interests have been made not against Radicals for lavish subsidy but against Conservatives for selling railroad assets at too great a loss and without adequate provision for future regulation.[11] On the other hand, local government agencies in Virginia, like those in

[9] *Ku Klux Report*, vol. I, p. 369. See also Mobile *Register*, Oct. 24, 1871.

[10] Liberty *Herald*, quoted in Jackson *Mississippi Daily Pilot* (Republican), June 8, 1871. See also the *Pilot*, June 3 and 12.

[11] C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction* (Boston, 1951), p. 41.

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many of the other states, continued throughout the period their active aid to new railroad construction.

Though no brief summary could do justice to the variety of Southern railroad experience and policy during Reconstruction, it may be of service to attempt a comparative analysis of the two principal groups of cases outlined above. Since it seems impossible to write on this period without using the words coined by one side in the controversy, they will be discussed under the headings "Orgy and Revulsion" and "Revulsion Before Redemption".

Orgy and Revulsion

If the partisan epithet of "orgy" fits any part of the story, it may certainly be applied to *Georgia* in 1870. The Congressional conditions for restoration to the Union were not fully met until the beginning of that year, since the legislature of 1868, though elected under the Reconstruction Act, had expelled its Negro members. At the end of 1870, the Conservatives carried the election. There was therefore only a single year of Reconstruction in the strictest sense. Within it, the legislature voted to aid twenty-nine railroads by bond endorsement at the rate of $12,000 or $15,000 per mile; and in some cases the Governor endorsed the bonds with suspicious promptness. Some three million dollars' worth of these endorsements, on the bonds of three companies, were later repudiated by the state on the ground that the railroads had not complied with the requirements of bona fide investment and construction. An investigating committee appointed after the Democrats regained control found it "worthy of remark" that "the State's trust was only abused upon" the three roads whose president was a close business associate of the Governor's, and it also charged that the measures themselves had been "pushed through this bastard Legislature, by the infernal force of *gold*".[12]

Another indignant committee investigated the management of the state-owned Western and Atlantic Railroad. It collected accusations and admissions of guilt and presented them

[12] *Report of the Committee to Investigate the Bonds . . . issued or negotiated since July 4, 1868* (Atlanta, 1872), pp. 5, 183. Italics in original.

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under exclamatory headlines.[13] But it is not necessary to evaluate this "raw file" of data to reach the conclusion that the state's property was plundered. Of this the financial record seems a clear indication. On the eve of the war, the net earnings of the Western and Atlantic had reached $450,000 a year. In 1866 the state borrowed $1,500,000 to put it back into good condition. Through most of the year 1869, the road paid into the State Treasury $25,000 a month. At the end of 1870, private interests contested eagerly for the privilege of leasing the road at a monthly rental at the same figure. Yet under Radical administration in the year 1870, the state road incurred a deficit of at least $500,000.[14]

At the end of this remarkable year, the road was leased for twenty years to a private company. There were two principal contesting groups, one closer to the Governor, the other managing to enlist the support of Northern railroad and political interests. "By some combination on the last day in the morning," the rival parties entered a single successful bid at the minimum rate provided under the law.[15] During the twenty years of the lease the company made a substantial margin over the monthly rental of $25,000, though apparently it would have suffered a small loss if the figure had been $30,000 instead.[16]

[13] *The Evidence taken by the Joint Committee of the Legislature . . . to investigate the management of the State Road under the administration of R. B. Bullock* (Atlanta, 1872).

[14] It paid $45,000 into the Treasury but ran up heavy debts. N. P. Angier, the State Treasurer, testified in 1872 that more than $400,000 had been paid on this account during his term of office. *Ku Klux Report*, vol. VI, p. 157. His last Treasurer's Report, for 1872, contains the item: "Further unsettled claims against W & A RR—$120,000." Reports of later Treasurers indicate that the state was paying on this account as late as 1877. Other estimates of the debt total are $700,000 and $750,000. C. Mildred Thompson, *Reconstruction in Georgia* (New York, 1915), pp. 238, 245, gives the figure as "nearly three quarters of a million", though pointing out that the condition of the books made impossible an accurate computation.

[15] *Testimony before the Joint Committee on the Legislature of the State of Georgia to investigate the fairness or unfairness of the contract known as the Lease of the Western and Atlantic Railroad* (Atlanta, 1872), esp. p. 6. Thompson, *op. cit.*, ch. vi, gives an account of the "intricate" negotiations.

[16] Dividends paid during the lease were $665,891.98, the credit balance at the end was $343,060.52, and the state later paid a claim of $99,644.04. James Houston

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When the Redeemers came into power, they reacted promptly against Radical recklessness in railroad finance. The flood of measures for state aid ceased abruptly, though some twenty statutes authorizing local aid were passed in the years from 1871 to 1877. The legislature of 1872, though condemning the manner in which the lease of the state road was obtained, declared that the contract itself was "a most advantageous one, as it secures a fair sum certain for the treasury, and removes the road, with its business complications, from the politics of Georgia, which of itself is a consummation devoutly to be wished."[17] In the same year the Democrats began the process of repudiating what they considered the fraudulent commitments of the previous régime. In 1874, the legislature repealed all earlier provisions for bond endorsement, excepting only a few cases in which a vested right had been established by actual investment and construction. Delegates to the Convention of 1877 declared that one of its main objects was to put an end to railroad subsidies,[18] and the constitution as adopted prohibited both state and local aid.

Yet even in Georgia, the contrast in railroad policy between Radical Reconstruction and the remainder of the period was less than absolute. During the years before 1870, powerful pressure was building up in support of liberal subsidy to railroads. The Conservative legislature of 1866, in addition to providing for the repair of the Western and Atlantic, passed measures offering state aid to a number of other railroads. The Governor protested that there was no "precedent for general aid" of this sort and insisted that Georgia's traditional policy of confining assistance to one or two trunk lines, and mainly to the single state road, was still "the wisest, safest and most

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Johnston, *Western and Atlantic Railroad of the State of Georgia* (Atlanta, 1931), pp. 67–70. If there is no duplication between the second and third items, the total return to the stockholders was $1,108,596.54, or an average of a little over $4,600 per month. The next lease was made for 29 years at $35,001 per month. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[17] August 26, 1872. The bill authorizing the lease had been introduced by a Democratic member of the 1870 legislature.

[18] *A Stenographic Report of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention* (Atlanta, 1877), esp. pp. 297, 298, 300.

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comprehensive plan."[19] He made one reluctant exception, in the case of the Macon and Brunswick, and vetoed the bills for aid to the other companies. The pressure mounted still further in the legislature of 1868–69, and acts were adopted to endorse the bonds of seven companies. It was this body, in which control was divided between Republicans and Democrats, that broke with Georgia's traditional policy before full Reconstruction began.

Tennessee was never in the strict sense a Reconstruction state. Restored to the Union in July 1866, it was not reorganized under Congressional regulations; but many of its white citizens were disenfranchised in 1865 and suffrage was extended to Negroes in the following year. A Radical régime gave liberal aid to railroads in what its opponents later called "a carnival of revelry and corruption,"[20] and the Democrats who took control in December 1869 provided one of the sharpest and most immediate cases of reaction against the policy of state assistance.

The Radicals inherited an ante-bellum system of state aid and some 1,300 miles of railroads badly in need of post-war rehabilitation. To assist in this process, the companies previously aided were excused from interest payments on their state bonds until 1870, and new bonds to the amount of nearly $3,500,000 were voted in January 1866. Additional legislation before the end of the year provided aid in no less than twenty-six cases, mainly for new construction. Several other measures were adopted in 1867, and in December of that year an "Omnibus Bill" was adopted granting new aid to fifteen railroads.

Under the Radicals, the companies received a total of nearly $14,000,000 in state bonds. In violation of the provisions of both the pre-war and the post-war acts, the bonds were generally disposed of by the companies at less than par, and the requirements of bona fide private subscriptions and of prior construction were frequently evaded. In one of the more extreme cases,

[19] Senate *Journal*, 1866, pp. 445–446; House *Journal*, 1866, pp. 244–246. Milton C. Heath, *Constructive Liberalism* (Cambridge, 1954), emphasizes the uniqueness of this aspect of Georgia's ante-bellum policy.

[20] "The State Debt Report of the Committee to Investigate It", *Appendix to the House Journal*, 1879, p. 15.

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the Tennessee and Pacific had up to 1870 received $1,185,000 in state bonds and $600,000 in county bonds as compared with paid-up private subscriptions of less than $17,000.[21]

Charges of corruption centered on the passage of the "Omnibus Bill" of 1867. The majority of a committee of the Democratic legislature of 1879 declared that recruits for this "assault on the Treasury" had been gathered "from the pulpit to the bagnio," with additional advice from a "female spiritualistic medium." The minority report conceded that there was "strong presumptive evidence" though not legal proof "of bribery and corruption."[22]

There was no doubt of the reaction when the Democrats came into power. One of the first acts of the legislature which met at the end of 1869 was a repeal of state aid, and the constitutional convention of the following year adopted a provision forbidding future aid. In both bodies, the sentiment was overwhelmingly in favor of dissolving the partnership between the state and the railroads, which one delegate described as "the dead bodies . . . tied to Tennessee."[23]

Tennessee thus furnishes a sharp contrast between Republican and Democratic policy toward railroad aid. Yet there were at least some signs of revulsion before redemption in the mild cautions of Republican governors in messages of 1868 and 1869,[24] in the campaign of a Republican paper against state management of railroads,[25] and in the vigorous intervention of the State Comptroller which helped defeat a second Omnibus Bill in 1868.[26] On the other hand, the earlier Radical measures of railway aid seem to have had very general popular support.

[21] Tennessee General Assembly, *Appendix to the Senate and House Journals*, 36 Assembly, 2 and 3 Sessions, 1870–71, pp. 1–255, 327–670, 721–994.

[22] "The State Debt", *loc. cit.*, pp. 16, 17, 29–30.

[23] Nashville *Union and American*, Feb. 1, 1870, Nov. 25, 1869. "The State Debt", *loc. cit.*, p. 80.

[24] Nashville *Press and Times*, Nov. 11, 1868, June 18, 1869.

[25] *Ibid.*, Feb. 14, Feb. 20, Nov. 10, 1868.

[26] Stanley J. Folmsbee, in Philip M. Hamer, ed., *Tennessee: A History, 1673–1932* (New York, 1933), vol. II, p. 668.

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A Republican paper was able to list names to show that about nine tenths of the bonds issued had gone into the hands of Democratic railroad presidents.[27] "The public debt of Tennessee", declared a Democratic editor in 1873, "represents an actual investment which has more than doubled the wealth of the State and which by the operation of railroads, and their accumulation of capital is daily adding thereto."[28]

Finally, it should be noted that the Democratic revulsion did not extend to action by local authorities, which had been authorized by the Radicals in some twenty cases. The same legislature which repealed the state aid program adopted ten measures authorizing local aid, and in 1870 the Democrats passed a general law liberalizing the conditions for such assistance and making it unnecessary to come to the legislature for a special law in each instance.

The case of *Alabama* is a less perfect illustration of "orgy and revulsion". It is true that the greatest open-handedness toward the railroads was shown by the Radicals and that the Redeemers closed the history by constitutional prohibition. But the differences between pre-Radical and Radical legislation were less great than in some cases, and important steps toward readjustment were taken some time before the Conservatives returned to power.

The legislature of 1867, responsive to appeals for railroad building to make "the hills and valleys of Alabama . . . vocal with industry,"[29] adopted a general law offering state endorsements of railroad bonds at the rate of $12,000 per mile. "This act served as a basis for all of the state aid laws" of the Radical period.[30] The first Republican legislature, meeting the following year, promptly amended the act by easing its conditions and

[27] Nashville *Tennessee Tribune*, Nov. 13, 1871.

[28] Nashville *Union and American*, Feb. 16, 1875.

[29] Tuscaloosa *Observer*, quoted in Mobile *Daily Advertiser*, Aug. 28, 1867.

[30] A. B. Moore, "Railroad Building in Alabama During the Reconstruction Period", *Journal of Southern History*, vol. I (1935), p. 422. This article, pp. 421–441, is one of the few treatments of railroad aid during Reconstruction which relate it to developments in other parts of the country.

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raising the rate to $16,000 per mile. It also adopted a general measure providing for local aid.[31] The next legislature authorized a number of additional endorsements, including one increasing the rate per mile to $22,000, and voted $2,000,000 in state bonds to the Alabama and Chattanooga. By September 30, 1871, endorsements under these various acts had reached $13,120,000, and $2,300,000 had been issued in state bonds.[32]

The stories of corruption center on the session of 1870–71. It was at this time that J. C. Stanton won such a reputation as lobbyist for his own and his brother's railroad interests that it was said "that other railroads could do nothing without giving him a large slice."[33] The unfortunate Jere Haralson, perhaps the most often quoted bribe-taker of the period, received sixty dollars in a hotel room but believed that his more sophisticated colleagues were collecting several hundred dollars apiece.[34] The Radical Governor confessedly issued bonds and signed railroad endorsements in violation of the conditions requiring prior construction, and in one case made endorsements for a greater mileage than the road had been authorized to build. The Democrat who succeeded him, in a partial hiatus of Radical rule, was himself accused by a committee of the Democratic House of illegal endorsements and of gross laxity in keeping the records of railroad aid.[35]

After 1870 there was no further legislation calling for state financial aid, though two measures were passed in 1871 to borrow money to meet unpaid interest on the bonds of the Alabama and Chattanooga. The legislature of 1872–73, with the Republicans again in full control, authorized the purchase of this railroad,

[31] Walter L. Fleming, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama* (New York, 1905), pp. 604–605, tabulates the heavy commitments made by a number of counties under this and subsequent legislation.

[32] Legislature, *Public Documents*, 1871–72, p. 91.

[33] Memphis *Daily Advertiser*, Feb. 8, 1871.

[34] Fleming, *op. cit.*, p. 593. *Ku Klux Report*, vol. I, p. 319. See also House *Journal*, 1871/72, p. 236 and *passim*.

[35] John Witherspoon DuBose (James K. Greer, ed.), *Alabama's Tragic Decade* (Birmingham, 1940), pp. 180, 183, 339–342. See also *Ku Klux Report*, vol. I, p. 172. The Radicals retained control of the Senate.

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now in bankruptcy, and its sale to private interests. In 1873 a measure was adopted to substitute smaller fixed obligations for larger contingent ones by offering the railroads $4,000 per mile in state bonds in exchange for the return of $16,000 per mile in endorsements. Under this act, over $5,000,000 in endorsed bonds were exchanged at what a modern historian has described as "a large saving to the state."[36] But contemporary opinion on the measure was sharply divided, and in this as in other cases the divisions failed to coincide with party lines.[37] Though the act was carried mainly by Republican votes, it was praised by a leading Democratic paper as "a great financial measure, worthy of the conception of the genius of a Neckar," since it would at the same time save the public credit and stimulate internal improvement.[38] On the other hand, the *State Journal*, official organ of the Republican party, denounced it as an iniquitous scheme of the rich corporations. "They put up a poor mouth, and beg for another teat whereby to suck away the life blood of Alabama."[39]

The Conservatives came into power by the elections of 1874. In 1875 they adopted constitutional prohibitions forbidding both local aid and the loan of the state's credit. By negotiations with creditors, they succeeded in still further reducing the burden of the state's railroad obligations. But such reductions had already begun in 1873. A recent historian has noted the extensive increase of railroad mileage under the Radical régime,[40] and the State Auditor, in 1877, gave a somewhat unexpected valedictory on railroad aid in Alabama. He did not wish "to

[36] Moore, *loc. cit.*, p. 439.

[37] Horace M. Bond, *Negro Education in Alabama* (Washington, 1939), ch. iv, suggests that some of these variations may be explained by the fact that the Stanton railroad interests were particularly close to the Republican party while their rivals of the Louisville and Nashville had closer relations with the Democrats. The Republican Montgomery *Alabama State Journal* appealed to popular feeling against the outsider L. & N. interests on April 8, 1873. But so, in another connection, did the Democratic Mobile *Register* on March 9 and 10, 1875.

[38] Mobile *Daily Register*, April 5, 1873.

[39] Montgomery *Alabama State Journal*, April 6, 1873.

[40] Moore, *loc. cit.*, p. 441. See also Table II below.

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defend the policy of subsidizing corporate companies," but he felt it his duty to point out "that the state is not reeling under the effort to carry a fraudulent railway debt and that she stands at this day almost in the attitude of a beneficiary of that dangerous policy."[41]

The case of *Arkansas* falls only doubtfully under the heading given above. It is true that the first Radical legislature promptly submitted to the people a liberal general aid law calling for state bonds of $10,000 per mile for roads receiving federal land grants and of $15,000 per mile for others and that this was carried almost unanimously by popular vote. A swarm of promoters, some of them evidently counting on their political influence, chartered no less than eighty-six companies to take advantage of the law. Many of them were new men, unlike the old-line Democratic railroad presidents who received most of the aid in Tennessee. The Republican Governor was accused of receiving bribes and of irregularities in the issuance of bonds. Within the first year of Redemption, moreover, a constitutional convention adopted provisions forbidding both local aid and the state's loan of credit.[42]

If this seems to conform to the classic picture of Radical recklessness and Redeemers' revulsion, certain qualifications are nevertheless required. Only five of the many corporations, after some consolidation of smaller companies, actually received state bonds. More attention has been paid to the questionable wording of the ballot in the 1868 referendum, which read simply "For Railroads" or "Against Railroads",[43] than to the fact that the Conservative legislature of the previous year, unhampered by the restriction in the Reconstruction constitution against state aid without vote of the people, had adopted over the Governor's veto a similar measure giving aid at $10,000 a mile.

[41] *Report of the State Auditor of Alabama*, Sept. 30, 1877, p. 6.

[42] Thomas S. Staples, *Reconstruction in Arkansas, 1862–1874* (New York, 1923), pp. 360–366. Powell Clayton, *The Aftermath of the Civil War in Arkansas* (New York, 1915), ch. xi. House *Journal* 1868–69, pp. 24, 664–665; 1871, pp. 370, 538–541.

[43] This irregularity was later used as a basis for repudiation of the bonds issued under the act. Staples, *op. cit.*, p. 352, points out that the issue was "kept squarely before the public" in an exciting campaign.

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As late as 1870, a Democratic newspaper was claiming credit for this measure to show, as it put it, "that our own people set on foot this spirit of improvement before the cormorants came."[44] The same legislature also adopted measures for local aid.

During the six years of Radical rule, the railway mileage of the state increased by 662 miles. Not all of this received state subsidy, but the Arkansas case is one in which the mileage actually constructed under state aid approached very closely the mileage for which the assistance was intended.[45]

Railway aid was still a lively issue in the final legislature under Radical control, that of 1873. A general law was passed providing for aid by local authorities. A bill was introduced to permit the railroad companies to substitute their preferred stock in exchange for the release of their mortgage obligations to the state. It was argued, as sometimes in other states, that such subordination of the public claim was necessary so that private capital could be obtained for necessary expansion; but two senators described the proposal as "an unparalleled railroad steal", and the *Arkansas Gazette* declared that no one that was unbought could possibly vote for it.[46] The measure finally failed of enactment after a bitter controversy in which the *Daily Republican* and most of the Radical legislators supported the railroad interest and were opposed by the Democratic and part of the Republican press, by almost all the Democratic legislators, and by the Republican Governor.[47]

Revulsion Before Redemption

If the experience of *Florida* belongs in a different category from those described under the heading "Orgy and Revulsion",

[44] Little Rock *Arkansas Daily Gazette*, Sept. 15, 1870.

[45] See below, Table II. Staples, *op. cit.*, p. 535, reaches the opposite conclusion by citing a figure for August 1872, and adding: "The hard times of 1873 practically stopped railroad construction." But *Poor's Manual* reports an addition of 250 miles in 1873 as well as 192 in 1872. The $5,350,000 of bonds actually issued were intended to aid in the construction of 420 miles.

[46] Senate *Journal*, 1873, p. 583. *Daily Arkansas Gazette*, April 1, 1873.

[47] *Daily Arkansas Gazette*, March 25, April 2, 3, 4, 9, 18, 27, 29, 1873.

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it is not because of the absence of abuses under Radical rule. On the contrary, this is a case in which charges of railroad fraud can be substantiated from the records of the United States Supreme Court.[48] The most controversial legislation was that passed by the Republican legislature of 1869–70. In spite of a provision in the Reconstruction constitution forbidding taxation for the benefit of a corporation, measures were adopted offering aid by state bonds or endorsement to six railroads at rates from $10,000 to $16,000 per mile. Two of these companies, the Florida Central and the Jacksonville, Pensacola and Mobile, were now in the hands of Milton S. Littlefield and George W. Swepson. The properties were ante-bellum lines, which had been taken over by the state because of defaults and then sold on easy terms by the Republican administration. In the second case, payment was made partly by a worthless check and partly in the bonds of the companies themselves, which the promoters had bought at low prices with funds embezzled from a North Carolina railroad.[49] To these two companies, the Governor promptly issued $4,000,000 in state bonds. These were sold at about seventy cents to the dollar, but only a small part of the money was actually spent on railroad construction;[50] and only twenty-nine miles of railroad were brought into operation in Florida during the years from 1868 through 1873.[51]

What distinguishes the Florida case from those discussed earlier is the fact that revulsion took place some years before the state was finally "redeemed" in 1877. Most of the bonds provided for by the legislation of 1869–70 were never issued. Early in 1873, an act was passed repealing all measures providing for aid by endorsement or state bonds. Finally, a constitutional amendment was adopted in 1875 forbidding railroad aid by local authorities and either stock subscription or loan

[48] R. R. Cos. *vs.* Schutte, 103 U. S. 120.

[49] Some of the bonds were purchased from the "new Republican" commissioners of counties which had extended aid before the war. William Watson Davis, *The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida* (New York, 1913), p. 658.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 662. The author states that only a little more than $300,000 "was even nominally applied to building and equipping Florida roads."

[51] See Table II below.

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of credit by the state.[52] These actions themselves correspond almost exactly with those taken in Georgia in 1874 and 1877, but the difference is that in Florida they were carried out not by Conservative Democrats but by Radical Republicans.

Financial aid does not comprise the full Florida story. As elsewhere, both Radical and Conservative régimes found ways of aiding railroad construction by the use of other assets. The state had "swamp and overflowed lands" at its disposal and also certain land granted by the federal government in 1850 for internal improvements. The pre-Radical government of 1866 made one railroad land grant and the Radicals added several in 1870. In 1874, after the repeal of the measures for financial aid, the Republicans adopted a general law setting conditions for grants or sales of these resources. This policy was still being actively pursued by the Conservative legislature of 1879.

The case of *North Carolina* resembles that of Florida in two respects. Both states were victimized by the same pair of promoters and in each a sharp reaction against reckless railroad aid took place before Redemption. It differs from Florida in that orgy and revulsion were compressed into shorter compass within the briefer period of Radical rule.

At the close of the war, the state held a two-thirds interest in three North Carolina railroads and securities of several others. The pre-Radical legislature of 1866–67 renewed the ante-bellum measure requiring the state to bear two thirds of the cost of building the Western North Carolina and aided two other railroads by transferring to them securities held by the state in other internal improvement enterprises. It also adopted a number of measures for local aid.

When the Radicals came into power, the pace of railroad subsidy was sharply accelerated. They were so anxious to aid the railroads that the Constitutional Convention of 1868, without waiting for the legislature to meet, itself adopted ordinances offering a $1,000,000 endorsement to one company, $1,200,000 in state bonds to a second, and bonds at the rate of $10,000 a mile to a third. When the General Assembly met on

[52] Davis, *op. cit.*, mentions neither the repeal nor the amendment.

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July 4, it received a message from the Governor urging it to create "a vigorous and well-directed system of internal improvements, from the seashore to the Tennessee line."[53] Before it finished its sessions, the number of Radical measures offering state financial aid had risen to sixteen. By the time the next Assembly met in the fall of 1869, bonds had been issued under the new legislation to the amount of $12,600,000, about half of which had gone to the Western Division of the Western North Carolina.

The legislature of 1869–70, though still Republican, was in a different mood. In February it ordered the companies to return all state bonds that remained unsold. In March it passed a bill repealing all railroad appropriations made by the preceding legislature. The reason for this reversal appears in the report of a Senate investigating committee, received March 13, on what the companies had done with the bonds. On most of the roads they had either been used for ordinary construction purposes or had not yet been sold. More than $4,000,000 of bonds were returned under the February act. But the major case of the Western Division, whose presidents were successively Mr. Swepson and General Littlefield, was a different story. They had spent almost nothing on building the road, they had raised almost no private subscription, and they had used nearly $1,000,000 of North Carolina bonds in the Florida speculation which has already been described.[54]

The Conservatives came into power in the elections of the same year. When the new legislature met, the holdover Governor, soon to be impeached, admitted that too many railroad bonds had been placed on the market at one time and that their prices were in general less than twenty-five cents to the dollar.[55]

[53] General Assembly, *Executive and Legislative Documents, 1868–69*, "Message of Governor W. W. Holden", p. 9.

[54] *Ibid.*, Document No. 33, "Report of the Senate Investigation Committee" pp. 1–9. The president of one of the other roads testified that he had sold bonds to General Littlefield at less than market price "in consideration of services rendered in getting the bill through the legislature", pp. 126–127. Other testimony charged that the standard rate for his services in this capacity was 5 or 10 per cent of the bonds issued to the railroad concerned.

[55] *Ibid.*, 1870–71, "Message of Governor W. W. Holden", p. 5.

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The legislature promptly created a commission of its own to make further investigation of the railroad scandals of the Radical period.[56] The documents of this and later sessions contain a serial story of efforts to obtain restitution from the Swepson-Littlefield group, in one of which the commissioner "followed the defendants through Canada west to Detroit and attached about sixteen hundred tons of iron."[57] The legislature of 1871–72 attempted to reduce the state's railroad obligations by an act providing for the relinquishment of the state's holdings of stock in companies which would return the state's bonds.

Yet the North Carolina Conservatives, unlike those of Virginia, were by no means disposed to sell at a sacrifice the entire railroad investments of the state. In 1872 the legislature demanded an investigation of the report that the Eastern Division had been sold under judgment for "a very inadequate sum . . . whereby the interests of the state in said road were sacrificed." In 1877 the state agreed to pay an assessment of $1.50 per share on its stock in the Atlantic and North Carolina and in 1879 to aid another road by purchasing its first mortgage bonds. Of greater interest was the decision of the state in 1875 to purchase for $850,000 the Western North Carolina, which became a mixed enterprise with three quarters of the stock in the hands of the state and one quarter in other hands. During the years 1877 through 1879, the State Treasurer spent substantial sums in purchasing iron and other materials for the completion of its track.[58]

Local aid to encourage railroad construction, which had been employed both before and during Radical rule, was relied on still more intensively after the Redeemers came into power. Their first legislature, meeting at the time of greatest disillusionment over the ruined credit of the state, enacted no less than

[56] *Ibid.*, 1871–72, Document No. 11, "Report of the Commission to Investigate Charges of Fraud and Corruption", pp. 1–576.

[57] *Ibid.*, 1871–72, Document No. 25, p. 6. See also 1870–71, Document No. 33, and 1872–73, Document No. 6.

[58] *Biennial Report of the Public Treasurer, 1878; ibid., 1880.* Legislation authorized such expenditure up to $70,000 per year. Actual disbursements for the three-year period ending September 30, 1879 appear to have been about $120,000.

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twenty-one measures providing for local assistance. The policy was maintained throughout the rest of the period under review, with ten such acts adopted in 1879. They contained various provisions attempting to ensure actual construction, providing, for example, that the subscription should not be made until the road was built and "cars running" to a given point. Most measures called for bond issues, in one case limited in amount to ten dollars per inhabitant; but a number permitted subscriptions in "lands, timber, work or money." Under a law of 1873, any county voting aid for the Western Division must levy a special tax payable in "bacon, wheat, beef, pork or corn or such articles as the commissioners may designate."

In North Carolina, as the terms of these acts indicate, the reaction against the excesses of railroad subsidy was a turn, not to the abandonment of public aid, but rather to a set of more modest expedients for stretching the limited resources of an agricultural area for the improvement of its transportation facilities.

In *South Carolina*, state financial aid to railroads was authorized by the pre-Radical legislature of 1866, and the policy was continued and extended during the first years of Republican rule. The principal controversies were not over the amount of aid during Reconstruction, which was relatively small, but over the terms on which the Radical régime disposed of the state's interest in certain railroads. Revulsion occurred long before the return of the Democrats to power.

In 1866, the Columbia and Augusta was voted bond endorsement at the rate of $6,500 per mile, and the Greenville and Columbia was granted a $600,000 addition to earlier endorsements. In the first year of Radical rule, the chief claimant for assistance was the Blue Ridge Railroad. In 1868, its president still declared that the Blue Ridge, when completed, would be "the cheapest and most direct line from the West to the Atlantic seaboard."[59] The Governor's message referred to the road as a "great national highway";[60] and the legislature voted $20,000

[59] "Conditions and prospects of the Blue Ridge Railroad Company in a letter addressed to Governor James L. Orr by J. W. Harrison, president of the Company" (Charleston, 1868).

[60] Senate *Journal*, Special Session, 1868, pp. 242–248.

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in cash for urgent repairs, $1,000,000 of endorsement of its existing bonds, and $3,000,000 of the endorsement of new bonds. In 1871 the state agreed to defer its own first lien on the company to permit it to seek first mortgage financing elsewhere, and in the same year the state's stock interest in the road was sold at a dollar a share to a "ring" including officials of the state administration. Because of the depreciation of the state's credit, the endorsed bonds remained unsalable. In 1872, the Radical legislature, over the veto of the Radical Governor, passed a measure offering the company $1,800,000 in state scrip in exchange for the $4,000,000 of endorsements. The story of the Greenville and South Carolina, which obtained additional aid in 1869, is a similar one. The state's stock was sold to the "ring" in 1870, under a statute ostensibly referring to other state property; and this road, on consolidation with the Blue Ridge, also obtained postponement of the state's lien. The combined company failed to prosper, and the great project of the Western connection never advanced beyond the pre-war tunnel drilled part way through Stump House Mountain.[61]

Reaction followed quickly. As early as November 1869, the Senate approved a report of its committee on railroads declaring itself "unalterably opposed to granting any pecuniary aid or assistance to any railroad scheme at present."[62] Committees of the two following legislatures criticized the handling of state finances and investigated charges of bribery to secure the passage of railroad measures.[63] In January 1873, the legislature, still under Republican control, ratified a constitutional amendment forbidding "the loan of the credit of the state by guarantee, endorsement or otherwise" without the approval of two thirds of the qualified voters. The next legislature began the process of scaling down the debt, much as Conservatives

[61] The Charleston and Savannah, the other road aided in 1869, also secured postponement of the state's lien. Similar postponement had been voted in 1865. Francis Butler Simkins and Robert Hilliard Woody, *South Carolina During Reconstruction* (Chapel Hill, 1932), ch. vii, contains histories of each of the principal railways.

[62] General Assembly, *Reports and Resolutions*, 1869–70, pp. 1591–1592.

[63] *Ibid.*, 1870–71, pp. 814–824; 1871–72, "Report of the Financial Investigating Committee".

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were doing in other states at the same time. Meanwhile, with state aid abandoned, the Radical legislatures attempted to meet the continuing demand for encouragement to railroad construction by measures for local assistance similar to those enacted in North Carolina.

When the Conservatives finally came into power in 1877, they continued the policy of local aid and published a "Fraud Report" giving fuller documentation to the scandals of Radical Reconstruction.[64] But the decisive turn in railroad policy had occurred some years before.

In *Louisiana*, revulsion also took place before the Democrats returned to power. State financial aid was extended for five years during the Radical régime and the policy was revived by the Redeemers, in one controversial case, at the very end of the period.

During the years 1868 through 1872, twelve measures were adopted offering the state's financial aid to railroads. The most common provision was for bond endorsement at the rate of $12,500 per mile to be covered by a second mortgage. A number of the projects failed to materialize, and the principal aid actually extended was to the New Orleans, Mobile and Texas Railroad, which was to make the much-desired connection with Texas. Acts of 1869 and 1870 provided for endorsements of $12,500 per mile on its main line and Shreveport branch and for an outright subsidy of $3,000,000 in state bonds, of which the first installment of $750,000 was actually paid. An act of 1871 provided for a stock subscription of $2,500,000. This was intended to be in substitution for the previous obligation to endorse the company's bonds, but the new state bonds were issued and endorsements of $875,000 remained outstanding.[65] The company completed some seventy miles of road and then abandoned operations far short of the Texas border.

The railroad measures aroused violent controversy, and accusations of bribery to secure their passage were matched by

[64] General Assembly, *Reports and Resolutions*, 1877–78, "Fraud Report".

[65] The figure of $875,000 is taken from *Statutes*, 1875, No. 86. Governor Kellogg gave it as $750,000. Senate *Journal*, 1874, pp. 9 *et seq.* Garnie W. McGinty, *Louisiana Redeemed: The Overthrow of Carpetbag Rule, 1876—1880* (New Orleans, 1941), p. 19n, states the total received by the company as $4,250,000.

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accusations of the use of money by competing shipping interests to prevent their adoption. But the alignments did not conform closely to party lines. "The moderate conservative press as well as the radical" supported improvement measures,[66] and a Republican Governor vetoed several subsidy bills and warned the legislature against "schemes of plunder", particularly those put forward by "well-dressed gentlemen claiming to be representatives of the most respectable of our people."[67] When railroad aid fell into disrepute, the Republican official organ published a booklet of "Facts and Figures" showing the part played by Democratic legislators in sponsoring and approving the legislation.[68] During the 1870 debates, a Republican representative accused both parties of "cracking the whip" in favor of subsidy, while Democrats were among those who spoke most eloquently in favor of reaching out to the "Canaan of promise . . . this great state of Texas at our door."[69]

After 1872, the Republican legislatures passed no further acts offering state financial aid. A repeal measure was adopted in 1874. As early as 1870, an amendment had been adopted limiting the public debt of the state to $25,000,000, and the limit was reduced to $15,000,000 by action of the 1874 legislature. Meanwhile, the state continued to grant to new railroads free right of way and use of materials in the state lands, and made occasional use of the method of local aid.

Oddly enough, there was a revival of railroad aid when the Redeemers came into power. "Transportation was one of the urgent needs of the state in 1877, and new railroad projects occupied the time of the legislature and the governor."[70] Two ways-and-materials acts were passed and signed even before the withdrawal of federal troops made their government secure. They repealed one Radical bill for local aid but enacted two of their own. Connection with Texas was again the great object, and in 1878 the legislature voted to lend $2,000,000 in state

[66] Ella Lonn, *Reconstruction in Louisiana After 1868* (New York, 1918), p. 36.

[67] Senate *Journal*, 1871, p. 27,

[68] O. D. Bragdon, *Facts and Figures or Useful and Important Information for the People of Louisiana* (New Orleans, 1871), pp. 49–50. *Cf.* Lonn, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[69] House, *Debates*, pp. 72, 68–69.

[70] McGinty, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

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bonds to the Texas and Pacific. The Governor considered the bill unconstitutional, since it would carry the state debt beyond the limit set during the Radicals' régime. He nevertheless approved it, in "deference to the large majority" it had received in both houses and in order to permit a court test, and then refused to sign the bonds themselves.[71] Thus the account of railroad aid in Louisiana ends with a controversy between a Democratic Governor and legislature reminiscent of a number of disputes between their Republican counterparts in this and other states earlier in the period.

In each of the eight states in which Radical régimes launched extensive programs of railroad aid, a revulsion against this policy took place in the early seventies. Perhaps surprisingly, the principal turn occurred in every instance before the panic of 1873. In four of the cases, the change of policy coincided with the return of the Democrats to power. Yet the experience of the other four states suggests that Redemption was not necessary to bring about this particular result. In these cases, it was the Republicans who made the change, either because of their own disillusionment with chicanery and failure or because the depreciation of state credit made further aid impossible.

It remains to examine the relationship between railroad construction and the policies which have been described. Table II gives the additions to railroad mileage in each of the states during the years 1865 through 1879. Like Table I, it is arranged in order to permit comparison between the Radical and other régimes. A first impression conveyed by the figures is that railroad building progressed more rapidly under the Radicals than under the Conservatives. Construction in Arkansas and Alabama was particularly noteworthy, and presumably Georgia's peak figure in 1871 owes more to the Republican largesse of the preceding year than to the restraint of the Redeemer legislature that met in the fall of 1871. The one major exception is Texas. But in that case the bonds voted during the Republican era never reached the railroads, and the effective aid was in land,

[71] House *Journal*, 1878. Extra Session, p. 18. Hilda M. McDaniel, "Francis Tillou Nicholls and the End of Reconstruction", *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, vol. XXXII, pp. 466–468.

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TABLE II

RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH
1866–1879

	La.	S. C.	Fla.	Miss.	Ark.	Ala.	Tex.	Ga.	N. C.	Va.	Tenn.	Total
	Mileage in operation Dec. 31, 1865											
	335	1007	416	898	38	805	465	1420	984	1407	1296	9071
	Net addition to mileage in operation during year											
1866	0	0	0	0	0	34	6	82	58	9	0	202
1867	0	0	21	0	0	12	42	46	0	22	62	220
1868	0	69	0	0	48	2	0	27	55	0	78	279
1869	40	25	9	92	42	63	70	77	33	11	15	477
1870	75	38	0	0	128	241	128	193	48	0	41	892
1871	16	62	20	0	2	339	154	263	12	4	28	880
1872	0	89	0	0	192	132	213	52	60	49	0	785
1873	0	30	0	0	250	94	500	100	25	36	100	1137
1874	0	0	18	28	0	60	72	0	68	70	10	343
1875	0	15	0	0	40	18	35	4	13	0	0	125
1876	0	18	1	66	27	0	346	42	43	10	15	571
1877	0	53	0	4	0	1	179	33	27	17	11	325
1878	0	13	2	38	16	31	218	76	9	11	9	423
1879	78	5	32	14	25	0	163	45	11	26	36	435
	Total net addition to mileage in operation, 1866–1879											
	209	417	103	242	770	1027	2126	1040	462	265	405	7066
	Mileage in operation, Dec. 31, 1879											
	544	1424	519	1140	808	1832	2591	2460	1446	1672	1701	16137

Source:—Poor's Railroad Manual, 1872–73, p. xxx; 1880, p. v.

As in Table I, the area between the heavy lines represents the period of Radical Reconstruction, and the area below the lower heavy line represents the period after the Conservatives had returned to power.

with which the Conservatives were more liberal than the Radicals. The boom in railroad building in 1873 coincided with the twenty-seven land grants voted by the first Reedemers' legislature. Thus Texas experience confirms rather than challenges the conclusion that, on the whole, railroad building during the period tended to flourish when and where public aid was being extended. Florida stands out, to be sure, as a state that acquired railroad debt and little railroad mileage. On the other hand, Mississippi acquired no debt and little mileage; and Virginia, which gave no state aid, shows the smallest percentage increase.[72] In Louisiana and South Carolina, construction

[72] John F. Stover, *The Railroads of the South, 1865–1900* (Chapel Hill, 1955), p. 61, notes that these three states "proportionately trailed all the rest of the states in the Union in new trackage for the decade" 1865–1875. With respect to the two Carolinas, Georgia and Alabama, the author declares that there was no "sig-

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slackened or ceased when the Radicals curtailed their programs of state assistance. Retrenchment did not build railroads. Whatever the leakages of public funds, and in spite of the fact that some roads were built without government assistance, there was—as would be expected in a developing region—a clear and substantial correlation between railroad aid and railroad construction.

It would, however, be a mistake to attribute these differences to political causes alone. Texas and Arkansas lay across the threshold of promising transcontinental routes. On the other hand, Virginia, with the largest mileage when the period opened, probably had the least need for new construction. Moreover, one striking reflection of economic conditions appears on the face of the figures. More than half of all the new building is concentrated in 1870 and the three following years. After 1873 it falls off abruptly and only in Texas is there substantial recovery before the end of the decade. Thus the peak of construction coincided with the boom years preceding the panic of 1873, and stagnation with the depression that followed. Since this was also true for the United States as a whole, though the contrasts were somewhat less sharp,[73] it would appear that one major explanation for the differences between parts of the period lies in the alternations of general economic prosperity and depression.

For the nation, the period taken as a whole, in spite of the setback of the seventies, was one of rapid railroad expansion. As would be expected, percentage increases in mileage were spectacular west of the Mississippi and moderate on the Atlantic seaboard. But the eleven Reconstruction states showed a rate of gain only slightly more than that of the New England and Middle Atlantic regions and considerably less than that of the long-established area of the Old Northwest. The share of the

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nificant connection between the presence of extraordinarily active carpetbaggers in these states and their relatively rapid railroad construction" (p. 62).

[73] United States mileage doubled from 35,000 in 1865 to 70,000 in 1873 and added about 16,000 more miles by 1879. A little more than 23,000 miles of the increase was made between December 31, 1869 and December 31, 1873.

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Reconstruction South in the total national mileage dropped from 26 per cent in 1865 to 19 per cent in 1879.[74] The gain in these states of some 7,000 miles—nearly 5,000 east of Texas—represented a substantial achievement, and it did much to transform the short and often disconnected lines of 1865 into a relatively complete regional system.[75] Yet the transportation network of the South was less developed than that of the North at the time of the Civil War, and in the fifteen years that followed the gap widened rather than closed.

A consciousness of this retardation played a significant part in shaping the Southern attitudes on railroad questions. One illustration is the series of requests and petitions throughout the period for federal government aid for internal improvements in the South. The Georgia Constitutional Convention of 1868 expressed the opinion that it would be "eminently wise and liberal in the Government of the United States to aid the impoverished people of the South in restoring their material prosperity". State legislatures, in memorializing Congress for support of particular railroads, often used the argument that they would be important links in a "great chain" that would connect the Atlantic with the Pacific;[76] and the movement for federal aid reached its culmination in the well-organized campaign of propaganda waged from 1874 on to secure a federal loan for the Texas and Pacific Railroad, which was supported by almost every Southern legislature.[77] The *Clarion* of Jackson, Mississippi declared that such appeals to the federal government were "bad in policy . . . wrong in principle . . . [and] contrary to the traditional creed of the Democratic party from its earliest organization to the present time", yet managed—by a turn

[74] Stover, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–61, makes a similar comparison, also on the basis of the Poor figures, for a group of ten southeastern states for the decade December 31, 1865 to December 31, 1875. Their gain was 46 per cent while that of the United States was 113 per cent. His group differs from that discussed in the present article by including Kentucky and excluding Arkansas and Texas.

[75] As may be seen from the admirable map facing p. 236 of E. Merle Coulter, *The South During Reconstruction, 1865–1877*, vol. VIII of *A History of the South* (Baton Rouge, 1947).

[76] Georgia, March 6, 1868. Alabama, Dec. 28, 1868, Dec. 7, 1871.

[77] Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction*, ch. iv. But the Florida legislature on March 8, 1877 opposed the measure as "unjust to this state".

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which Mr. Dooley would have enjoyed recording—to reach the conclusion that the national government should issue the Texas and Pacific bonds.[78]

A similar attitude appeared to govern Southern policy with respect to railroad regulation. In the Middle West this was the heyday of granger legislation, and the National Grange itself enlisted a considerable membership in the South. Commenting in 1873 on its appearance in Alabama, a Memphis editor cautioned against doing anything that might frighten the possible investor. "Foreign capital is proverbially timid. . . . We have far too few railroads and we are looking anxiously to the day that shall find more built."[79] Under these conditions neither Radical nor Conservative legislators were prepared to go very far in regulating railroad rates and practices. The South remained a region eager for more railroads and desperately short of the capital needed to build them.

The lack of local capital, and the expedients to which it gave rise, are illustrated in an "Address to the People" of Lee and Tallapoosa counties by the promoter of an Alabama company. It was, he said, an "admitted principle amongst capitalists" that, once railroad companies had prepared the roadbed with their own resources, they "were entitled to a sufficient credit to purchase the rails and equipment for the road." It was to make sure of obtaining these funds that the state of Alabama had agreed to endorse the bonds of the railroads. But this was not enough. "In the view of the wreck of private fortune, resulting from the war, it became evident to the Legislature, as was palpable to every reflecting man outside, that individual subscription and isolated effort were unequal" even to the task of grading. The plan of local government subscriptions had therefore been adopted as "the most equitable, most easily borne and most effectual". Accordingly the promoter asked $365,000 in local aid to add to the state's endorsement of $640,000. There remained in his calculation as the contribution of local individual investment only "work done"—$100,000—and "good and avail-

[78] Jackson *Weekly Clarion*, Nov. 17, 1875.

[79] Mobile *Register*, Aug. 21, 1873. See also Nashville *Union and American*, March 5, 1875.

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able private subscriptions"—$35,000—the two making not much more than 10 per cent of the whole.[80]

It is easy to recognize in expedients like these, as in North Carolina's county tax in beef and bacon, the determination to get railroads somehow in spite of inadequate means. Private subscriptions for developmental railroads in an impoverished region could not easily be secured. When they did come forward it was often in response to civic and patriotic rather than purely pecuniary appeals. An advertisement asking subscriptions to the Tennessee and Pacific challenged the reader to "Bear an Honorable part in this Great State and National Road".[81] Under such conditions, the policy of public assistance had arisen at times when, as one man put it for Texas, "there was not a single corporation in the state that had money enough to buy a single member of the legislature even at a very small price."[82] Even after corruption became possible, and in some cases prevalent, much of the same civic desire for improvements continued to survive. A Democratic newspaper made the following comment on a Radical measure for railroad aid: "The Legislature may have had in view the stealings they could make out of the scheme; but we can stand a pretty big 'steal' if we can get railroads in the State."[83]

Nor was all this confined to the South. In the early part of the period, the federal government was giving massive aid to the transcontinental railroads, and public assistance by state and more often by local governments was still accepted policy in much of the country. The programs were inspired by varying combinations of public spirit and private interest. Bribery was not unknown in Northern and Western legislatures or in

[80] Samuel G. Jones, "An Address to the People of Lee and Tallapoosa on the Subject of County Subscriptions to the Savannah and Memphis Railroad" (Montgomery, 1869), in the collection of the Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville. For other cases with similar figures, see Nashville *Press and Times*, March 22, 1869; Nashville *Union and American*, Feb. 11, 1870.

[81] Nashville *Daily Press and Times*, Feb. 21, 1867.

[82] S. S. McKay, ed., *Debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1875* (Austin, 1930), p. 404.

[83] Fayette *Chronicle*, quoted in Jackson *Daily Mississippi Pilot*, June 3, 1871.

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local railroad elections. In the Credit Mobilier, members of Congress and other national figures shared in the insiders' quick profits from the Union Pacific subsidy; and Southern editors adopted the phrase to warn their readers against "An Arkansas" or "An Alabama Credit Mobilier".[84]

Ambitious programs—if not orgies—of railroad aid had been and continued to be followed by revulsions against the policy. Some of the older states and cities had long since abandoned the practice, either because aid was no longer needed or because their programs had foundered in the depressions of the thirties and the fifties. New York preceded Tennessee and the Carolinas in their shift from state to local aid. Federal grants to the transcontinental railroads ended in 1871, and Southern advocates for the Texas and Pacific bond issue found themselves too late for success. There were striking similarities between the regions in the reaction to the depression that followed the panic of 1873. Within four years, constitutional provisions against state aid were adopted by Missouri, Nebraska and Colorado in the West as well as by Arkansas, Alabama, Florida and Texas in the South.[85]

Public aid to railroads in the Reconstruction South should be considered in the perspective of this national experience. There is no doubt that the Radical régimes were unusually subject to corruption and extravagance, and some of their frauds might well have seemed unexcelled in their "enormity . . . by any thing that ever disgraced the pages of American History."[86] Yet neither the abuses nor the accomplishments of Southern railroad aid during Reconstruction were wholly unlike those in other parts of the country.[87] On the other hand, the

[84] Little Rock *Daily Arkansas Gazette*, Feb. 8, 1873. Montgomery *Alabama State Journal*, April 22, 1873.

[85] Goodrich, "Revulsion", *loc. cit.*, especially table on pp. 158–159. Within the same period, New York adopted a constitutional prohibition against aid by local authorities.

[86] *The Evidence taken by the Joint Committee of the* [Georgia] *Legislature . . .*, p. iii, *supra* note 13.

[87] One Southern historian has even declared that "The methods employed in railroad building in Alabama were neither better nor worse than those generally practiced throughout the country." Moore, *loc. cit.*, p. 440.

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revulsion of Southern Conservatives against public assistance in the seventies was to a large degree shared by legislatures in the North and by those still controlled by Radicals in the South. It is of course possible that under other leadership the rest of the Southern states, like Virginia, might have refrained from granting aid in the post-war decade. If they had done so, they would have secured fewer miles of railroad. But the region had a strong ante-bellum tradition of public assistance,[88] and this was revived in a number of states before the Radicals came into power. Even during Republican rule, Democratic legislators and newspapers often supported, and occasionally initiated, measures for railroad aid. The relative poverty of the region tended to maintain the strength of the popular demand for public assistance in the improvement of communications. It would have been difficult for any governments in power in most of the states to have resisted this demand in the late sixties and still more difficult to have brought their programs of construction unscathed through the depression of the seventies. It would, moreover, have been contrary to the experience of other regions if there had not been some examples of venality and more of miscalculation as public authorities rendered assistance in the development of transportation facilities before they could be provided by private enterprise alone.

CARTER GOODRICH

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

[88] Milton S. Heath, "Public Railroad Construction and the Development of Private Enterprise in the South before 1861", *Journal of Economic History*, vol. X (1950), Supplement, pp. 40–53.

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REVIEWS

The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945. By GORDON A. CRAIG. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, 1955.—xx, 536 pp. $11.50.

Professor Craig's thesis (p. 468) that "throughout the course of German history the Prussian army, and the German army which grew out of it and inherited its traditions, had been a law unto itself, acquiescing in directions issued by the political heads of the state for the most part only when it suited its purpose to do so" up to the year 1933, is well and persuasively maintained throughout this excellent book. It is perhaps surprising that a really satisfactory appraisal of the part played by the Prussian and German army in the political development, since the days of the Great Elector, of the territory it was brought into existence to defend and to extend has never before been achieved. Persons of German birth are almost *ipso facto* incapable of the task, though many have tried and several have nearly succeeded. Other foreigners, like John Wheeler-Bennett, have concentrated, even where highly successful, upon short periods or upon some particular crisis. Even Mr. Wheeler-Bennett, with all his brilliance and virtuosity, just failed to achieve the calm, almost aseptic, appraisal that Professor Craig has managed to put on paper in the course of this dissection of the growth, setbacks, triumphs, humiliations and final decay of the Prussian Army and its leaders. One felt when reading Mr. Wheeler-Bennett's *The Nemesis of Power* (with which the final chapters of Professor Craig's book must inevitably be compared) that this author, who knew very many of Germany's generals and army officers of the period personally, liked some of them too much and disliked others of them too intensely always to reach a truly unimpassioned judgment. In particular, his moving account of the affair of July 20, 1944, and of its consequences, verges in places on the sentimental.

Sentiment is almost entirely absent from Professor Craig's book, though of sensibility there is an abundance. It is a fine piece of historical writing, though it never for a moment descends to mere "fine writing". His concluding paragraph makes the best epitaph I have read of the armies of Germany and their leaders.

> To the very end the commanders of Germany's armies showed the technical virtuosity and the physical courage which had always, since

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> the recovery from Jena and Auerstädt, been characteristic of the Prussian officer corps. But what they failed to demonstrate in these last desperate years was what they had failed to demonstrate when Hitler stood on the threshold of the chancellorship in 1933, what they had failed to demonstrate when he loosed his murderers on the land in June 1934, what they had failed to demonstrate when Schleicher was killed and Fritsch disgraced: namely, any trace of the moral courage, the spiritual independence, and the deep patriotism which had marked the careers of such great soldiers of the past as Scharnhorst, Boyen, and Gneisenau. Without these things, their other gifts were without value; and they themselves were powerless to avert the disaster which had been so largely the result of their political irresponsibility (pp. 502–3).

It is to be devoutly hoped that, in the new *Verteidigungsministerium* of Herr Minister Blank at Bonn on the Rhine, and throughout the education branches of the West German Army, Professor Craig's book will be made required reading, just as was Admiral Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History* (but from somewhat different motives) in the Imperial German Navy presided over by Admiral von Tirpitz. It would not do the East German People's Army (or its masters) any harm either to read and digest the lessons and the warnings of Professor Craig!

The new German Army may resent the preachings of the foreigner, but in Professor Craig's book it can also find effective criticism of its past rôle in politics, quoted from German sources. Thus (p. 425) Carl Severing is quoted as reminding the *Reichstag* on January 20, 1928

> that, during the First World War, the army had dictated the foreign and domestic policy of Germany, and that the German people was still paying for the disastrous results of military domination. Now, Severing charged, the army seemed bent on recapturing its war-time powers. It had 'a foreign policy of its own, a domestic policy of its own and, it seems to me, is beginning to have a financial and economic policy of its own as well'.

One wonders how much notice the *Reichsbankpräsident*, Dr. Schacht, took of these last words, which were very courageous ones for any German to utter, even in the year 1928, and all too true.

The period of reform in and after 1807 (succeeded a bare decade later by reaction), which is described by Professor Craig in his second chapter, represents the brightest exception to this sorry tale of the creation by the Prussian state of a Frankenstein monster that was ultimately to destroy both itself and Prussia as well. Prussia's early nineteenth-century "New Deal", though conservative old General York called it a *Natterngeschmeiss* (p. 49), gave that country and its rulers its first real chance to gain proper control over a truly National Army. When Humboldt, Boyer and Grollman were forced out of office in 1819, the opportunity had passed. A

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second opportunity came in 1848 and 1849 and another in 1918 and 1919. Three times unlucky, Germany is now attempting to rebuild her armies and re-create their traditions once again.

JOHN A. HAWGOOD

UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM,
ENGLAND

The Civilian and the Military. By ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR. New York, Oxford University Press, 1956.—xi, 340 pp. $6.50.

This nation was born with a universal conviction that standing armies, however necessary, are "ever dangerous to the liberties of the people." It has reached a point at which it is maintaining colossal standing armed forces, peacetime conscription, a huge intervention of strategic factors into the civilian economy and policy, and other stigmata of the garrison state. Mr. Ekirch has written a history of this striking transformation. With patience he has recovered and recorded the military programs, the debates, the enactments, which have steadily expanded the military factor in our affairs—his book is, indeed, useful as a history of American military policy. Together with this he has searched out the names and words of innumerable people, great and small, individually or in groups, who have opposed this process for one reason or another—pacifists, liberals, opposition politicians, anti-imperialists, money-savers, socialists, Quakers, draft-dodgers and many more. The resultant study is of value; it is almost painfully erudite, and illuminates a number of obscure corners in our military-political history.

Yet the focus is curiously blurred. One may question many of the author's inferences and some, even, of his more factual statements. But these seem the result not so much of error as of a certain naïveté. There is an unreality about the whole Ekirch drama. The jacket describes it as a history of "the American anti-militarist tradition". This last is in itself a vague, perhaps nonexistent, entity. It is true that Americans, like most other peoples, have traditionally disliked war, compulsory military service, paying for military budgets and predominance of the armed services in their civil affairs; but it is also true that traditionally they have responded to military power and glory, have used military means more freely than many other peoples, have fought wars with enthusiasm and have encouraged the development of the military factor in their affairs about as other modern states have done.

For Mr. Ekirch, the "anti-militarist tradition" has a solidity and consistency which he fails to communicate to his readers. It speaks through a confusedly variegated set of tongues, all the way from the

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New England dissidents of 1812 to the socialists and radicals of the early twentieth century or the industrialists and steel magnates who in the inter-war period opposed naval spending, despite their obvious interest in the profits which would accrue, because they thought it would endanger the stability of the economy. Mr. Ekirch can be astonished to find soldiers, like Pershing or Bliss, opposed to war; and grieved that liberal statesmen, like Wilson and Roosevelt, should resort to military means in the furtherance of policy. His history of "anti-militarism" not only concerns an elusive shadow, but is set in a nonexistent context, as if all questions of peace or war, militarism or pacifism, were purely domestic issues unrelated to the activities of other Powers upon the world stage—the old, isolationist conviction that it is for us alone to determine whether we shall adopt a "liberal-pacifist" or a "militaristic-imperialist" course. And even in attacking his problem as a domestic one, the author gives strangely little evaluation of the actual motives, or the importance, of the innumerable arguments he quotes. He has described a war between the Sons of Light (liberals, pacifists, isolationists and opponents of the party in power) and the Sons of Darkness (militarists) without analyzing the variegated hosts arrayed on both sides or even clearly analyzing what the war was really about.

The history has much of real usefulness and interest. But the approach seems to me to distort the true problems and in some measure to vitiate the results.

WALTER MILLIS

NEW YORK CITY

John Quincy Adams and the Union. By SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.—xvi, 546, xix pp. $8.75.

Within a few months scholars have published biographies of three members of the one Adams family—John Quincy by Samuel Flagg Bemis, Henry by Elizabeth Stevenson, and Brooks by Arthur F. Beringause—which amount to a fair percentage of the total output of this kind of literature during these months, and, if quality be the criterion, they add up to a much larger proportion. At the same time a Bibliography of the Adams Family and a microfilm of the Adams Papers for distribution to libraries are being prepared under the direction of Lyman H. Butterfield. What would Henry, who pointed so menacingly at the dissipation of American energy, think of this concentration?

The Adamses are historians' heroes. They never appealed to the American people very much. Probably historians themselves do not especially like the Adamses; indeed very few of them seem to have liked each other or themselves. There is nevertheless a series of moments

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in Adams family history to which students respond with an emotion that may not be love of the sort a Lincoln or a Jefferson evokes but that includes wonder and gratitude. President John Adams' decision to break with Hamilton for the sake of peace with France, Charles Francis Adams extracting from the British government a change in policy and an admission that it had wronged the United States in the *Alabama* affair, Henry Adams' vision of the Virgin of Chartres while he gazed at the dynamo at the Chicago World's Fair are such moments, and John Quincy Adams provides more of them than any other member of the line.

That is why Samuel Flagg Bemis, instead of calling this wonderful book volume two, following *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy*, calls it by another title almost as if there were two of his subject. Adams' "first career" had yielded marvelous results in the great treaties of 1818 with Great Britain and 1819 with Spain and the Monroe Doctrine. The presidency ought to have climaxed his career and would have completed a normal one. But it was only the introduction to the "second career" which is described in this volume. Adams was not recognized as "the Man of the Whole Nation" he yearned to make himself as President until after his seeming failure in the White House and astonishing mutation into a member of the House of Representatives. There he was the first to demonstrate that the moral character of the nation required the abolition of slavery and the first to win a fight against the slavocracy.

This was the essence of his "second career", and what a fight it was! Bemis is at his best describing the years-long battle against the Gag Rule. He makes no bones about his conviction that Adams, half-concealed abolitionism and all, was magnificently in the right. The victory brought Old Man Eloquent closer than any Adams to popularity. He even won the respect of Southerners, although it was of course in the North that deeper responses came forth. His concealed happiness at the outpouring of crowds to see and honor him reminds us that the Adamses were undoubtedly human. He would have preferred to be loved instead of stewing in what Bemis calls his "compulsive psychology", which led him after a day of torchlight processions, guns booming, ringing church bells and outspoken public affection to write in his diary, "To myself it was but the crowning proof how unfit I am for such occasions."

The inability of the Adamses to be happy about themselves or their country and their fantastic energy in undermining the comfort of both probably account for the surge of interest in them in our own anxious day. With the help of family papers which no other historian has used, Bemis probes the Adams psyche. The label "compulsive psychology"

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is only shorthand for his moving study of John Quincy's relations with his wife Louisa and his son George Washington, the melancholy of the former and the breakdown and suicide of the latter. In both relations John Quincy drove too hard and suffered because he knew it. In Charles Francis' shouldering of his hereditary burdens the father found comfort, and the tragedy of George brought him closer to his wife and strengthened his ability to forgive others if not himself. In the end his status of national patriarch, while it did not relieve him of his need to remain in the harness of office, so that he died in the Capitol itself, meant to him what he said in his last words: "This is the end of earth, but I am composed."

Adams' "inner direction" would better be left unlabeled. Bemis' sense of his subject is in his appellations of Adams: "the Old Contender", "the Friend of Human Freedom", "the Man of the Whole Nation". These are antique, but no one who values liberty and the Union can fail to be moved by their fitness. The final judgment of the author of this great diptych is that "The historical figure of John Quincy Adams stands behind that of Abraham Lincoln in this Union" (p. 545), and one senses that in this position he is displacing Daniel Webster and Henry Clay. The book is, if one dares say so in admiration, an exercise in American piety. Nothing about it can be criticized except the delay of Samuel Flagg Bemis in adding to his great work in diplomatic history a "second career" as writer of domestic political history and artist in biography.

BASIL RAUCH

BARNARD COLLEGE

Jefferson Davis: American Patriot, 1808–1861. By HUDSON STRODE. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955.—xx, 460 pp. $6.75.

A good biography of Jefferson Davis is a major need in our Civil War historiography. Lincoln bibliography runs into thousands of items, but biographies of Davis number fewer than two dozen, none of outstanding merit. The latest attempt to fill this important gap is the present volume by Professor Hudson Strode of the University of Alabama. In this and in a succeeding volume, which will cover the remainder of Davis's career, Professor Strode attempts to rehabilitate the Confederate President and to show him "as gifted and sensitive, as upright and valiant," "the hero in another version of the ultimate tragedy, which is that of a great and good man destroyed."

Mr. Strode's biography has a good deal of merit. It is the fullest account of Davis's pre-war years, and its chapters on Davis's boyhood,

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military training, tragic first marriage, and home life in Mississippi are sensitive and intelligent. Since he has been permitted to use some family papers never before opened to biographers, Mr. Strode has more to tell about Davis's personal life than has any of his predecessors. And Mr. Strode, a professor whose courses in creative writing are nationally famous, has presented his findings in a spirited, engaging style.

Despite these assets, Mr. Strode's *Jefferson Davis* is not the excellent biography for which Civil War students have been waiting. It makes surprisingly few contributions to our knowledge of the tragic and complex history of the decades before the Civil War. Mr. Strode has nothing new or significant to say about the Mexican War, in which Davis played an honorable and distinguished rôle; about Southern politics, where Davis came to take up the mantle of John C. Calhoun; about the national government, in which Davis ably served as Franklin Pierce's Secretary of War; or about the secession movement, in which Davis was a reluctant leader. Instead of illuminating these dark and confused subjects, Mr. Strode has chosen to write a defense of Jefferson Davis's every action. Sometimes he is partisan only by indirection; he quotes only pro-Davis sources and fails to warn his readers of their bias. At other times he seems deliberately to distort, as when he asserts that the "chief" change the Confederates made in adapting the Federal Constitution was the insertion of a clause "absolutely prohibiting foreign slave trade"—and fails to mention that the Southern constitution also had as an "innovation" a clause explicitly guaranteeing the perpetuity of human slavery.

Nor is Mr. Strode's book much more successful as a biography. He believes in telling his readers rather than showing them. Repeatedly we are informed that Jefferson Davis was a man of great distinction "as a scholar and a thinker"—but Mr. Strode's own book gives no evidence that the future Confederate President ever had an idea that was not previously Calhoun's. We are told that Davis, far from being reserved and cold, "was a good listener as well as an excellent raconteur, with a gift for both humor and wit"—but no examples are adduced of his brilliance in any of these lines. Fairly successful when recounting Davis's actions, Mr. Strode makes no attempt to analyze the conscious or unconscious motivations of his hero. It is enough for him to believe that the Confederate leader was a great and good man.

When Mr. Strode commenced his project, the late Douglas Southall Freeman told him: "I hope you will approach your subject with complete detachment of spirit and without preconception . . . never proceed from a thesis to a confirmation of it, but rather frame the thesis from the evidence." Unfortunately Mr. Strode failed to heed the kindly warning. Instead of doing grubby digging in the Mississippi newspapers, in the

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Congressional Globe, and in the National Archives, he has preferred to rely upon a handful of family letters, overrated because hitherto unpublished, upon lavender and old lace recollections by Davis descendants, and upon inspirations received when he visited Calhoun's grave in 1954, where he found "a flowering crab apple . . . in full bloom and birds . . . singing in its branches." As a result his book is not a real biography but a sentimental apologia.

DAVID DONALD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Revolt of the Moderates. By SAMUEL LUBELL. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956.—ix, 308 pp. $2.75.

Eisenhower the President. By MERLO J. PUSEY. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1956.—300 pp. $3.75.

Samuel Lubell tosses off insights—some brilliant, some cloudy, all interesting—at the rate of three or four per page. At his best he has no betters in the art of current commentary on the American political scene. And while, in *Revolt of the Moderates,* he is not always at his best, the book is well worth reading.

Among other things, Lubell is concerned here with bringing up to date the main lines of political analysis which he staked out four years ago in *The Future of American Politics.* In that remarkable first book he mapped the rise and decline of the Roosevelt coalition, the waxing and waning, in his terms, of the Democratic "sun" since 1928, and posed the question: what is to replace it in the skies of politics—and when? To the illumination of that question his new work now adds observations on events and popular responses accumulating since his earlier appraisal, from the campaign of 1952, that is to say, through the pre-cardiac phase of Eisenhower's presidency.

In these appraisals of trends among groups, or, as he puts it, "streams" of voters, Lubell relies for raw materials upon his own surveys of local election returns, together with his on-the-spot, face-to-face, sampling of ideas and attitudes among assorted voters, journalists, officials and key citizens. The generalizations which he draws from these sources make fascinating reading. The reader, however, having no independent check upon the author's own interpretations of his own material, is liable to frustration and uncertainty, reactions compounded by the wide latitude Lubell sometimes gives himself in drawing illustrations from his data file. It is disconcerting, for example, to find a discussion of class impacts on voting in Augusta, Georgia, highlighted by a table ranking Democratic percentages against home valuations in Houston, Texas.

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However, such difficulties with his data and its uses have not caught the author unaware. In an interesting appendix (pp. 259–92) he undertakes a chapter-by-chapter sketch of methods and of sources. These notes seem more productive in their substantive and theoretical asides than in their explanations of technique; they do show an awareness of the reader's problem, though, and a humility about the author's aims conspicuously lacking in the text. That makes it hard to quarrel with him.

It is Lubell's conclusion that neither of our major parties now holds the allegiance of a popular majority, in the sense of a firmly welded voting coalition, and this because so many millions of Americans, "middle class" in attitude, "conservative" in temper, comprising a variety of "voting streams", are caught between old attitudes and new realities, restive in their past political affiliations, yet shy of settling firmly into new ones, in varying degree dissatisfied not only with both parties but more basically with the compulsions of cold war and technological revolution. These are the "moderates" of this book's title, and it becomes Lubell's concern to speculate upon the prospects of both parties in attempting to bring them into a new, stable pattern of alignment.

Besides his surveys of the voters, therefore, he appraises aspects of contemporary intra-party politics. The dilemmas of organization Republicans are brilliantly defined in terms of contradictions characterizing Richard Nixon. The dilemmas of organization Democrats are dramatized by pointing out (against a civil-rights background) the polarization, South and big city, of their hard-core "safe seats" in Congress. Above all, Lubell looks at Eisenhower, not uncritically but sympathetically, grants him high marks as a "compleat politician", and credits him with substantial attainments in the art of leading by following, conciliating on the way.

This is a serious appraisal of the President as politican and, seemingly, a favorable one in terms of the very practical political considerations which occupy the author through most of his chapters. But Lubell is not really satisfied. He ends his book upon a note of critical concern about the adequacy of contemporary leadership. He fears we may be failing to conceive and carry through the policy commitments requisite to national survival.

At bottom, Lubell is a man of passion about policy. His interest in a substitute for Roosevelt's coalition reflects his strong desire for sustained impulses toward and support of what seem to him essential substantive adjustments (specifics are left undefined), particularly in the sphere of national security. And central to his present concern seems to be the conviction, or impression, or presentment (it is hard to say which) that

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Eisenhower's régime has not moved as hard, or boldly, or imaginatively, as it might to hasten a new political sunrise; to press the moderates toward a facing of the future, thus freeing them of their fears, ties, associations from the past. For, once freed of these things, Lubell implies, these moderates may regain their political resolution and come together in a new, forward-looking, partisan majority.

Throughout his closing argument, indeed throughout the book, one cannot help but sense some sort of "party government" conception of the policy-making process in our system. Lubell seems to assume an identity between "party" as a voting coalition, and "party" as an organization structure, and "party" as an aggregate of variously elected public officers (he continually employs the term in all three senses and without distinction). He seems to assume a close causal link between "stalemate" in the voters' partisan alignments and "stalemate" in Washington's policy departures (this term, too, is used both ways without distinction); thereby implying, perforce, that one party's dominance, electorally, sparks progress governmentally. But the resulting picture of our parties and our government is remarkably unhistorical, unanalytical. Whatever these institutions may become, whatever they now may be in process of becoming, they have been, until now, quite unlike *this*. Lubell remarks (p. 231): "During these years of transition . . . we shall have to continue to look to whoever is President rather than to Congress or to the parties themselves for unifying leadership." When, in this century, has it been otherwise?

It may be that Lubell's concept of our political institutions is, in fact, far more sophisticated than the logic of his argument suggests to this reviewer. If so, one can but wish he were more rigorous in using terms like "party", "stalemate", "unity", or even "moderates"—which last term, incidentally, goes undefined throughout his book.

These difficulties aside, *Revolt of the Moderates* makes a considerable contribution to our body of ideas about the nature and the risks of contemporary politics—the contribution of a writer whose acuteness and originality are demonstrated, fully, in his work. One wishes one could say as much for Mr. Pusey's foray into the field of campaign-year biography. Unhappily, his book has little to commend it.

Eisenhower the President is, in effect, campaign portraiture without the buoyancy which sometimes springs from simple adulation; it strikes a "factual" tone without the crispness or the pace of good reporting; it makes a place for criticism now and then, but rarely in the depth, never with the sharpness, often characteristic of contemporary editorials in the *Washington Post and Times Herald* which Pusey serves as Associate Editor. Not once does the author ask of his subject or himself a searching

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question on the order of those posed continually in the press by Lippmann, say, or Reston, or Rovere. Not once does his treatment of issues, or events, reach near the level of Lubell's far briefer but much more rewarding commentary on this presidency. And in the realm of straight recording of events there is no effort made to take account of, much less clarify, what seem to be denials of contemporary press reports signed by reliable reporters and printed in the author's paper, among others.

A serious, close-in, current appraisal of the Eisenhower presidency from a sensitively sympathetic point of view could make a very valuable contribution. Unfortunately, it is not made in this book.

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925. By JOHN HIGHAM. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1955.—xiv, 431 pp. $6.00.

In historical retrospect, the transformation of American immigration policy after the First World War will, no doubt, seem one of the decisive changes in the life of the nation. The consequences were momentous; and the complete reversal of popular attitudes reflected a long chain of historical developments. So long as the issues were still alive, it was difficult to assess the causes of the new departure. We have heretofore had only occasional and fragmentary contributions to the understanding of this most important event.

Professor Higham's study is the first serious historical account of the whole movement to restrict immigration. It is a thoughtful work, carefully put together and based upon the use of a wide range of sources. Its judgment is generally dispassionate and sound. It is well written and will add substantially to our knowledge of many phases of the history of the United States in the half-century after 1875. It is a good beginning to a revaluation of the whole movement it describes.

The subject is important and fresh enough, however, to justify some mention of the deficiencies of this excellent work. On some points of detail the author has gone seriously astray. It is surprising, for instance, that he should misunderstand the character and overlook the importance of the Dillingham Commission (p. 189). Again, Professor Higham has not fully grasped the relationship of organized labor to the movement for immigration restriction; and the inability to use immigrant sources occasionally distorts his account (pp. 45, 160, 188).

More important, he labors under the burden of an untenable thesis, one not really germane to his purpose, and yet that nevertheless too often

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intrudes, to the distortion of his views on significant points. He believes that nativism was a constant in American history, a kind of subterranean stream making its presence felt in "cycles" or "rhythms". In depressions, it burst into the open; in times of prosperity, it sank again beneath the surface.

This simplistic view is a source of constant difficulty. It simply does not fit the facts of the case Professor Higham honestly presents. To square the interpretation with events he is driven to treat deeply-held attitudes as if they could be turned on and off by monthly fluctuations in the stock market. Thus, anti-Catholicism faded after 1900, revived after 1907, "shrank like a pricked balloon" in 1915, was reinflated in 1920 and disappeared after 1924 (pp. 175, 200). A more realistic view would find a steady development of that sentiment for sixty years after 1880, with a peak between 1924 and 1928. Similarly I cannot find that the alternations of depressions and recovery had much to do with the consistent growth of sentiment in favor of immigration restriction between 1890 and 1924.

In any case, all this is not really relevant to the story. The restrictionist movement stands decisively apart from all earlier nativism. No significant group of Americans before 1880 conceived of an end to European immigration as a serious possibility. Thereafter growing numbers of them did. Economic changes had little direct relevance to this profound shift in sentiment. The transformation was rather due to the injection of a completely new ideological element, racism. Professor Higham has many interesting things to say about the influence of racism; fortunately, they are not altogether obscured by his theory of cycles and rhythms.

OSCAR HANDLIN

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The French Canadians, 1760–1945. By MASON WADE. Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1955.—xvi, 1136 pp. $7.50.

Mason Wade's monumental and scholarly study of the French Canadians is a noteworthy contribution to our knowledge of North America, and, more specifically, to our knowledge of Canada's bicultural character.

The author of a life of Parkman (1942), of *The French Canadian Outlook* (1946), and the editor of Parkman's *Journals* (1947), Wade has devoted some fifteen years to a study of French-Canadian civilization, and has spent the major part of this period in Canada, as the recipient of grants from several foundations, and also as cultural attaché at the American

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Embassy in Ottawa. He is now in charge of Canadian studies at the University of Rochester.

"This book", he states in his preface, "is an attempt to explain why the French Canadians live, think and react differently from the English-speaking North Americans." This question is the crux of the matter. Yet, by focusing his attention on what differentiates the French Canadians from the rest of North America rather than on the many views which they share with us, Wade runs the risk of giving his readers a distorted view of his subject. This is a risk of which he is fully aware. "Somewhat disproportionate attention", he writes, "will be devoted to the extremists of a generally placid and easy-going people, who possess a singular devotion to the golden mean as a rule of life; for this is an attempt to explain differences, not to stress resemblances."

In order to explain the complexities which have beset French Canada in its struggle to survive and to develop, and the special problems which have attended the political growth of binational Canada from "Colony to Nation", Wade has resorted to extremely detailed accounts of the various crises which have marked this evolution from 1760 to 1945, emphasizing chiefly, of course, the political aspects of these struggles. While the welter of names (most of them new to American readers, and many others forgotten in Canada today), and the innumerable dates and incidents, are likely to baffle or even repel the uninformed reader, the fact remains that his book is a gold mine of information and of stimulating side lights which are of inestimable value to the student of Canadian affairs. Moreover, the pen pictures which the author has interspersed casually in his massive accounts of political events show a keen psychological insight on his part and a fundamentally impartial approach to his material. This impartiality is even more striking when he deals with such complex and emotion-generating topics as the constitutional rights of the French Canadians in the Northwest and in Ontario, not to mention the conscription issue, an issue which has been completely misunderstood in the United States, as well as in large sections of Canada itself. Here, as elsewhere in his searching volume, Wade has allowed documents to tell the story from both the French and English-Canadian points of view.

The pages in which he discusses the nonpolitical aspects of French-Canadian civilization, art, education and literature are excellent. Indeed, one might wish that there were more of these; for, quite aside from the much-needed information which they provide regarding a very important aspect of French-Canadian activity and its contribution to the culture of Canada as a whole, they are also of help in placing French-speaking Canada in its proper perspective and in correcting the false

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impression which (as Wade himself feared) might be created by his emphasis on the nationalistic trends in French-Canadian history.

Yet, in spite of this emphasis, which was unavoidable in view of the question posed, "Why are the French Canadians different?", the all-important fact is that *The French Canadians, 1760–1945* marks an important stage in the development of Canadian studies, and that it is bound to remain for years to come an invaluable *instrument de travail* for further research.

Marine Leland

Smith College

Medieval Political Ideas. By Ewart Lewis. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1954.—2 vols. xii, v, 661 pp. $12.50.

In writing these two volumes Mrs. Lewis set herself two tasks. She wished to put before the nonspecialist teacher and his students a body of texts in good translation which would illustrate the principal elements and sources of medieval political thought. And she proposed to give each body of translations a commentary which would place it in the proper historical setting, make clear its meaning, relate the topic under discussion to other questions of medieval significance, and, beyond this, consider the quality of medieval thinking on the "eternal questions" of political theory. To these ends she has given us some 320 pages of translation, and 250 of commentary. All things considered, she has succeeded remarkably well.

The books are divided into eight topical chapters of varying length: The Idea of Law; Property and Lordship; The Origin and Purpose of Political Authority; The Individual and the Community; The Structure of Government in the State; The Structure of Authority in the Church; The Problem of Empire; Regnum and Sacerdotium. The phraseology of these headings indicates the writer's approach to be that of the political scientist and not of the historian. Within each chapter, therefore, Mrs. Lewis systematically handles the theoretical problems involved, always being careful to note the origin of the issue, its terms, and its medieval treatment before she proceeds to analyze the medieval ideas in terms of their historical significance and permanent intellectual value. Her ability to see through medieval verbosity and pomposity to the fundamental issues is commendable, as is her clarity in adjusting medieval terminology to its modern equivalent. This topical approach makes it impossible for the student to get in any one place a complete picture of, say, the political thought of Marsilius or Thomas; but this is valuable in that it makes difficult facile generalizations and the use of near-meaningless adjectives such as "Marsilian" and "Thomistic".

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The volumes have other merits. The choice of problems and the treatment of church-state relations at the end of the second book make clear both the great complexity of medieval political thought and the great variety of sources the scholar must master to understand it. The author has a good sense of chronology and uses it in discussing the variations in argument caused by changing economic, social and political conditions in the world. Indeed, she tries throughout her introductions to keep in view the pertinent reflections of institutional developments in every field upon political theory. More specifically, the influence of Roman and canon law upon political thought is properly recognized, in England as well as on the continent; and the interrelationship between public and private law is also pointed up.

But there are unfortunate failings. Although well placed, her historical remarks are not always sure. Her references to Innocent III and treatment of the Investiture Controversy are marked simplifications, and the footnotes give neither adequate bibliography nor indication to the reader that here is a matter of great scholarly controversy. Several subjects show neglect of recent scholarship; for example, the relationship between the Hohenstaufens and Romanist activity, characterization of the glossators as mere explicators of Justinian's law, the rôle of the canonists in the development of imperial-national relations.

The choice of texts is wide, ranging from the legal to the theological, but again an opportunity has been missed to make clear to the non-specialist precisely how marginal comments to key words or passages of Roman or canon law were made the vehicle for political thinking. Mrs. Lewis' translations have come in for severe criticism [in the *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, LXX (Oct. 1955), 633–35], probably too severe if one can judge from a random check. In large measure, then, Mrs. Lewis has succeeded in giving aid, to paraphrase her, to those who now leave Augustine with trepidation and "sigh with relief" upon achieving the *Second Treatise on Civil Government.*

PETER RIESENBERG

SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

The Theory of Economic Growth. By W. ARTHUR LEWIS. Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955.—453 pp. $6.00.

This admirable book represents a venture which only a few contemporary economists have so far attempted: a general survey of the whole vast and rugged terrain of economic growth. The title, however, is misleading, and the reader will be disappointed if he expects to find *the* theory, or *a* theory, or *comparative* theories of economic growth. Nor should the reader look here for case studies or statistical tabulations.

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Instead, he will find a thoughtful and penetrating examination of the history and problems of economic growth, and a faithful account of the complex interrelationships among many more and less familiar features of growth. And the presentation is made in a delightful English style—easy, clear, somehow precise without much recourse to the technical jargon, frequently witty, and in several sections (especially in chapter iii) a remarkable echo of the accents of Adam Smith.

The author himself declares, in an immoderately modest Preface, that what he has done "is to make not a theory, but a map." In the present reviewer's opinion, Professor Lewis has done much more than that, in the way of various analyses and interpretations; but also somewhat less, as regards the need for a rationale, or clear and explicit system of coördinates in his map.

The book opens with an urbane introduction to behavioral analysis and analysts, proceeds to the "will to economize" as the motivation for economic growth, and then considers the economic institutions which regulate this motivation. The subsequent three chapters deal with the accumulation and distribution of various resources, discussing knowledge, capital, population, and international trade. Finally, the various issues of private and public policy, many of which were treated *passim*, are drawn together in a concluding chapter on government.

For all this discursive approach, the treatment is largely, almost thoroughly, dynamic. Lewis is interested not only in the *conditions* of growth but also in the *evolution* itself, and most of his discussion is on a different level from the primarily taxonomic treatments in the current literature (such as Rostow's *The Process of Economic Growth*), as well as different from the comparative-statics treatments (such as the Harrod and Domar models of "stable growth"). On the other hand, Lewis seems to retain some static biases, notably in his treatment of economic institutions as being mainly obstacles to growth (neglecting the capacity of some institutions, such as the corporation or bank, for positive and creative influence), and also in his description of growth motivation as essentially a drive to economize (to the neglect of the great movements of expansion and construction), and again in his fear of shortages during growth (with small allowance for the stimulating effect of excess demand, especially for factors of production).

In interpreting the phenomena of growth, Lewis does not shrink from drawing conclusions, including some unorthodox ones. Thus he dares to say a good word for inflation (under controls) as a means of capital formation (pp. 217–225 and 404–6); for indirect taxes, if properly rendered progressive (p. 403); and for a large rôle by government in societies where the Western type of individualism is not dominant (pp. 13–14

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and 382). He dislikes detailed central planning, but recommends "piecemeal planning"—"since the results of demand and supply are not socially acceptable in their entirety" (p. 384). In general, Lewis' approach is experimental, and he is actually more sympathetic to new departures than are Buchanan and Ellis, whose somewhat comparable book, *Approaches to Economic Development*, seems at first glance to be more "action-minded".

To this reviewer, the chief limitation of Lewis' book is its lack of an organizing principle. More exactly, its organizing principle is not explicit and deliberate, with the result that the reader is left with the bits and pieces of a doctrine. The book would probably be difficult to use as a course text. But the author does himself an injustice in pointing to multiplicity, and modestly pleading pluralism. For, implicit in several crucial passages (most notably in chapter iii, sec. 5a) is a kind of model of the social process, in terms of the pursuit of "economic opportunities" when permitted by the "social institutions". While this may not be a wholly adequate theory of social action, even when buttressed with certain other implicit concepts from Lewis' pages, it could be worked up into an integral concept of development, standing a step or two beyond Schumpeter's, on the way toward a true process-model of development.

EDWIN P. REUBENS

CITY COLLEGE OF NEW YORK

The Theory of International Economic Policy. Volume II: *Trade and Welfare.* By J. E. MEADE. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1955.—xiv, 618 pp. $7.20.

Trade and Welfare: Mathematical Supplement. By J. E. MEADE. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1955.—viii, 128 pp. $4.00.

The second volume of Professor Meade's *magnum opus* takes full employment and balance-of-payments equilibrium for granted, and examines all other arguments for trade controls from the standpoint of world economic efficiency.[1] The volume is in four parts, the first dealing with general principles of economic policy, the second and third with

[1] Volume I, *The Balance of Payments*, was reviewed in the December 1952 issue of this journal.

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controls on international trade and on movements of labor and capital, and the fourth with the question of multilateralism *vs.* discrimination.

The book is significant chiefly as a thorough and systematic exposition of the pure theory of international commercial policy. Its most original feature in this respect is the analysis of "second-best" arguments for trade control: arguments that recognize trade restrictions as bad in themselves, but as possibly useful for offsetting the effect of other bad things (such as internal taxes or monopolies). It cannot be said, however, that the discussion of "second-best" arguments, necessary though it may be for completeness, yields any very striking results. The author himself considers them "not very compelling". Even less compelling are the "distributional" arguments for trade controls, designed to shift the distribution of income in favor of one or another factor of production within a given country. Free trade maximizes economic efficiency; any desired change in income distribution can always be achieved by other means, such as fiscal policy.

The author is more impressed with the "structural" argument, which is essentially the infant-industry case for protection. To use his excellent metaphor, the ordinary "marginal" criteria of economic improvement can tell us whether we are going uphill, but not whether the mountain we are climbing is the highest of all possible peaks. Meade strongly believes in the importance of structural as distinct from marginal changes; what puzzles him is "how to tell whether a structural change will be economically efficient or not" (p. 568). Thus we are given no easy rules as to the choice of the right mountain to climb. The choice must remain largely an act of faith or intuition. While the reviewer is in sympathy with this approach, he has nevertheless some misgivings about Meade's habit of discussing the theory of external economies on the assumption that the size of the market is constant or, at all events, is somehow given independently of the changes discussed (pp. 259–270). The chapters on the structural problem are highly illuminating, but do not seem based on a fully adequate view of economic growth as a whole. However, since no one has yet developed such a view, this is no criticism of the volume before us.

There is a further argument for trade control as a possible means for a poor country to improve its terms of trade and thereby its real income (a "distributional" argument on the international plane). Meade accepts this, but stresses at the same time his preference for the conceivable alternative policy of direct grants-in-aid from rich to poor countries. In one place, however, he asserts that there is no necessary connection between a country's per capita income level and the strength or weakness of its balance of payments (p. 476). This seems debatable and creates,

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moreover, an inconsistency in his treatment. When he comes to examine the case for discrimination, he presents a group of countries in descending order of strength in their balance-of-payments positions, the strongest having no import restrictions and the weakest employing discriminatory restrictions on imports from all sources (pp. 553 *et seq.*). Now if this descending order of balance-of-payments strength is not also a descending order of real income per head, there seems to be no justification for import restrictions by countries with weak payments balances. The only basic justification is that, as Meade argues earlier, a poor country should be allowed to improve its terms of trade with its richer trading partners, and that the richer countries should acquiesce in this—unless they are prepared to offer outright grants instead.

But what is the use of improving the real income of poor countries—whether through shifts in the terms of trade or through grants-in-aid—if these countries suffer from population pressures of the Malthusian kind? The result would be increased populations at physical subsistence levels and no increase in welfare. In such circumstances there is evidently a strong case for making any international income transfers conditional on demographic restraints or, so long as these are inadequate, for channeling any additional resources into capital accumulation rather than consumable income. Meade himself presents on these grounds an interesting argument for controlling capital movements to countries of this type, entirely analogous to the case for curbing the emigration of labor from such countries. In a remarkable chapter on population problems he gives incidentally a very plausible theoretical account of the disguised unemployment in overpopulated peasant economies, showing that in such economies the marginal product of labor can easily be, not just zero, but actually negative (pp. 92–93).

Meade points out that differences in taxation and welfare-state arrangements in different parts of the world may create uneconomic incentives for international movements of capital, which it would be proper to check by means of direct controls. On the whole, however, he is a firm believer in freedom for factor movements as well as trade. Thus he finds no valid argument for restricting capital exports from a country that is losing in competitive power either because of chronic inflation or a persistent spontaneous shift in world demand away from its products. Some writers have feared that continuous exchange depreciation would lead to an excessive urge to transfer capital out of a country in such a predicament. Meade replies that if inflation alone is the trouble, money rates of interest may well be high enough to retain capital funds at home, while in the case of an adverse shift in demand the export of capital would actually be in accord with economic needs, and should not be prevented.

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Much of the main volume is a translation into plain English of the models set out in a complex but well-devised notation in the *Mathematical Supplement.* Plain English is not always a good medium for essentially mathematical reasoning. Some parts of the main volume make rather cumbersome reading. Thanks to the author's expository skill and lucid style of writing, the book is not really difficult; yet it does place great demands on the reader's stamina and patience. Like its predecessor, the present volume is severely abstract. It is not, of course, entirely original. Some of it is based on work published by Fleming, Metzler, Samuelson and Viner in the years 1948–51. Meade's characteristic achievement is to combine the ideas of others with many important insights of his own, to form a comprehensive treatise that is grand in design and coherent in texture. It is a truly impressive achievement.

RAGNAR NURKSE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

British Industry, 1700–1950. By WALTHER G. HOFFMANN. Translated by W. O. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1955.—xxiii, 338 pp. 35*s.*

In view of the present concern with problems of economic development, this volume appears at an opportune time. Economists and historians have succeeded in presenting at least the broad outlines of the general process of economic development. But development studies have reached a point where they must now become more empirical, and the relativity of the development process must be recognized—in terms of both inter-temporal and inter-spatial differences. In this connection, this book should interest any student of Britain's course of development.

It is a translation and enlarged version of Professor Hoffmann's study of British industrial production from 1700 to 1935. The initial study, published in German in 1940, endeavored to analyze quantitatively long-term changes in the British industrial economy. The author has incorporated some new material on Britain's industrial production between 1935 and 1950 and a brief note upon some criticisms that have been made of the statistical technique employed by him in calculating "long waves" of industrial production.

The major propositions presented by the author are as follows. (1) An index of total industrial production is constructed for the last 250 years: with 1913 as the base year, the index rises from 1.19 in 1700 to 164.0 in 1950. (2) Inter-temporal differences in the rate of growth of

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industrial production are noted: the rate of growth of industrial production accelerated until 1830 and then has been decelerating, and within the aggregate there was a more rapid expansion of producer goods industries than consumer goods industries until World War I, after which time the rôles were reversed. (3) From a consideration of the "growth histories" of forty-eight individual industries it is concluded that the output of most industries shows an initial phase of continually increasing growth, then a phase of slower growth, and, in some cases, a third phase of absolute decline. (4) Long-term fluctuations are also examined: a "long wave" of approximately twenty years' duration is suggested for most of the individual industries and for total industrial production.

These propositions are worthy of broader attention if, as the author suggests, the statistical methods employed could be used to extend our inquiries to the history of other industrial economies, if it could be shown that Britain's experience was typical of all industrial economies, and if economic historians were better able to appreciate the significance of fundamental industrial changes.

As they stand, however, the propositions are subject to some criticisms. One may seriously question the reliability of the statistical materials: the index of total industrial production may have significant reliability for the late nineteenth century, but for the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century the index appears extremely narrow and highly speculative; the calculation of weights can be questioned; no allowance is made for the increasing complexity of industrial output in terms of wider range of products; and the use of moving averages casts suspicion on the existence of "long waves". Moreover, in a broader context, the author fails to consider the wider—and more interesting—issues of the determinants of his findings and their implications for the study of economic development. From the standpoint of recent literature on development problems, it would now be enlightening to try and interpret Professor Hoffmann's findings in terms of such development issues as the existence of "growing points" in an economy, the need for "balanced growth", the effects of the export sector on domestic growth, and the tendencies toward secular stagnation in rich industrial countries. The subject matter of economic development—even the restricted field of British industrial development—still awaits its author who can combine theory, history, and statistics in an appropriately balanced fashion. For attempting to present some statistical details, Professor Hoffmann's work should be welcome. But it can provide only a small part of the whole story.

GERALD M. MEIER

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

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The Origins of the British Labour Party. By J. H. STEWART REID. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1955.—xiv, 258 pp. $4.50.

This is a careful, scholarly and rather single-minded effort to explain the development of the Labor party in terms of a continuing political alliance among divergent groups for the purpose of seeking practical measures of social reform. The author is a Canadian historian who is chairman of the Department of History, United College, University of Manitoba.

Beginning with a discussion of the changing nature of British politics in the 1870's Professor Reid carries the story down to 1918. Although he is covering well-trodden ground in his account of the early years of the Labor party, his book should be a valuable addition to the library of any student of British politics. He traces the early political history of the Labor party in considerable detail, and places the events in the context of related political and economic developments in an admirable fashion.

The author's hypothesis is that the essential character of the Labor party as a working alliance of different groups was established by the experience of the early years before and during World War I and still persists. The party began as an expediential alliance among various trade unionists and socialists to obtain needed social reforms—to remedy the common failure of both Liberals and Conservatives to deal realistically and effectively with the problems which industrialization had raised for the working class. The alliance persisted and grew stronger because, in large part, its divergent elements were willing to shelve their long-run objectives and concentrate on the attainment of short-run reforms. With the help of a number of fortuitous events, not the least of which was World War I, the Labor party survived the acute disagreements which threatened its existence during the early years and emerged as a major force in British politics at the end of World War I. Divisions and differences have continued; as the author notes (p. 236), "the Labour party has always seemed to live on the edge of civil war between its factions." In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, the party has become a model of effective participation by organized labor in democratic politics.

Professor Reid's view of the Labor party as a coalition of divergent groups playing practical politics according to accepted British conventions is a salutary departure from romanticized interpretations which overstress the solidarity of the party or consider its development largely in terms of

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socialist ideology. Although the book lacks pace and excitement, it has the solid virtues of a clearly stated and theoretically significant thesis and a well-organized exposition of materials relevant to that thesis. Nevertheless, there are certain points on which this reviewer must enter either a reservation or an objection. In the first place, Professor Reid has failed to explain satisfactorily why socialists, trade unionists and others should have been able to agree that a policy of seeking short-run reforms through peaceful democratic political action was the best way to solve the problems which were tormenting the British working class. As a matter of fact (as the author makes clear), many socialists, trade unionists and others interested in the problems of the working class were not able to accept this strategy of action. Why? The book chronicles the policies followed by the party during the early years and gives the reader a lively sense of the precarious nature of the alliance on which the party rested. It fails, however, to give adequate consideration to the attitudes and beliefs (underlying immediate views on politics) which were held in common by those who joined together in the Labor party.

In the second place, Professor Reid's argument tends to exaggerate the importance of the early years as a determinant of the present character of the Labor party. One may accept his view as to the origins of the Labor party and still believe that socialism has played a more important rôle in its life, particularly since 1918, than he would seem to imply. Socialist theory has provided an orientation and sense of direction for Labor party policy; it has served as a reservoir of ideas, and as an attraction to draw in the able men the party needs for leadership. Belief in the ideal of a socialist commonwealth has served as an inspiration to many of the rank and file, and particularly to those who have carried on the hard, slogging work of party organization at the grass roots. Perhaps the difference—the "edge"—which has carried the Labor party successfully through so many crises has been precisely the belief that the party is something much more than merely a vehicle for the winning of bread-and-butter reforms. By placing his emphasis on the pre-socialist days of the Labor party, Professor Reid provides an interpretation which encourages one to overlook or play down both the past contributions of socialism to the Labor party and the dangers to the party which arise from the ideological difficulties and programmatic poverty of British socialism.

LANE DAVIS

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

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Pioneering in Big Business, 1882–1911. By Ralph W. Hidy and Muriel E. Hidy. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1955.—xxx, 839 pp. $7.50.

The first research project approved by the Business History Foundation, Inc., in sponsoring the preparation of the histories of the larger corporations in the United States, was a study of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey). *Pioneering in Big Business* is the first volume to appear in a multi-volume history of the administration and operation of this large, vertically integrated company. As such, it is a vital part of a case study in the development of big business during the past seventy-five years.

The present volume, which was written by Professor Ralph W. Hidy (of New York University) and his wife, traces the history of the formation and growth of the Standard Oil group to the point of its dissolution by the United States Supreme Court in 1911. Although it concentrates on one large corporation, it is more than a history of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. It is really a biography of the Standard Oil combination, for Jersey Standard existed for twenty-nine years before 1911 either as a powerful member of an integrated aggregation of companies or as the legal parent of the Standard Oil group and the instrument through which many different corporations were operated as one petroleum business.

The first part of the book deals with the period from 1882, when the trust was established, to 1899, when Standard Oil of New Jersey became the central holding corporation for the Standard Oil combination. Following a brief sketch of the rise of the oil industry and the creation of the Standard Oil alliance, the authors turn to the formation of the trust and a detailed account of Jersey Standard's operations. They provide a comprehensive treatment of the most important aspects of the entire combination's business, including decision-making and control, the pattern of staff organization, transportation, and manufacturing and marketing at home and abroad. They discuss the steady expansion of the Standard Oil companies, the problems they faced in opening new fields, their technological contributions, the accomplishing of full integration, and the growing public criticism of the Standard Oil "monopoly".

The second part of the volume is concerned with the years 1899–1911, during which Standard Oil of New Jersey served as the apex of a pyramid of companies dominating the American petroleum industry. In this period the functional pattern of the combination remained essentially the same as it had developed in the 1880's. But it was necessary for the

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Standard Oil executives to adjust managerial techniques and operating policies to a rapidly expanding petroleum industry and to a highly charged political atmosphere. Domestic and foreign competition increased, and Standard Oil suffered a decline in its proportion of the national market and a narrowing of its profit margin. Standard Oil men fought with great resourcefulness to maintain their position and they achieved many successes. The financial rewards remained high for Standard Oil but, as the Hidys point out, "the strain was terrific."

Fully aware of the complicated nature of the story they have to tell and of the complex forces involved in so vast a business as they are treating, the authors are cautious about advancing simple explanations and sweeping generalizations. Nevertheless, there emerges from the rich texture of their account a clear conception of the pattern of development that Standard Oil followed. Professor and Mrs. Hidy are sympathetic in their treatment of the combination. The behavior of John D. Rockefeller and his associates, they declare, can be presented most realistically as the result of decisions made in response to "a succession of prods and pressures." While they are not altogether uncritical of Standard Oil men and methods, many of their conclusions seem to be stated as implicit defenses of those men and methods. They say in one place, for instance: "Every one of the techniques used by Standard Oil marketers was adopted by competitors, either before or after organization and systematization of the methods by the combination" (p. 470). This is not to imply that the authors should choose the right as opposed to the wrong or that they should get into the realm of value judgments. Indeed, to a degree this appears to be just what they have done. But a more important shortcoming, in the reviewer's opinion, is their tendency to assume that what happened had to happen and their reluctance to point out alternatives open to Standard Oil executives.

One may disagree with some of the Hidys' conclusions, but it is impossible not to admire the scale of their work. Their sources are impressive. The Company, which made a substantial grant to the Business History Foundation, opened its voluminous records to the researchers without restriction. The records of other Standard Oil affiliates were also used, as well as the correspondence of many Standard Oil executives, state and federal documents, and a wide range of other contemporary materials and secondary works. The value of the book is enhanced by a good index and the inclusion of a large number of interesting and helpful maps and illustrations.

DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, JR.

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

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Proposals for Changes in the United Nations. By Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1955.—xiv, 537 pp. $5.00.

The action taken recently by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, in favor of holding a general conference to review the UN Charter "at an appropriate date" in the near future, gives this important volume a special timeliness. For the volume provides an admirably balanced analysis of the principal proposals put forward by governments and private groups during the past decade for alterations in the UN system, discusses their probable impact on the system, and suggests some of their implications for American policy. The two collaborating authors, both scholars in their own right, were, at the time the study was prepared, chief of staff and consultant, respectively, for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and as such were primarily responsible for the series of valuable staff papers issued by its Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter. Much of the analysis presented in the volume under review was adapted from these papers.

After briefly summarizing available methods for effecting changes in the United Nations and the current movement for Charter revision, the authors deal successively with proposals relating to the general character of the organization, the maintenance of peace and security, the promotion of the general welfare, non-self-governing territories and the trusteeship system, and organizational structure, administration and budget. In a concluding section the arguments for and against the advisability of holding a review conference are shrewdly weighed in terms of the radically different world political climate that has emerged since the San Francisco Conference of 1945.

From the over-all analysis it appears that proposals for changing the UN tend to fall into four distinct categories: (1) those that would provide the organization with greater power and authority by transforming it into a supranational institution; (2) those designed to improve its operations without formal amendment of the Charter; (3) those intended to reduce its authority and scope, especially as to enforcement action and the impact of its programs in the economic and human rights field; and (4) those that would alter its composition by forcing the expulsion or withdrawal of certain member states. While admitting that a strong theoretical case can be made for some of the "supranationalistic" proposals—most of which have emanated from various "world government" groups—the authors realistically observe that there is little or no chance of their acceptability by the major Powers (including this country)

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within the foreseeable future. Indeed, even the modest changes suggested in the recent Report of the Senate Subcommittee for eliminating the veto from peaceful settlement procedures and the admission of UN members bid fair to encounter tough Soviet opposition. Nor is Secretary Dulles' ingenious proposal for a "double majority" voting system in the General Assembly, combining state equality and weighted representation, likely to win favor from many of the smaller states.

On the other hand, as the volume rightly stresses, there are great potentialities for further development of the UN system within its present constitutional framework. The Charter is a remarkably flexible instrument and by liberally interpreting it the various UN organs have already been able to initiate much constructive activity, particularly in the domain of technical assistance for economic development. Further, it has been possible to develop an interlocking network of regional collective defense pacts under Article 51 of the Charter, thus compensating in part for the paralysis of the veto-bound Security Council as an enforcement agency.

Even with respect to the armaments problem, the authors note, "the United Nations is . . . a comparatively free agent . . . in the sense that it can submit proposals to Members for any system of regulating armaments that it deems appropriate for consideration" (p. 182). Placing specific provisions in the Charter relevant to atomic energy, even if it were politically feasible to do so, would not ensure an effective international control of thermonuclear weapons without a much more drastic reduction of tension between East and West than has yet taken place. The record of the United Nations on arms regulation may be disappointing but it is not the Charter that has "prevented progress".

All in all, the volume under review takes a moderately hopeful view of the future of the UN system. Some of its political tendencies, such as the excessive emphasis on formal voting and an unwise resort to "public diplomacy" for the treatment of certain types of controversial issues, may be regrettable, but its solid accomplishments over the past decade have contributed measurably to the building of a world-community approach to a variety of complex problems. Now, with the breaking of the log-jam over the admission of new members, there are signs that the UN may be entering a new phase of wider activity—within the context of "nuclear stalemate".

WALTER R. SHARP

YALE UNIVERSITY

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This Is Our World. By Louis Fischer. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956.—xvi, 522 pp. $5.00.

This is an account of the post-war travels and observations of a highly experienced journalist who is widely informed and rather strongly opinionated. As a very readable and reasonably valid introduction to the contemporary scene, the book has much to commend it to the general reader. But it is in no sense directed toward an expert audience; one doubts that professional students of international affairs will find much in it that is valuable to them.

An exception may be Fischer's story of his own rôle as go-between in top-level Philippine political negotiations which enabled Magsaysay to secure the presidential nomination of the Nationalist party. Fischer's report is tantalizingly sketchy, but it does constitute fairly concrete evidence of direct secret (private?) American intervention on Magsaysay's behalf a full year before the 1953 election.

Except for this brief Philippine episode, however, Fischer presents himself as an observer rather than as a participant, and his observations, though usually shrewd, are rarely original. He traveled back and forth in non-Soviet Europe and Asia during the period after World War II, but did not get into the USSR (where he had spent many years previously) or to the Chinese mainland. He barely touched the Arab world and made only one journey to Southeast Asia and Japan, but in West Europe, Yugoslavia, Israel and India his visits were frequent enough and his contacts extensive enough to have provided the basis for a first-rate foreign correspondent's book. Unfortunately Fischer spread himself thin in writing this one. He tries to cover most of Eurasia since 1945, and thus fails to do real justice to any part of it. His technique resembles John Gunther's, but without Gunther's concentration of attention and massing of information. India is the subject which interests Fischer most, and he shows understanding of the complexities of her social problems; but even then he does not choose to analyze them deeply, preferring to give what seems disproportionate space to repeated jabs at Prime Minister Nehru and at the very existence of the Moslem state of Pakistan.

Fischer's devotion to Mahatma Gandhi is well known; the book is dedicated "to the Gandhians of all countries". But this again is a philosophy which Fischer does not here undertake to systematize fully, either as it might be applied to the current problems of India herself or to those of other countries. Rather, he approaches issues with a vaguely defined progressive spirit which warms, for example, to Maysaysay and U Nu and Milovan Djilas, finds much to admire in the mixed economy of Attlee's England and Eisenhower's America, and idealizes the stillborn EDC. It is difficult to reconcile these strong value preferences (and a

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recurrent emphasis on revolutionary forces) with Fischer's occasional observations concerning the nation-state system, which call to mind an old power-politics model where mere self-centered state units interact. For the most part, however, he is more preoccupied with the desirability of certain internal changes in the various countries; indeed his strong personal preferences sometimes lead him to excessively broad and unsupported assertions. He rarely bothers to identify the sources of his information and is almost always dogmatic in his presentation. Fortunately his breadth of first-hand experience saves him from abusing the reader's confidence often.

One instance in which he does do so, in the opinion of this reader, is in the emphasis he puts on the reality of strong conflict between Soviet Russia and Red China. He goes so far as to imply that there are practically no binding ties between the two countries except mutual fear of America and Japan. This is not a field in which Fischer possesses special competence; one wishes that he had at least argued his views with more careful weighing and citation of the scant available evidence.

The inadequacy, of course, again relates partly to the audience to which this book is designed to appeal. Nonspecialists in international relations may yet find it a helpful stimulus to intelligent concern with world politics.

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Dictators Face to Face. By DINO ALFIERI. Translated by David Moore. New York, New York University Press, 1955.—x, 307 pp. $4.95.

The Rebuilding of Italy: Politics and Economics, 1945–1955. By MURIEL GRINDROD. London and New York, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956.—vii, 269 pp. $4.00.

The observation has been made that, in view of the exiguity of her resources and of the demands made upon these by the numbers of her people, Italy has no right to exist. For all that there is not a little misery in Italy, this is belied by the facts. Nevertheless, the limitations of Italy's basic resources, hence of her power, surround the problem of existence with considerable difficulty. Be it in the management of her domestic life or in that of her relations with others, a high premium is always placed on the art of accommodation, and the allowable margin of error remains small.

Because of these fundamental limitations, the First World War produced

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unusual stresses in Italy which soon surrendered herself to the experiment of Fascism. Viewed as a whole in retrospect, Fascism was an experiment in adaptation to circumstances, an attempt to find a solution to problems for which the older categories seemed to supply no satisfactory answer. The desirability of a balance of power in Europe has always been clearly perceived by the directors of Italian policy; it was therefore only natural that Italy—any Italy—should be sympathetic to the restoration of Germany to a position of parity among the European Powers. But the peculiar nature of Fascism helped Italy become embroiled in the German connection to an unwise degree. By the time war broke out in Europe again, the Axis had long ceased to be an association of equals; when Alfieri took charge of the Berlin Embassy, in May 1940, the die had already been cast in favor of Italy's intervention.

His task was a thankless one, for "the Axis never functioned or . . . if it functioned it did so only at the expense of Italy" (p. 99). He remained in his post until the removal of Mussolini, and his book is the record of an unhappy time: the insistence on the right to an equal position could not but sound hollow, a contrived legalistic case,[1] to the Germans who treated their ostensible ally in scantly less cavalier fashion than their conquered foes. Alfieri does not contribute essentially new information, but his testimony, even allowing for its apologetic aspects, remains of value owing to his position. Despite his loyalty to Mussolini he could not help becoming increasingly disillusioned at the latter's inability to stand up to Hitler's tirades and rantings in the course of their successive meetings. The picture of a passive Duce, culminating in the dramatic meeting of the Grand Council of July 24, 1943, long familiar, is here confirmed; of that meeting an interesting, though very urbane, account is given.

Personality sketches enhance the interest of Alfieri's book. Ribbentrop's crude and arrogant obtuseness was more offensive than the urbane levity of Ciano, but the latter was of little service to Italy; Alfieri's reports received little attention in Rome. Even when the Italian situation had become clearly desperate, Mussolini could not find the courage to do that which he alone could have done—speak to Hitler in unmistakable language. It was appropriate that he should leave the stage without fanfare, as the ineffective shadow that he had become.

The legacy of these mistakes was heavy. Instead of withdrawing from the war, as Alfieri and many others contended was the only possible solution, for more than two years Italy was one of its battlegrounds. She

[1] One can only express astonishment at Alfieri's argument based on the value of the contribution of Italian physicists, among them Enrico Fermi, for some years resident in the United States (see p. 209).

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was, in 1945, truly exhausted and ruined, but this gives all the more point to the tale of her recovery with which Miss Grindrod's book is concerned.

Considering her total impotence, Italy's foreign policy has been remarkably successful. In this respect, Sforza and de Gasperi were essentially sane and intelligent, recognizing that Italy's best interest lay in the reconstruction and integration of Europe as a whole rather than in the possible exploitation of differences. For all that was said about the rôle of Fascism in saving Italy from the danger of communism, that danger was far greater after the Second World War than after the First; as in France, it was a delicate operation to govern, first with, then without and even against, the Communists after 1945. The task, even if a largely negative one, was performed with skill, and in the Italian case was rendered more difficult by the large place that the issue of the fate of Trieste assumed. The changing views of the Western Powers toward Tito's Yugoslavia did not make matters easier where it came to maintaining the allegiance of Italy to the Western combination.

To be sure, the successful reintegration of Italy was in large measure due to the turn of events after the war, dominated by the contest between the Soviet Union and the United States. Like others, Italy was the beneficiary of American largesse that derived from combined motives of humanity and enlightened self-interest. But if American assistance played a vital rôle in the recovery of Italy, credit goes equally to the Italian effort. Considering the havoc of war superimposed on the basic limitations of the Italian economy, that recovery may truly be called remarkable. Miss Grindrod's book gives an excellent analysis of the tangled record of the operation of politics as well as of the course of the economic reconstruction. The manner in which inflation was brought and held under control is not the least of Italy's accomplishments.

Nevertheless, the basic handicap remains of very limited resources on which a growing population puts pressures of an explosive nature. This condition is in the end more fundamental than the glaring contrast between wealth and poverty, the main significance of which derives from political and psychological implications. The same may be said of the problem of land reform and of that of the South in general. Social reform may alleviate these political and psychological pressures, but the possibilities of drastic alteration remain inevitably limited. This is a useful, amply documented, and well-done interim report on the ten-year record of an Italy that still exists and functions not without success.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

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The Republic of Indonesia. By Dorothy Woodman. New York, Philosophical Library, 1955.—ix, 444 pp. $6.00.

Before World War II practically nothing appeared in English on the countries of Southeast Asia. Now it is quite otherwise. The war and subsequent events have brought this region into the main currents of world politics, and much is being written on it. The book under review is a welcome addition to this recent literature. It deals with the history, economics and politics of the largest country of the region.

This book can be very helpful to the general reader in understanding the interesting, if sometimes baffling, developments in this tropical, insular country, provided he keeps certain things in mind. The first is that the author looks upon the Indonesian scene largely through the eyes of Indonesian nationalists. She espoused their cause and gave them such aid as she could in London. When she visited Indonesia in 1951 she was gratefully extended every courtesy by the Indonesian government. There was nothing wrong with this, but it does color her interpretation, especially of the pre-revolutionary period. Secondly, Miss Woodman is a British socialist, apparently of the Bevanite wing of the Labor party. This attitude is most marked in her discussion of foreign policy. While anti-Communist she is also strongly anti-American. She ascribes the final break-up of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union to the decision of the Dutch to join N.A.T.O. "By becoming a strategic and an economic outpost on President Eisenhower's world map of the American century, they became committed in the 'cold war'." (The reviewer is at the moment interested only in indicating the bias and not in the historical inaccuracies which render the statement absurd. President Eisenhower was not the creator of N.A.T.O. and the Netherlands was already a member of the North Atlantic defense alliance at the time the Netherlands-Indonesian Union was formed.) Thirdly, the reader must keep in mind the fact that Miss Woodman wrote her book before Indonesia held its first general parliamentary election (late in 1955).

Miss Woodman states that the object of her visit to Indonesia was to ascertain how far the Republic had moved toward the achievement of the aim described on its national insignia: Unity in Diversity. In view of its geography, ethnography and history, this is probably the most important question that can be asked about Indonesia, although at the time of the author's visit the Republican government had had little time to move in any direction. While Miss Woodman frequently wanders far from this main quest, she does not forget it, and in spite of her very evident sympathies, examines the trends critically. She is critical of the flirtation carried on between the Nationalist and Communist parties, it

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having become a question "of who uses whom", but each wanted to use the other as an ally against the moderate Masjumi (Moslem) party. She recognizes the dangers of the Darul Islamists, who wish to set up a theocratic, Islamic state, and resort to terrorism to achieve their ends. She notes also that the political parties use anti-Netherlandism as an alibi for a sounder economic policy of their own, and she is concerned about Communist control of large and powerful labor unions. Miss Woodman concludes that the conflict between Islam and Marxism for control of the nationalist movement remains unresolved, but that the ultimate victory will rest with neither group. The majority of the people, she believes, want neither a communist nor a Moslem state, but a government which will settle some of the country's outstanding problems. Miss Woodman will not find too much comfort in the 1955 election returns, which registered a marked swing to the left and to the right, with the moderate parties in the decline.

Miss Woodman cites decentralization of the government as the most urgent problem, if diversity in unity is to be maintained. She is convinced that the problem of internal security is in part the result of overcentralization, though she justifies the shift from the federal to the unitary state in 1950, almost immediately after independence.

This is an interesting book, chiefly because the author is not afraid to state her views and express judgments. The author attempts too much and occasionally there are odd errors, such as the statement (p. 53) that Snouck Hurgronje wrote his famous Atjeh report immediately after he visited Mecca and based it on what he had learned there. The reviewer felt flattered at the frequent references in the first part of the book to his work on the Dutch East Indies, but he was surprised to be called a Dutch historian.

AMRY VANDENBOSCH

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

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BOOK NOTES

The study of opinions has been one of the most fruitful developments in social science during the last twenty-five years. Like many innovations in social science, however, it has tended to become separated from its roots in systematic theory and to become the unintended victim of its special methodologies and techniques. Now an excellent book—*Opinions and Personality* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, London, Chapman & Hall Limited, 1956; ix, 294 pp. $6.00) by M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White—has sought to expose and eliminate these shortcomings. One purpose of the authors and their fourteen collaborators at the Harvard Psychological Clinic was to develop a "strategy of discovery" by which the study of opinion could be once again integrated with its sources in systematic psychological and sociological theory. Another was to employ the same strategy to develop new methods of interview and measurement that would make "the study of attitudes [that is, opinions] one phase of the study of complex behavior generally" (p. 1). Toward these two ends, each of ten adult men was studied intensively during fifteen weekly, two-hour sessions by twenty-eight different procedures, some of them developed especially for this research. The topic was their opinions about Russia. (The study was carried out in 1947, and incidentally shows a bright light on how much American views on Russia have changed during the past ten years.) In Chapter Three, the authors state their assumptions about personality, analyze the different functions an opinion can play in a personality system operating in a social environment, and list the categories by which a functioning opinion is to be characterized. These assumptions, functions and categories form the frame of reference within which the opinions about Russia of each of the ten men are described. The personalities and opinions of three of the men are recounted in detailed case histories; this part of the book alone fills one hundred and twenty pages. The other seven are described in about half this amount of space. The general findings about the relations between opinions and personalities are stated on the basis of a summary of the specific relations that have been discovered in the ten cases. Among the most interesting general findings are the following: "we have been impelled to treat the function of an opinion as a resultant or compromise between reality demands, social demands, and inner psychological demands. The three are inseparable" (p. 275); "there is no

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rigid or one-to-one relationship between the opinions a person develops and the underlying needs or dynamics of his personality" (p. 278); and, "opinions serve several functions for their holder . . ." (p. 278). Finally, in their all-too-brief "postscript", the authors state the implications of their research for the study of personality and for the study of opinion. Their statements about the relationship between the overt and covert aspects of personality, about interview methods, and about techniques of measurement are especially valuable. This is a book to be read with profit by all social scientists concerned with problems of personality and opinion.—BERNARD BARBER, Barnard College.

Students of American political history are, Lee Benson recently declared, "called upon to answer the 'why' of American presidential elections without knowing the 'what' and the 'who.'" It is incredible but true that attempts have been made to explain such problems as the support given to Andrew Jackson or the defeat of Blaine in 1884 by writers who have never examined the actual election statistics. In the past, historians could plead that election returns were scattered and not very reliable, but with the publication of W. Dean Burnham's *Presidential Ballots, 1836–1892* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955; xix, 956 pp. $10.00), such an excuse can no longer be tolerated. Mr. Burnham has compiled tables showing the votes cast for each presidential candidate in every county of every state from 1836 through 1892. Taken together with Edgar E. Robinson's *The Presidential Vote, 1896 to 1932*, Mr. Burnham's book gives us a detailed picture of nearly a century of election behavior. Now a student can, in a matter of minutes, trace—or at least find data to speculate upon—geographical, economic, ethnic, and other influences upon American presidential elections. There are few criticisms to make of Mr. Burnham's important work, which has obviously taken much time and labor to prepare. Generally Mr. Burnham has been able to use the most authentic election returns, frequently either published or unpublished official tabulations, though he surprisingly relies upon *Whig Almanac* figures for Kentucky, for which a definitive compilation of returns was recently published. His tabulations are given by counties, which, at least in urban areas, are such large and complex units as to be almost useless in election analyses. It would be helpful to have ward or precinct breakdowns for at least some important cities. But these are minor defects in a most important book which should become the constant companion of every student of American political history.—DAVID DONALD, Columbia University.

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The Nonpartisan League, one of the most significant episodes in the history of American agricultural reform, has long needed a full-length scholarly study, and this need has been supplied by Robert L. Morlan in his *Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan League, 1915–1922* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1955; 408 pp. $5.75). Mr. Morlan's account of the Nonpartisan League is a lengthy, sympathetic, judicious, and heavily documented work in which both the political and the economic problems and achievements of the organization are retold in somewhat more detail than most readers will care to struggle with. He tells how the North Dakota farmers rose up during the era of the First World War against the railroad interests and merchants who fattened on them, and obtained a considerable measure of relief through state legislation. The Nonpartisan League was an extremely controversial organization, and Mr. Morlan has picked his way judiciously, if soporifically, through the intricacies of his record. His account of its affairs is complete on the business and political side; the political culture out of which the movement arose is left somewhat vague, though we get revealing glimpses of the League's remarkable organizer, A. C. Townley, of some of his early lieutenants, and of such men as Lynn Frazier and William Langer.—Richard Hofstadter, Columbia University.

A recent book by John R. Williams, *The Conservative Party of Canada: 1920–1949* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1956; xiii, 242 pp. $6.00), is an important contribution to the literature on political parties in Canada, a field which up to quite recently has been neglected even by Canadian political scientists. This is a study of a party in decline, as the Conservatives were in office for only one term of five years during the whole period from 1921 onward. One of the questions which the author attempts to answer in this book is the cause of this decline. After an excellent introductory chapter on the historical background of the party up to 1920, Professor Williams discusses the rôle of party leaders, and the nature and function of national party conventions. He also devotes considerable attention to party organization, both inside and outside of Parliament. There is an interesting chapter on the cost of election campaigns, and the sources of campaign funds. He analyzes the dominant issues, as well as the distribution of seats and popular vote, in all elections held during the period under study. The author's conclusion is that the decline in strength of the Conservative party is largely due to the fact that the party has lost a good deal of its appeal to the younger voters, as well as to farmers, workers and the French Canadians. He also attributes the party's failure to win popular support to the lack of

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bold and imaginative leadership stating that for the most part, Conservative leaders from 1920 to 1949 "present a sad spectacle of well-intentioned men lacking the ability to reconcile many different interests, as is necessary in Canada with its varied racial, sectional, language, and religious groups" (p. 42). In spite of all this, he is not yet ready to write off the Conservative party as a force in Canadian politics, pointing out, quite correctly, that a party which was successful in polling almost a third of the popular vote in the election of 1949 is still far from being dead. Professor Williams' book in many respects provides a good illustration of how the study of a political party should be undertaken. It covers every phase of party activities, and is filled with detailed data which have not been available up to the present time. The author has not been satisfied with a study of newspaper files, party literature, constitutions, memoirs and other documents, but has also spent a considerable amount of time interviewing politicians, attending party conventions, and observing on the scene the election campaign of 1949. Although the book is primarily a study of the Conservative party, one of its merits is that its author also devotes considerable attention to the policies and practices of other parties for purposes of comparison. This is a well-written and carefully documented study, with helpful charts and tables, and is essential reading for anyone who wants to gain some insight into the nature and functioning of political parties in Canada.—HERBERT F. QUINN, Sir George Williams College, Montreal, Canada.

Documents on Germany Under Occupation, 1945–1954, selected and edited by Beate Ruhm von Oppen (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto, 1955; xxvii, 660 pp. $10.10; 63*s*.), is an admirably intelligent and comprehensive selection of documents, dealing, for the first time in an English work, with all four zones of occupied Germany. In his Preface, Alan Bullock states the principles of selection which governed this collection: that the documents should illustrate the implementation of policies rather than their formulation at international conferences, that material easily available elsewhere should be subordinated to equally important but more scattered material, and that important documents should be reproduced at length rather than extracts from a greater number of documents. The editor selected the documents from a variety of sources, including international agreements, press releases and parliamentary debates, laws and directives of the Allied Control Council, orders of the military and political authorities in the individual zones, and, particularly in the case of the Soviet zone, party

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pronouncements. The collection, ordered chronologically, provides an excellent guide to the tangled story of Germany's somewhat haphazard evolution from a defeated to a divided nation and is particularly valuable for its informed and imaginative coverage of the Soviet zone. All foreign documents, save those originally in French, appear in English translation, and those from the Soviet zone manage to preserve some of the flavor of the odious Stalinist lingo of the East Germans. The book has neither explanatory notes nor an introduction which would recall to the general reader some of the principal developments of the period. For the specialist, however, this collection will prove to be an invaluable reference work, a model not only for its contents but for its clear page and handsome production.—Fritz Stern, Columbia University.

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THOMAS J. WATSON

The officers of the Academy of Political Science record with deep sorrow the death of Thomas J. Watson on June 19, 1956, at his summer home in New Canaan, Connecticut. For more than thirty-five years he was an interested and interesting member of the Academy, serving it as Director and Vice President since 1939. Many members cherish the memory of his genial presence at the annual and semi-annual meetings; and the Board of Directors remembers well his wise counsel and generous assistance in determining Academy policies.

A native of New York State, Mr. Watson received his formal schooling at Addison (N. Y.) Academy and Elmira School of Commerce. For fifteen years he was associated with the National Cash Register Company where he demonstrated the originality, resourcefulness and administrative ability which characterized his leadership in International Business Machines Corporation. From 1914 to 1949 he was president of IBM, becoming Chairman of the Board in the latter year. It was a period of remarkable growth and rapidly expanding influence for IBM; and Mr. Watson was the inspiring formulator of policy.

Though his business responsibilities took much of his time, they also opened many new doors of opportunity for unselfish public service. Somehow he managed to combine his determination to promote international trade with his desire to advance the cause of international understanding and world peace. In the three decades between the First and the Second World War he was active in the work of the Council for Inter-American Cooperation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Foreign Policy Association and the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a firm believer in what President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University had called "the international mind". Honors came to him from the governments of a score of nations in Europe, Asia and Latin America; and he wore his decorations with dignity and humility.

Despite the world-wide range of his interests he seldom failed to respond to the needs of his own country, his city, his neighborhood. The list of philanthropic organizations, in which he bore a hand, is long and

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important. Over the years he gave generously of his energy to the Roosevelt Hospital, the New York University-Bellevue Medical Center, the Salvation Army, the Bureau of Service for the Blind, and the Federation of Protestant Welfare Agencies.

The problems of higher education caught his imagination and held it firmly, especially during the last quarter century of his life. At Lafayette College, the University of Buffalo, Bryant College and as trustee of Columbia University, he translated into deeds his belief in the ability of American education to shape the future of the American people wisely and well.

He was convinced, and he wished to convince others, that the Academy of Political Science, as a forum for the full and fair discussion of controversial subjects, was a vital agency in the great educational processes of a free society.

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